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Introduction 
In 1976 the European economy suffered, to differing degrees among the Member 
States, from persisting and in some cases worsening inflation, unemployment, 
monetary disturbances and balance-of-payments disequilibria. 
In the last few years the acquisition of Europe's supplies of energy have undergone 
a major upheaval. A general dialogue has begun between countries rich in technol-
ogy to establish a new and more equitable economic order. Willingly or unwillingly, 
Europe is in the throes of a long-term process of structural transformation and 
must somehow restore some kind of equilibrium within a new international divi-
sion of labour. 
In their attempts to solve the most pressing problems, above all that of reconciling 
stability with full employment, the Community institutions, the Governments of 
the Member States, business and the trade unions must remember the need for 
Europe to keep its frontiers open when planning for the future. The emerging 
industrial structures and new technologies must therefore be competitive. The 
preservation of the unity of the common market is and remains the basis for all 
new activities in the field of competition. The illusion that economic and social 
problems can be solved either by Community or national protectionism, jeopard-
izing the unity of the common market, cannot. be maintained. 
Competition policy is one of the fundamental means for preserving the unity of 
the market. Its aim is to ensure that business operates along competitive lines, 
while protecting the consumer by making goods and services available on the 
most favourable terms possible. It therefore endeavours to cut monopoly profits, 
to ensure that the economy remains adaptable to circumstances and to stimulate 
innovation. 
In Community terms competition policy has to play an ancillary role to other 
policies, essentially to preserve or restore conditions in which competition can 
flourish. The fourth medium-term economic policy programme, for example, calls 
for 'an active competition policy' which can 'improve the effectiveness of the 
instruments of overall demand management'. Although competition cannot take 
the place of economic or social policy, it is nevertheless essential to the preserva-
tion of the flexibility which the economy must have if it is to remain adaptable. 
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The principle of competition, so basic to the common market, is therefore by no 
means rigid or dogmatic. It should not be regarded as the negation of a structural 
planning policy, as long as such a policy takes the unity of the common market as 
a basis and aims not to protect industries ill-equipped, to meet competition, but 
to develop competitive acitivities. 
The Commission' consequently pays special attention to ensuring that its policies 
in specific areas do not render competition inoperative. The unity of the market 
and the structural changes which are needed if competitive business is to be 
developed must not be jeopardized by agreements entered into between private 
undertakings, and tolerated or even encouraged by the authorities. 
Nevertheless, developments in competition policy go hand in hand with develop-
ments in other policies. 1;bis means that, in a multiplicity of economic situations, 
competition policy can fu~ both its role of establishi,ng a competitive environment 
and of supporting other measures.' ' 
In the field of transport, for instance, the Commission has continued its work on 
the preparation of regulations applying the rules of competition to shipping and 
aviation. In conjullction with industrial policy, competition policy has continued 
its endeavours to promote cross-frontier cooperation between Community firms, 
particularly small- and medium-sized firms. They will, thus be at less of a dis-
advantage against large enterprises, for which cooperation with other enterprises, 
in internal and external growth, and the development and management of new 
technology poses less serious problems. 
. i 
In relation to State aids $e role of competition policy has been not only to ensure 
that States take action oflIy where there is a real p.eed, but also to give added 
efficacy to the social and regional policies of the Community countries. The Com-
mission's preference has been firmly in favour of aids which will solve long-term 
social problems, as against measures which do no more than preserve the status 
quo and put off decisions which will inevitably have to be taken. 
Similarly, in dealing with regional aids, the Commission's attention has been 
directed primarily to the. interests of the poorest regions, which are particularly 
vulnerable to overbidding for new investment between regions and Member States. 
The Commission has, therefore, given priority to ithe technical tasks necessary 
for the full application 'of the principles of coordination adopted in 1975, in 
or:der to submit all regional aids granted by Member States to Community disci-
pline. At the same time it has continued the systematic examination of national 
schemes of regional aid, its overall approach facilitating a Community-oriented 
analysis. ' 
The same desire for consistency has led the Commission to specify the rules to 
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be complied with by Member States when they are involved in the direct or in-
direct confrontation between firms in competition through public corporations 
over which they exercise management or control. The Commission is in this respect 
pursuing a request made by the European Parliament for the equal application of 
the rules of competition to all firms with due respect for the neutral approach of 
the Treaty to public and private ownership of companies and for the constraints 
imposed by the special responsibilities frequently assigned to undertakings. 
In the direct application of the rules of competition to enterprises, the Commission 
made nine formal decisions under Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, and 
twenty-eight under Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty. As the Commission's 
practice becomes more definitive and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in 
references for interpretation grows, it increasingly suffices to draw a firm's attention 
to actual or possible infringements of the rules of competition for the offending 
practice to be voluntarily terminated. In the past year some 380 cases were dealt 
with in this way. In cases of particular importance, either because of the points 
of law which were raised or because of the economic power of the firms involved, 
the Commission issued press releases. It is much to be regretted that the Com-
mission still has to issue decisions imposing prohibitions and fines in respect of 
export bans, for the position on such practices is abundantly clear from a long 
line of decisions. 
The Commission has given priority to cases involving the conduct of firms in 
industries whose structure is such that any lessening of competitive pressures is 
likely to harm the consumers' interest. Such is the case where firms acquire market 
power through mergers, specialization, technological advance or by any other 
means. The Commission has also pursued its endeavours to apply Article 86 more 
systematically to enterprises in a dominant position and prohibited one such 
enterprise from operating an infringing system of rebates. 
As regards prices charged by firms, the Commission has clarified its attitude to 
price information agreements. It has also begun considering the compatibility of 
spatial pricing systems with the rules of competition. 
The fact that prices for a certain number of goods and services. continue to 
vary sharply from one Member State to another is a continuing cause for concern. 
The differences may partly be explained by objective factors such as price control, 
prices imposed by the authorities, currency fluctuations and distribution charac-
teristics. But in other cases they are the result of anticompetitive collusion or 
abuse of a dominant position. The Commission is of the opinion that it is abnormal 
in a market, supposedly a single entity, for major differences between prices for 
identical goods or services to persist over a lengthy period. The various national 
authorities should, therefore, be made aware of this phenomenon and its scale 
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gradually reduced. For its part, the Commission attaches great importance to 
analysing the causes of sucJt differences and has extended its programme of studies 
on concentration, particul~rly to ascertain the relationship, if any, between the 
degree of concentration in~ a given industry and the l~vel of prices charged. 
, 
In the steel industry the Commission has endeavoured to help firms to overcome 
the critical situation which has confronted them since 1975. But the Commis-
sion's action cannot be taken as a commitment to defend or protect the industry, 
either within the common market or as against the outside world, from the 
structural changes necessary for the future. The Community steel industry must 
remain competitive and will have to accept some degree of structural change. 
Consequently, the Commission has pursued its policy of promoting groupings of 
firms, and rationalization .and specialization arrangements, which might help to 
achieve more competitive structures. It authorized a series of rationalization agree-
ments combining a large ~umber of German and Luxembourg steel firms. Several 
mergers were also authori~ed, some on a very large ~ale. 
Of the outstanding questions which still remain to be settled under Article 85 of 
the EEC Treaty, the problems arising from joint ventures represented a sub-
stantial proportion in the past year. This is an area where a general approach is 
hardly possible; case-by-case scrutiny is the only satisfactory means of giving due 
consideration to the diversity of economic situations which may arise. 
As regards industrial and commercial property rights, on the other hand, the 
Commission, with the exp~rience of several individual decisions behind it, is pre-
paring a draft regulation ~or a block exemption of certain patent licensing agree-
ments. The regulation will reflect, among other things, the interest of small- and 
medium-sized firms in promoting the transfer of technology. The Commission has 
also prepared a draft notice to publicize its attitude to subcontracts in industry. 
Such agreements frequentiy provide a link between large firms which have work 
done outside the concern-frequently transferring knowhow for the purpose-and 
small- and medium-sized ~rms. Finally, the Commission has begun work on a re-
vision of the Notice of 1970 on Agreements of Minor Importance. 
All of these documents take special account of the interests of smalI- and medium-
sized firms. The Commission's aim is not only an in~rease in the certainty of the 
law, but also to reduce the formalities which may 'operate as a barrier to this 
category of enterprises. The Commission also wishes· to have a precise and effec-
tive body of Community mles of competition adequately reflecting current com-
petitive structures. : 
It is all the more regrettable that the Council's work on the proposed merger-
control regulation is proceeding so slowly. The Commission's proposal has been 
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before the Council since July 1973 and the broadly favourable opinions of Parlia-
ment and the Economic and Social Committee were published in February 1974. 
It is important that the Community should have the instruments it needs to pre-
serve a competitive structure in the .common market for the future. National 
merger-control rules, be they already in force or still at the drafting stage, are not 
enough: the Community must set itself a common objective and common rules to 
deal with mergers on a European scale. 
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Chapter I 
Main developments in Community policy 
§ 1 - New regulations and interpretation of existing regulations 
1. Patent licensing agreements 
1. In the First Report on Competition Policy the Commission referred1 to the 
possibility of a block exemption for patent licensing agreements under Regulation 
No 19/65/EEC.2 Parliament has suggested this on a number of occasions,3 and 
Community industry has regularly expressed interest in the idea. 
2. In December 1974 the Commission and government experts from the Member 
States discussed the main problems arising from the application of the competition 
rules to patent licences.' At the conference of the Member States to prepare for 
the signing of the Convention for the European Patent for the Common Marketll 
the Commission stated that no later than the date of entry into force of the Con-
vention it would propose a regulation granting block exemption for patent licensing 
agreements. In the memorandum annexed to the address on the programme for 
1976 the Commission stated that a draft would be presented to the Member States 
before the end of the year.6 
3. The draft regulation on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to 
certain categories of patent licensing agreements has since been referred to the 
Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions, which first 
discussed it at a meeting on 8 and 9 December 1976. Because the matter is so 
1 Point 80. 
2 Council Regulation No 19/65/EEC of 2 March 1965 on the application of Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices: OJ 36 of 6.3.1965. 
3 Resolution on the First Report on Competition Policy, paragraph 6: OJ C 14 of 27.3.1973' Resolu-
tion on the Second Report on Competition Policy, paragraph 6: OJ C 11 of 7.2.1974; R~olution 
on the Third Report on Competition Policy, paragraph 6: OJ C 140 of 13.11.1974; Resolution on 
the Fifth Report on Competition Policy, paragraph 8: OJ C 238 of 11.10.1976. 
4 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 21. 
5 OJ L 17 of 26.1.1976. 
6 Ninth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities, 1975, p. XLVI. 
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complex and there are so many questions to consider, consultations will continue 
early in 1977. 
4. The draft is inspired by the principles emerging from Commission decisions 
taken from 1972 onwards in a series of individual cases. 1 It assumes that Article 
85(1) of the Treaty applies to licences granting an exclusive territory for the ma-
nufacture and sale of patented goods. Exclusive manufacturing licences qualify for 
exemption provided the licensed territory is not too large. Exclusive sales licences 
qualify for exemption during a limited period where small- and medium-sized 
firms are concerned; Parliament was insistent on the need for this. As required 
by Article 1(2)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 19/65/EEC, the draft lists the re-
strictions and clauses which do not qualify for exemption and the other conditions 
which must be fulfilled. 
The Commission stands by the views which it has already expressed2 on Article 43 
of the Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market. 
2. Subcontracts 
5. The Commission shares the concern of industrial circles and political au-
thorities in the Community that legal uncertainty as to the application of the rules 
on competition in the Treaties must not be allowed to stand in the way of the 
growing tendency for large firms in the modern economy to have certain work 
done for them by others, particularly as this can be highly advantageous to small-
and medium-sized firms. 
6. Accordingly it has submitted the broad lines of a notice on subcontracting 
agreements to the government experts of the Member States. The Commission 
envisages the establishment by means of the notice of guidelines which, though 
not exhaustive, will assist firms to understand the meaning of the Treaty provi-
sions, chiefly, Article 85(1) of the EEC and Article 65(1) of the ECSC Treaty, 
relating to subcontracting. Particular attention is paid to a number of clauses which 
are frequently found in subcontracts. 
1 Decision of9 June 1972 (Davidson Rubber): OJ L 143 of 23.6.1972; Second Report on Competi-
tion Policy, point 46. Decision of 9 June 1972 (Raymond/Nagoya): OJ L 143 of 23.6.1972; 
Second Report on Competition Policy, point 45. Decision of 18 July J975 (Kabelmetal/Luchaire): 
OJ L 222 of 22.8.1975; Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 66. Decision of 25 July 1975 
(Bronbemaling/Heidemaatschappij): OJ L 249 of 25.9.1975; Fifth Repon on Competition Policy, 
point 67. Decision of 2 December 1975 (AOIPjBeyrard): OJ L 6 of 13.1.1976; Fifth Report on 
Competition Policy, point 63. 
2 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 11. 
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7. The proposed notice will be a first attempt to clarify the legal status of sub-
contracts under the Treaty rules of competition. The basic problem is the compati-
bility with Article 85 of specific obligations imposed in subcontracts by reason of 
the prime contractor's interest in the performance of the order. Assessing these 
conditions therefore requires the specific nature of these contracts to be taken into 
account. Subcontracts differ from licensing agreements in that the knowhow, pro-
cesses or information protected by patent or otherwise, made available to the sub-
contractor by the prime contractor is provided for the sole purpose of enabling the 
subcontractor to meet the order. It therefore follows that restrictions on the sub-
contractor, which in a licensing agreement might infringe Article 85, should not 
be prohibited in a subcontract, provided the subcontracted goods incorporate a 
substantial portion of the prime contractor's knowhow. These considerations are 
chiefly relevant to clauses restricting the subcontractor from using the prime 
contractor's knowhow for his own purposes or imposing an obligation to deliver 
the products of its application to the prime contractor only. 
8, As regards other clauses commonly found in subcontracts, such as the 
obligation not to divulge knowhow to third parties, the use after the agreement has 
terminated of knowhow received by the subcontractor during the currency of the 
agreement and the use of inventions, patentable or not, made by the subcontractor 
during the course of the work, the Commission will follow similar considerations 
to those which have previously guided its scrutiny of patent and knowhow licensing 
agreements.1 
9. In view of the close link between this field and patent licensing, consultations 
on this notice will proceed in the same way as on the regulation mentioned above.2 
3. Amendment of Regulation No 67167 IEEe 
10. The Commission is proposing amendments to a number of Articles in Re-
gulation No 67/67 IEEC of 22 March 1967 on the application of Article 85(3) 
of the Treaty to certain categories of exclusive distribution agreements3 to bring 
them into line with developments in Community law, particularly as expounded 
by the Court of Justice . 
. 11. The first amendment concerns Article 1 (1) of the Regulation, which declares 
Article 85(1) of the Treaty to be inapplicable to exclusive supply and purchasing 
1 See, for instance, the Kabelmetal/Luchaire Decision: OJ L 222 of 22.8.1975; Fifth Report on 
Competition Policy, point 66. 
2 Point 3 of this Report. 
3 OJ 57 of 25.3.1967, amended by Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2591/72 of 8 December 1972: 
OJ L 276 of 9.12.1972. 
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commitments in relation to specified goods for resale. As regards the exclusive 
supply commitment, Article l(l)(a) states that the resale must be 'within a defined 
area of the common market'. The group exemption applies only where exclusive 
rights are given in respect of a specific territory. But Article 1(1)(b), dealing with 
exclusive purchasing commitments, does not make this point. The Commission feels 
that the latter provision must be amended to preclude any misunderstanding. 
Application of Regulation No 67/67 has also revealed the need for a tighter 
definition of what constitutes a 'defined area of the common market'. In practice 
more and more exclusive distribution agreements are being made to cover the 
entire territory of the Community with the exception of one small country. Although 
such agreements conform to the letter of the Regulation they are incompatible 
with its spirit. Both the wording of Article 1(1) and the recitals to the Regulation 
show that the aim of Community law was to give the benefit of the group exemp-
tion only to exclusive distribution agreements covering a part of the common 
market. The appraisal of agreements allotting all, or virtually all, of the territory 
of the Community to a dealer should therefore be a matter for individual decisions.1 
The definition of the allotted territory in Regulation No 67/67 should be consistent 
with the definition in the proposed group exemption for patent licensing agree-
ments. 2 In the interests of competition the exclusive territory allotted by the manu-
facturer to his dealer must not represent too large a proportion of the Community 
market as a whole. 
12. The question of changing the law as it now stands also arises in respect of 
Article 1(2) of the Regulation, under which the group exemption does not apply 
to agreements between undertakings from one Member State only and which 
concern the resale of goods within that Member State. Hitherto the Commission 
had interpreted this as excluding all purely 'national' exclusive distribution agree-
ments from the scope of Regulation No 67/67. It therefore regarded these agree-
ments, where they were within the prohibition of Article 85(1) as eligible for 
exemption under Article 85(3) only by means of an individual decision.3 The Court 
of Justice has taken a different view, holding that the group exemption is also 
available for contracts 'which, although concluded between two undertakings from 
one Member State, may nevertheless by way of exception significantly affect trade 
between Member States but which, in addition, satisfy all the conditions laid down 
in Article 1 of Regulation No 67/67'.4 The Commission is currently considering 
1 Duro-Dyne/Europair Decision: OJ L 29 of 3.2.1975; Fourth Report on Competition Policy, 
points 102 to 104. 
2 Point 4 of this Report. 
3 Goodyear Italiana/Euram Decision: OJ L 38 of 12.2.1975; Fourth Report on Competition Policy, 
point 98. 
4 CJEC 3.2.1976 (Fonderies Roubaix v Fonderies Roux), 63/75: [1976] ECR 1l1, 119 and 120; 
point 35 of this Report. 
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whether the change in the legal situation brought about by this judgment requires 
another amendment of the regulation. It may be that Article 1(2) will simply have 
to be deleted. 
13. Finally, it would seem opportune to redefine the limits of the group exemption 
more tightly. Above all, Article 3(a) requires amendment. The new wording must 
make it clear that contracts between competing producers which impose exclusive 
supply or purchase obligations in no case qualify for the group exemption, whether 
the obligations are unilateral or reciprocal being immaterial. 
14. Acting under Article 6(1)(a)of Regulation No 19/65/EECl the Commission 
for the first time consulted the Advisory Committee as to the proposed amendments 
on 10 December 1976. There will be further consultations in the first part of 1977. 
4. The proposed merger control regulation 
15. In 1976 the Council Working Party on Economic Questions held onb,- one 
meeting-on 23 March-to consider the Commission proposal transmitted to the 
Council on 20 July 1973,2 approved by Parliament on 12 February 19743 and by 
the Economic and Social Committee on 28 February 1974.4 It submitted an inter-
im report to the Permanent Representatives Committee on how work should pro-
ceed on the five following problems: the principle of premerger control and the 
legal basis of the proposed regulation, the field of application, the possibility of 
derogations from any prohibition, the notification of planned mergers and the 
decision-making procedure. The Committee was unable to come to any decision 
this year. 
5. Proposed regulations applying the rules of competition 
to sea and air transport 
16. The Commission has pursued its work on a regulation applying the rules of 
. competition to air transport. 5 Views and information have been exchanged with 
the Member States. 
Replying to a Commission questionnaire, the national authorities responsible have 
provided detailed. information on the following subjects: laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions governing competition in air transport and their applica-
tion by national authorities and courts; the number, field of activity, economic 
1 OJ 36 of 6.3.1965. 
2 OJ C 92 of 31.10.1973. 
3 OJ C 23 of 8.3.1974. 
4 OJ C 88 of 26.7.1974. 
5 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 14. 
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size and services of airlines established in the various Member States, including 
both scheduled and non-scheduled flights; relations between Member States and 
airlines and international organizations; multilateral and bilateral air transport 
agreements entered into by the Member States; agreements for technical and 
economic cooperation between airlines; and relations between airlines and transport 
auxiliaries. 
Analysis of replies to the questionnaire has again highlighted the main difficulty 
faced by the proposed regulation; for the special aspects of the air transport in-
dustry should be taken into account but not in such a way as to jeopardize the 
direct operation of Articles 85, 86 and 90 of the EEC Treaty. The Commission's 
solution is to adopt a regulation based inter alia on Article 87(2)(c) of the EEC 
Treaty. 
17. The preliminary draft of the regulation to be proposed by the Commission 
will contain both substantive and procedural rules. 
As regards the substantive rules, the preliminary draft will define the regulation's 
field of application and reaffirm the principles laid down by the EEC Treaty as 
regards competition. The draft provides for an exception in respect of agreements 
solely governing technical cooperation between airlines. The Commission is also 
considering what other forms of cooperation-route-pooling agreements and agree-
ments concerning fares and terms of carriage concluded" in lATA, for instance-
may be the subject of a block exemption and to what extent. 
Little difficulty is expected with procedural rules since in virtually every case the 
provisions of Regulation No 17/62 or of Regulation (EEC) NolO 17 / 68 can be 
taken over. The Commission will refer the preliminary draft to government experts 
from the Member States for new consultations in 1977. 
18. The Commission has also continued its investigation of conditions on the 
shipping markeU In view of the economic difficulties facing this industry, re-
qt..ring re-examination of policies, and of the uncertainty surrounding the United 
Nations Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, preparatory work on a regulation 
applying the rules of competition to sea transport will require more time. " 
6. The regulation of periods of limitation for proceedings 
and enforcement under the ECSC Treaty 
19. The Commission has adopted the draft of a general decision concerning 
periods of limitation for proceedings and the enforcement of sanctions under the 
1 Fifth Report on Competition Policy. point 15. 
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rules of the ECSC Treaty and has referred it to the Consultative Committee and 
to the Council. 
In thus initiating the legislative procedure of the ECSC Treaty the Commission 
is following up a suggestion made by the European Parliament. In its deliberations 
on Council Regulation (EEC) No 2988/741 Parliament called for the adoption 
of similar rules of limitation in other areas of Community law. . 
20. Rules concerning periods of limitation for proceedings and the enforcement 
of sanctions under the ECSC Treaty are necessary as a means of ensuring certainty 
in the law. A large number of provisions in the ECSC Treaty (Articles 47, 54, 
58, 59, 60 to 64, 65, 66, 68 and the first and second paragraphs of Article 95) 
empower the Commission to impose pecuniary sanctions in the forms of fines and 
periodic penalty payments on firms that contravene Community law. The sanctions 
are designed to enforce compliance with rules in a number of different areas, such 
as breaches of the rules governing the provision of information and checks (Article 
47), investment (Article 54), measures taken to deal with crises (Articles 5F. and 
59), prices (Articles 60 to 64), competition (Articles 65 and 66), wages anj wel-
fare benefits (Article 68) and other matters (Article 95, first and secoDfl para-
graphs). Individual Commission decisions imposing fines or periodic pen?ity pay-
ments are enforceable under Article 92. But neither the Treaty nor the rules 
adopted for its implementation specify the period of time within which the sanc-
tions may be imposed or their enforcement may be sought. There is thus a lacuna 
in the legal system of the ECSC Treaty that can be filled in only by the Com-
munity's legislative processes. 
21. The proposed decision will be based on the first two paragraphs of Article 
95 of the ECSC Treaty, under which the Commission may take any decision which 
is necessary to attain one of the objectives of the Community in the common 
market for coal and steel in cases not provided for by the Treaty. The decision 
requires the unanimous assent of the Council and a reference to the Consultative 
Committee .. 
The structure and content of the draft decision broadly correspond to Council 
Regulation No 2988/74.2 Limitation periods will apply chiefly to the Commission's 
power to impose (limitation periods in proceedings), and to the enforcement of fines 
and periodic penalty payments imposed (limitation periods in enforcement). The 
draft defines the relevant limitation periods, the time from which they run and the 
events which interrupt or suspend them. 
1 Council Regulation (BEC) No 2988/74 of 26 November 1974 concerning limitation periods in 
proceedings and the enforcement of sanctions under the rules of the European Economic Com-
munity relating to transport and competition (OJ L 319 of 29.11.1974). 
2 Fourth Report on Competition Policy. points 48 to 50. 
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Limitation periods in proceedings have been set in relation to the nature and 
gravity of the infringements. There is a three-year limitation period as regards 
infringement of the rules relating to information and checks and a five-year 
period for infringements· of substantive rules. Time runs from the date when the 
infringement was committed, but where the infringement is continuing or re-
peated, time runs from the day on which the infringement ceases. The limitation 
period in enforcement is set at a uniform five years from the date when the 
decision became final. 
Rules concerning the interruption or suspension of periods of limitation are iden-
tical to those of Council Regulation No 2988/74. 
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§ 2 - Cases decided by the Court of Justice 
1. EMI v CBS 
22. A series of references for preliminary rulings gave the Court an opportunity 
to complete and to clarify its jurisprudence as to the limits imposed by Community 
law on the exercise of industrial and commercial property rights.1 
23. The judgments of 15 June 1976 in the cases between EMI and CBS2 deal 
chiefly with the question whether the principles applicable to trademark rights of 
common origin, which have evolved for the common market,3 can be extended 
to relations between the Community and non-member countries. 
The English company EMI Records Ltd, which owns the 'Columbia' trademark in 
all Community countries, relied on its trademark rights in several actions against 
the American group CBS Inc. CBS had imported into the Community records 
bearing the same label manufactured in the United States and distributed through 
its subsidiaries. Initially the Columbia label was held by an American firm through-
out the world. In 1917 it transferred its assets and goodwill in several European 
countries, together with the trademark rights held there, to its British subsidiary. 
However, it retained all rights for the UnIted States and certain other countries. 
The American label has since changed hands several times,and now belongs to 
CBS, which has no legal or economic link with EMI, the owner of the mark in 
Europe. 
24. The Court of Justice, following the Commission's arguments, held that the 
provisions of the Treaty relating to the free movement of goods, and notably the 
prohibition of measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions (Article 
30), normally apply only to trade between Member States. The exercise of a 
trademark right in order to block sales under an identical trademark of goods 
imported from a non-member country is without effect on intra-Community trade 
since it does not jeopardize the unity of the common market. 
There is no need to consider whether the trademarks· share a common origin with 
an identical trademark registered in a non-member country. This would be signi-
ficant only if it were necessary to consider whether there was the possibility of 
1 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, points 60 and 61. 
2 EMI Records Ltd v CBS United Kingdom Ltd, CBS Grammofon A/S and CBS SchaJlplatten 
GmbH, 51, 86 and 96/75: [1976] ECR 811,871 and 913. 
3 CJEC 3.7.1974 (Van Zuylen Freres v Hag AG), 192/73: [1974] ECR 731, 745: 'To prohibit the 
marketing in one Member State of a product legally bearing a trademark in another Member 
State for the sole reason that an identical trademark, having the same origin, exists in the first 
is incompatible with the provisions for the free movement of goods within the common market'. 
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partitioning markets within the Community. The question does not arise where 
a single owner has the same trademark rights for the same product in aU Member 
States. This conclusion is not invalidated by the provisions of the Treaty relating 
to the admission to free circulation of goods coming from non-member countries 
(Articles 9(2) and 10), nor by the rules on the common commercial policy (Article 
110 et seq). But the Court did not consider the question whether these principles 
also apply where the trademark rights are not held by the same person in all the 
Member States. Here, the exercise of the trademark right would tend to divide 
the Community into separate national markets. 
25. The Court also confirmed the Commission's opinion that in cases such as 
this the applicability of Articles 85 and 86 has to be considered 
If the exercise of the trademark right served to isolate the whole of the common 
market it could be caught by the prohibition in Article 85 if it were the object, 
the means or the consequence of a restrictive agreement. The mere fact of a 
restriction on the supply in the Community of goods originating in a non-member 
country, 'but similar to those protected by a trademark in the Community, could 
adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market. In cases 
where the owner of the disputed trademark in the non-member country has several 
subsidiaries established in different Member States of the Community, who can 
market the relevant goods in the common market, the segregation of national 
markets is also liable to affect trade between Member States. 
In the case in question, there had been an agreement between the American and 
European trademark owners to share world markets in gramophone records. The 
agreement had been terminated several years before litigation commenced. 
The question was therefore whether the agreement continued to have any effect 
after its formal termination, for this would make Article 85 applicable. 
Since the question had been referred for a preliminary ruling the Court was able 
to do no more than answer this question in the abstract. It nevertheless seemed 
inclined to reject that Article 85 was applicable in this case. In its judgment the 
Court stressed that a restrictive agreement is deemed to produce effects only if 
the conduct of the firms concerned justifies an inference of concerted action and 
coordination consistent with the agreement and produces the same result intended 
by the agreement. The Court also held that this would not be the case where the 
effects did not exceed those normally attached to the exercise of national trade-
mark rights. 
In this connection the Court recalled that the American firm could penetrate the 
common market even without using the Columbia label. The need for the 
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proprietor of an identical trademark in a non-member country to obliterate the 
trademark from the relevant goods when exported to the protected market and to 
inscribe some other trademark would therefore be one of the acceptable con-
sequences of the protection given to the trademark. 
26. As regards Article 86 the Court confirmed an earlier ruling to the effect 
that the .trademark right does not of itself confer a dominant position on the 
proprietor. It further held that to use a trademark to impede imports of products 
bearing an identical trademark into the protected territory was not to abuse a 
dominant position for the purpose of Article 86. 
27. In general terms the EMI v CBS ruling again reaffirms the significance of 
Community competition policy in relation to industrial and commercial property 
rights. In relations with non-member countries, where Article 30 et seq of the 
Treaty (providing for the free movement of goods) are not as a rule applicable, 
the rules of competition are the foremost means of removing barriers to trade 
erected by such rights. 
2. Terrapin v Terranova 
28. The judgment of 22 June 1976 in Terrapin v Terranova1 chiefly concerns 
the question of trademarks which are not of the same origin but are identical or 
similar enough to be capable of confusion. The plaintiff in the main action, a 
German company, markets finished plaster for facades and other construction 
materials under the registered trademarks 'Terra', 'Terra-Fabrikate' and, most 
important of all, 'Terranova'. The defendant, an English company, manufactures 
and sells prefabricated houses and components for the construction of such houses. 
It sells them· under the name 'Terrapin', which is also its business name. The 
object of the action was to have the defendant prohibited from using the name 
'Terrapin' in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
29. The Bundesgerichtshof, the highest national court, found that the products 
distributed by the two parties were similar and that use of the words 'Terra' and 
'Terranova', on the one hand, and 'Terrapin' on the other could give rise to 
confusion. It therefore concluded that the action for infringement brought by the 
plaintiff was well-founded in German law. However, it asked the Court of Justice 
whether this exercise of a trademark right under national law was contrary to the 
rules on freedom of movement in the common market. 
1 Case 119/75; [1976] ECR 1039. 
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30; The Court of Justice replied that it was not, holding that it was· compatible 
with the provisions of the EEC Treaty on free movement of goods for a firm 
established in one Member State, by virtue of a right to a trademark and a right 
to a business name protected by the legislation of that State, to prevent the 
importation of products of a firm established in another Member State and 
bearing. under the legislation of that State a name giving rise to confusion. It 
added a proviso to the effect that there must be no agreements restricting com-
petition, nor legal or economic ties between the undertakings, and that their 
respective rights must have risen independently of one another. 
The Court referred expressly to 'the present state of Community law' and to the 
'particular situation', so that the judgment does not resolve the matter definitively. 
Indeed the Commission has also stressed that the current legal situation is hardly 
satisfactory and that a single, uniform trademark law must be created for the 
Community.1 The national courts must further ascertain, in the light of the second 
sentence of Article 36 of the Treaty, whether the exercise of industrial and 
commercial property rights in a given case, while necessary in order to guarantee 
the very existence of those rights, does not constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States. 
31. As it has not yet been asked for a preliminary ruling on the matter, the 
Court has not had to pronounce upon the highly controversial question whether 
the similarity between the products of two parties and the possibility of confusion 
are to be regarded in the light of national law only or whether the principles of 
Article 36 also apply. But it did hold that 'an allegation by one undertaking as to 
the similarity of products originating in different Member States and the risk of 
confusion of trademarks or [business] names legally protected in these States may 
perhaps involve the application of Community law .. .'. 
3. Centrafarm 
32. Here it is also worth mentioning the Centrafarm judgment, given on 20 May 
1976,2 which illustrates the similarity between market-sharing through an extended 
exercise of industrial and commercial property rights, and market segregation 
resulting from technical barriers to trade. After obtaining confirmation from the 
Court of Justice3 that the rules on free movement of goods prevail over attempts 
to separate national markets through parallel industrial and commercial property 
1 In August 1976 the Commission published a memorandum proposing that an EEC trademark 
should be established (Supplement 8/76 - Brit. EC). . 
2 Adriaan de Peijper, Managing Director of Centrafarm BY, 104/75: [1976] ECR 613. 
3 CJEC 31.10.1974 (Centrafarm BY and Adriaan de Peijper v Sterling Drug Inc. (parallel patents) 
and Winthrop (trademarks»), 15 and 16/74: [1974] ECR 1147 and 1183; Fourth Report on Com-
petition Policy, point 61. 
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rights, the Dutch firm Centrafarm was confronted by another barrier to imports 
in the form of legal requirements as to pharmaceutical preparations. The importer 
of medicines is required to furnish documents relating to the manufacturing 
process, and qualitative and quantitative composition of the products. The 
documents were not available to it and, furthermore, had already been submitted 
to the relevant authorities by the manufacturer or first authorized importer. 
33. The Court of Justice held that national rules or practices which result in 
imports being channelled through certain traders only and excluding other traders, 
constitute measures having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction within 
the meaning of Article 30 of the Treaty. They cannot come within the exceptions 
specified in Article 36 of the Treaty, unless it is clearly proved that human life 
and health cannot be protected as effectively by other measures having a lesser 
effect on intra-Community trade or that any other rules or practices would' 
obviously be beyond an administration operating in a normal manner. Where 
necessary the national authorities should endeavour to obtain from the manu-
facturer, his official representative or the appropriate health authority in the 
exporting country, information establishing whether the imported medicine is 
actually the same as that for which they already have information. 
4. Roux v Roubaix 
34. Giving judgment on 3 February 1976 in Case 63/75 (Fonderies Roubaix v 
Fonderies Roux)l the Court ruled on the scope of the provisions of Regulation 
No 17 relating to notification and on the interpretation of Regulation No 67/67/ 
EEC on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of 
exclusive distribution agreements. 
The judgment was given on a request for a preliminary ruling by the Paris Court 
of Appeal. The case concerned the validity of an unnotified exclusive distribution 
agreement between two French firms concerning the marketing in France of 
certain goods imported from Germany. The French Court's question was whether 
contracts of this type relate to imports or exports between Member States and 
are therefore notifiable under Article 4(1) of Regulation No 17. 
The Court's answer was in the negative: 
'to the extent to which it exempts from notification agreements which do not 
relate either to imports or to exports, Article 4(2)(1) of Council Regulation 
No 17 must be interpreted as extending to agreements granting exclusive 
sales concessions in relation to the marketing of goods, where the marketing 
1 [1976] ECR 111. 
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envisaged by the agreement takes place solely within the territory. of the 
Member State to whose law the undertakings are subject, even if the goods 
in question have at a former stage been imported from another Member 
State'. 
35. The Court further confirmed that national courts had jurisdiction to find 
that such contracts are caught by the prohibition in Article 85(1) of the Treaty 
and to determine whether they qualify for the group exemption given by 
Regulation No 67/67/EEC. 
Departing from the line hitherto taken by the Commission, l the Court considered 
that it was both possible and necessary to apply Regulation No 67/67/EEC to 
. 'national' exclusive distribution agreements. Article 1 (2) of the Regulation, under 
which the exemption does not apply to agreements to' which undertakings from 
one Member State only are party and which concern the resale of goods within 
that Member State, does not debar application of the law in this way. The effect 
of Article 1(2) is to exclude from the prohibition in Article 85(1) and therefore 
from the scope of Regulation No 67/67/EEC exclusive distribution agree merits 
which are purely national in character and which are not liable to have any 
appreciable affect on trade between Member States. But it does not have the 
effect of precluding the benefit of the group exemption for agreements which, 
although concluded between two undertakings in the same Member State, may 
nevertheless by way of exception significantly affect trade between Member States 
and which, in addition, satisfy all the conditions laid down in Article 1 of 
Regulation No 67/67/EEC. 
36. As stated above2 the Commission is now considering the practical impli-
cations of this judgment. 
1 Goodyear ltalianajEuram Decision: OJ L 38 of 12.2.1975; Fourth Report on Competition Policy, 
point 98. 
2 Point 12 of this Report. 
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§ 3 - The rules of competition in the international context 
1. Application of rules of competition to undertakings from 
non-member countries 
37. Two recent decisions (United Brands! and Hoffmann-La Roche2) have again 
shown that the fact that an undertaking has its headquarters outside the Com-
munity does not exclude it from the scope of the Community rules governing 
competition within the common market. In its Second Report on Competition 
Policy, the Commission stated3 that it and the Court of Justice both considered 
that the Community had power to act against a non-Community undertaking 
under Article 85 wherever the effects of the restrictive practice were felt within 
the common market. 
In terms of legislation, administrative practice and court rulings, the legal theory 
here-the 'effects' theory4-is based on a broad interpretation of the principle 
that the authorities can act against restrictions of competition whose effects are 
felt within the territory under their jurisdiction, even if the companies involved 
are located and doing business outside that territory, are of foreign nationality, 
have no link with that territory and are acting under an agreement governed by 
a foreign law. 
38. In practice the cases so far brought before the Commission and the Court 
of Justice have always had some iink with the Community. In its very first 
decision under Article 8511 the Commission considered the effect in the common 
market of an exclusive distribution agreement that contained a prohibition on 
re-imports into the common market, concluded by a French manufacturer with a 
Swiss dealer in respect of sales in Switzerland. 
In the Beguelin case6 the converse applied: an exclusive agency was given by a 
Japanese producer to a Franco-Belgian firm for sales in Belgium and France, 
and the agreement fell within the broader context of a group of exclusive 
distribuiion agreements with other agents in other parts of the common market. 
1 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 71. 
2 Point 170 of this Report. 
3 Second Report on Competition Policy, point 24 . 
.. This theory is also recognized by the laws of several Member States. The German Act agaiast 
Restraints of Competition of 1957,for instance, states at Section 98(2): 'This act shall apply to all 
restraints of competition which have effect in the area in which this act applies, even if they originate 
outside such area'. . 
5 Grosfillex-Fillistorf: 0] 58 of 9.4.1964; First Report on Competition Policy, point 51. 
6 CJEC 25.11.1971, 22/71: [1971] ECR 959; Second Report on Competition Policy, point 24. 
COMPo REP. EC 1976 
32 POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES 
In an action arising from parallel imports into France the Court held that the 
fact that one of the undertakings involved was established in a non-member 
country did not debar· the application of Article 85 provided the agreement 
produced its effects in Community territory. 
The Dyestuffs cases1 concerned firms domiciled in non-member countries-ICI 
in the United Kingdom (before accession) and Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz in Switzer-
land-which all had subsidiaries in the common market. To prove that it had 
jurisdiction over the parent companies the Commission invoked the restrictions 
created in the common market by the concerted practices in which those com-
panies were involved. It also found that instructions to raise prices given by the 
parent companies outside the common market were binding on the subsidiaries, 
. so that the parent companies and not the subsidiaries were to be blamed for the 
restrictions of competition. In its judgments2 the Court of Justice held that the 
parent companies, through their subsidiaries (whose conduct they controlled) 
had themselves acted in the common market. It therefore considered that the 
separate legal personality of parent company and subsidiary could not be taken 
to counteract the assumption that on the market they acted as one. In these cases, 
therefore, the Court did not have to invoke the effects theory. 
In subsequent cases,s dealing now with Article 86 of the Treaty, the Court con-
firmed its jurisprudence as to the economic unity and unity of conduct on the part 
of parent company and subsidiary. 
39. The principles of law which thus emerge from this line of cases give 
substance to the economic unity theory, which to some extent supplements the 
effects theory and is of particular importance in relation to multinational com-
panies. It underlines the solutions found to problems arising in scrutiny, notification 
and enforcement where cases involve non-Community undertakings linked with 
Community undertakings. 
The notion of the economic entity, however, does not always involve imputing 
the subsidiary'S conduct to the parent company, or assuming that subsidiaries 
incorporated under the company law of the country where they are in business, 
are necessarily incapable of acting independently of the parent company. Indeed, 
subsidiaries in the common market may on occasion be found to be directly 
responsible for a practice prohibited by Article 85. That Article may thus apply 
even to restrictive agreements between companies of the same group. The Court 
1 Commission Decision of 24.7.1969: OJ L 195 of 7.8.1969, p. 11; First Report on Competition 
Policy, point 7. 
2 Cases 48,52 and 53/69: [1972] ECR 619,787 and 845. 
3 Continental Can, 6/72: [1973] ECR 215; Commercial Solvents, 6 and 7/73: [1974] ECR 223; Centra-
farm v Sterling Drug, 15/74: [1974] ECR 1147. 
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of Justice has held that 'Article 85 of the Treaty is not concerned with agreements 
or con~erted practices between undertakings belonging to the same concern and 
having the status of parent company and subsidiary, if the undertakings form an 
economic unit within which the subsidiary has no real freedom to determine its 
coUrse of action on the market, and if the agreements or practices are concerned 
merely with the internal allocation of tasks as between the undertakings'.l 
2. Restrictive practices in international trade 
(a) OECD 
40. The Commission has continued2 to take an active part in the work of inter-
national organizations concerned with issues affecting competition. 
41. It is represented on a number of specialist working groups in OECD current-
ly examining, among other things, various aspects of the restrictive business 
practices operated by some multinational enterprises, as well as restrictions of 
competition in the field of trademarks. The Commission also participated in the 
work which resulted in the publication by OECD in June 1976 of a Declaration 
on international investment and multinational enterprises. In a series of recom-
mendations, of which one whole section is concerned specifically with restrictive 
business practices, the Declaration established voluntary guidelines for multi-
nationals. The application of these guidelines in practice is to be kept under review 
in OECD. 
The OECD initiative reflects the very widespread concern currently felt about 
the economic power of multinational enterprises, whose activities may frequently 
be obscure because of their complexity and diversity and may exceed the control 
of anyone national authority. For this reason the guidelines emphasize as a matter 
of general policy the responsibility of multinationals to comply with official com-
petition rules and established policies of the countries in which they operate and 
to be ready to consult and cooperate with national authorities responsible for 
competition issues and investigations-for example by providing information, 
subject to the safeguards normally applicable. 
42. The Commission is still represented in the working group which is charged 
with the review of the operation of the two recommendations adopted by the 
1 Abovementioned Case 15/74. 
2 Fifth Report on Competition Policy. points 16 to 18. 
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OECD Council on cooperation in the field of restrictive business practices affecting 
international trade on 10 October 1967 and 3 July 1973.1 
(b) UNCTAD 
43. The Commission has continued to participate in the UNCTAD Committee 
on Manufactures, especially in the third group of experts on restrictive business 
practices set up under Resolution 96 (IV), which was adopted by the fourth 
UNCTAD at Nairobi. This expert group has been given the responsibility of 
preparing proposals and recommendations with the objective of formulating a set 
of multilaterally agreed equitable principles and rules for the control of restrictive 
business practices having adverse effects on international trade, particularly that 
of developing countries. The first meeting of the group of experts was devoted 
to defining the aims which such rules and principles are intended to realize. At 
least two more meetings are planned for 1977, in order to reach agreement if 
possible upon rules and principles wbich would apply to States as well as to enter-
prises, and upon the universal and voluntary character of such provisions. 
44. The fourth UNCTAD at Nairobi in May 1976 called for the continuation 
of work on drafting a code of conduct with the underlying aim of facilitating the 
transfer of technology.2 In this context competition and restrictive business prac-
tices are among a number of aspects of technology transactions under con-
sideration. These also include: 
the need for regulatory action, 
access to technology for developing countries at fair and reasonable prices, 
special treatment for developing countries, 
settlement of disputes. 
The group of experts convoked by UNCT AD has already begun a series of 
meetings which are programmed to continue throughout 1977. As matters stand 
at present, two proposals have been made. The Community has taken part in the 
formulation of the draft outline for a code of conduct submitted by the developed 
countries. It consists of voluntary guidelines addressed to governments and enter-
prises. The developing countries, on the other hand, want a legally binding code. 
This difference of approach is the most important of the many issues which have 
yet to be decided. 
As to their scope, both proposals are for a code which would have universal 
application, rather than one confined to developing countries, and could include 
plant, machinery and equipment within their terms, in addition to the transfer of 
rights in patents and knowhow. 
1 Third Report on Competition Policy, points 39 and 40. 
2 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 18; UNCfAD Resolution 89 (IV). 
COMPo REP. EC 1976 
MAIN DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNITY POLICY 35 
§ 4 - Price disparities in the Community 
45. The following section gives an outline of the Commission's activities to help 
eliminate price disparities in the Community. Quite apart from its direct appli-
cation of the rules on competition, the Commission has carried out studies on 
matters such as the causes of differing prices for identical products, investigations 
into the possible relationship between the position of certain firms on the market 
and their pricing policy, a more theoretical study of the effects of spatial pricing 
systems on competition and, finally, legislative activity. 
1. Differing prices for identical products 
46. So far none of the studies carried out in various industries where sharply 
differing prices between Member States were found to exisfl has shown that the 
differences resulted from restrictive agreements or concerted practices within the 
meaning of Article 85 of the Treaty, or from abuse of dominant positions within 
the meaning of Article 86. 
It has been found that, apart from purely competitive factors, there are a large 
number of other factors which may help to provoke or maintain price differen-
tiation. The degree and extent of differentiation in certain industries may .be 
influenced by price regulations in certain countries, price cuts ordered by the 
authorities, differences between national laws on marketing, and fluctuations in 
currency exchange rates. In other industries, price differences were found to be 
largely attributable to distribution costs which were much higher in one country 
than in another, the manufacturers not being involved at this stage. 
The Commission has made no attempt to establish general criteria for all ~ases 
to determine whether the pricing policy of dominant firms constitutes abuse. 
But it has taken action where it found persisting, major differences in prices for 
which there were no objective justifications. Decisions in certain cases are planned, 
like the decision already taken in the case of United Brands Corporation (Chiquita 
Bananas).2 
2. Price analysis in the programme of studies on concentration 
47. Studies on the evolution of concentration in different manufacturing indus-
tries3 inevitably have to consider the basic factors of international trade, dealing 
1 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, points 1 to 10. 
II Commission Decision of 17 December 1975: OJ L 95 of 9.4.1976; Fifth Report on Competition 
Policy, point 71. 
3 Part Three of this Report. 
COMPo REP. EC 1976 
36 POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES 
both with trade between Member States and trade between the Community and 
the rest of the world. 
By extending the field of study to distribution the Commission is aiming to 
establish significant relationships between the structure of international trade and 
comparative trends in retail prices, depending on the point of manufacture or 
origin. 
This is mainly a question of determining whether the price to consumers for 
imported goods rises more or less quickly than the price of domestic products. 
Does an increase in the price of a domestic product actually encourage imports 
of competing products? Do the retail prices of imported goods align on the retail 
prices of similar domestic goods or do the latter tend to fall under the impact of 
imports? Do the relations and reactions between the prices of imported and of 
domestic goods find uniform and simultaneous expression or are there major 
differences according to the country (and region) and sales point for the sample 
of products? 
With its expanded study programme the Commission also seeks to analyse the 
problem of increased purchasing power. 
3. Spatial pricing systems 
48. The operation of certain spatial pricing systems may affect the working of 
competition. 
For the coal and steel industries, Article 60 of the ECSC Treaty defines the pricing 
system which is compatible with the unity and smooth operation of the common 
market. The High Authority issued a number of decisions on this, and many of 
them eventually went to the Court of Justice.1 
In the area covered by the EEC Treaty, the Commission has frequently had to 
deal with certain price-fixing arrangements.2 
49. To clarify the competition aspects of spatial pricing, a theoretical ::;tudy has 
been made for the Commission. 3 It considers the question of the compatibility 
. 1 First Report on Competition Policy, point 101; Second Report on Competition Policy, point 12. 
2 Commission Decisions of 6 November 1968-Comptoir fran9llis de I'azote and Comptoir beige de 
I'azote: OJ L 276 of 14.11.1968; First Report on Competition Policy, points 11 to 13. Commission 
Decision of 23 December 1971-NederIandse Cement-Handelsmaatschappij OJ L 22 of 26.1.1972. 
Commission Decision of 18 December 1972-Cementregeling voor Nederland: OJ L 303 of 31.12. 
1972. Commission Decision of 22 December 1972-Cimenteries Belges: OJ L 303 of 31.12.1972; 
Second Report on Competition Policy, points 29 and 30. Commission Decision of 15 May 1974--
Glass containers: OJ L 160 of 17.6.1974; Fourth Report on Competition Policy, points 62 to 64. 
3 L. Phlips, Spatial Pricing and Competition: (Competition-Approximation of legislation) Series, 
No 29, 1976). 
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with the competitive market set up within the European Communities of the 
operation in industry of certain delivered pricing systems. 
The author concludes that 'these spatial pricing systems cannot be interpreted 
as being terms of sale derived from the specific trade usage of certain regions and 
certain industries, as having no implications for active competition and economic 
efficiency. In reality their impact is profound. Any competition policy which claims 
to be effective overlooks them at its peril'. He recommends that ex-works prices 
be the general terms of sale, with the seller paying the freight costs on occasion. 
50. The Commission is currently considering how far the results of this study 
can be used in individual cases to establish whether spatial pricing systems are 
compatible with the rules on competition. 
4. Price investigations 
51. In parallel with its investigations and studies on price differentiatior. for 
certain products and on the repercussions of the pricing policies of certain firms 
on competition, the Commission has continued its endeavours to make mailable 
to the consumer extra information on prices and country-to-countr! price 
differences.1 
The aim is to increase price transparency in markets within the Community 
through the publication of surveys of prices for certain products or services. This 
should enable distributors and consumers to take advantage of differences in 
prices between one region and another. The differences are still quite considerable 
for certain products or services. The anticipated result is a general fall in prices 
and a narrowing of the differences between prices from Member State to Member 
State. 
52. The Commission had initially planned to deal with the price surveys by 
means of a regulation. But in the course of talks with experts from the Member 
States, major technical difficulties have been found. These relate, among other 
things, to the definition of products, the survey methods and timing, fluctuations 
in exchange rates and the time that would elapse between the survey itself and 
the publication of its results. 
New discussions are planned. They will deal with the facilities available to the 
Member States for carrying out price surveys and with the possibility of Com-
munity coordination of national initiatives through a committee to be set up for 
the purpose. A possible alternative would be to harmonize national rules applying 
in this field. 
1 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 10. 
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§ 5 - Joint ventures 
53. Through its decisions in individual cases the Commission has continued to 
develop its policy on joint ventures.1 It has reached the, conclusion after dealing 
with a large number of cases that the question whether th~ formation of a joint 
venture is to be taken as a type of restrictive practice or as a merger can only be 
settled in the light of specific circumstances on a case by case basis. Joint ventures 
may amount either to a form of restrictive practice or to a merger. In complex 
cases both Article 85 and Article 86 of the Treaty may be applicable. 
54. The Commission has always pointed out that the application of the Com-
munity competition rules does not depend on the legal form which may have 
been chosen by the firms concerned, but on the economic realities of their situa-
tion. Joint ventures with the sole object of combining certain functions of the, 
firms involved, as in the case of joint buying organizations, joint selling agencies 
and joint R&D companies, have been held to amount to agreements. Article 85 
applies to such combinations where the agreements between the relevant firms 
may appreciably affect competition in the common market and trade between 
Member States. 
55. Nevertheless the prohibition in Article 85(1) can equally apply when the 
formation of a joint venture creates an independent economic entity with all the 
characteristics of a company in itself. The decisive qU'estion then is whether 
cooperation through the joint venture will have the object or effect of appreciably 
restricting competition between the parent companies or between them and other 
companies. 
For the prohibition on restrictive practices to be applicable in respect of such a 
formation, the parent companies of the joint venture must at least have been 
potential competitors. 
However, the prohibition will not in general be taken to apply to cases in which 
the parent companies transfer all their assets to the joint venture and themselves 
become no' more than holding companies. Such a situation will usually be con-
sidered to constitute a merger. 
Even where the transfer of assets is limited only to a part of the total business 
previously engaged in independently by the parent companies, the transfer may 
in exceptional cases be treated in the same way as a merger. But such exceptional 
cases can be taken to arise only where the parent companies completely and 
1 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, points 37 to 42. 
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irreversibly abandon business in the area covered by the joint venture, and 
provided that the pooling of certain areas of business does not weaken competi-
tion in other areas, and particularly in related areas, where the firms involved 
remain formally independent of each other. 
56. Since 1975 the Commission has given practical expression to these prin-
ciples in three decisions. 
In the SHY iChevron casel it authorized a partial merger affecting only the 
marketing of certain petroleum products, for the companies concerned 'had 
pooled their distribution networks and all related assets, withdrawing entirely 
from the market in which the joint venture operated. SHV and Chevron. were 
still competitors on the markets in related products. But these related products 
were technically and economically distinct from the market in which the joint 
venture operated and independent of that market. The Commission therefore 
concluded that it was most unlikely that cooperation through the joint venture 
would noticeably affect the conduct of the parent firms as regards competitir;n in 
other products. Accordingly, a negative clearance was given in this case. 
In the Bayer/Gist case2 the Commission opposed the formation of joint 'tentures 
which would have restricted competition between the parent compani~s to an 
extent contrary to Article 85. Under the initial agreements the facilities of the 
two parties for the manufacture of two products (raw penicillin and the inter-
mediate product 6-amino-penicillanic acid) were to be transferred to the respective 
joint ventures, in which the parents were to be equally represented financially 
and in terms of staff. This would have led not only to joint control over invest-
ment and production in relation to the two products but also, in view of the 
economic' importance of earlier production stages, to cooperation between the 
parent companies on the markets for processed penicillin and final products. 
The Commission was therefore unable to grant an exemption under Article 85(3) 
. in respect of the joint venture arrangement. 
In the KEWA case3 the formation of a joint venture by Bayer, Hoechst, Gelsen-
berg and Nukem was exempted under Article 85(3), subject to certain conditions 
and obligations. The business objective of KEW A is to construct and operate a 
large-scale nuclear fuel reprocessing plant and to market the reprocessed products. 
The parent companies undertook not to do business in these fields, except through 
the joint venture. The Commission regarded the agreement as restrictive of com-
petition, since the four companies are all expert in reprocessing technology and 
. must therefore be regarded as at least potential competitors. 
1 OJ L 38 of 12.2.1975; Fourth Report on Competition Policy, points 114 to 119. 
2 OJ L 30 of 25.2.1976; Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points 48 to 50. 
3 OJ L 51 of 26.2.1976; Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points 44 to 47. 
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57. A similar line of reasoning was applied to the Vacuum Interrupters case,! 
decided early in 1977, in which the Commission found a restrictive agreement 
within the terms of Article 85. Here two major firms in the heavy electrical 
engineering industry-Associated Electrical Industries Ltd and Reyrolle Parsons 
Ltd-set up a joint venture to develop, manufacture and market a new type 
of interrupter. The Commission concluded that, at least in the medium term, 
each of the two parent companies was capable of doing business separately 
within the field given to the joint venture. 
58. In order to determine whether Article 85(3) applies the main question is 
whether the joint venture offers :,mbstantial objective benefits to offset the dis-
advantages for competition. During the period covered by this report the Com-
mission took the view in two decisions that this was not the case where in view 
of the size of the companies and the oligopolistic structure of the markets, the 
agreements were likely to eliminate competition in respect of a substantial part 
of the relevant products.2 In a third case (Vacuum Interrupters) the Commission 
granted an exemption, and in a fourth (de Laval/Stork)3 has issued a notice 
under Article 19(3) of Regulation No 17 of an intended favourable decision. 
59. From the decisions taken by the Commission so far, the following conclu-
sions can be drawn: the Commission will refuse to grant exemption under 
Article 85(3) wherever the formation of a joint venture does not offer substantial 
economic benefits and wherever there is a chance that competition on the 
relevant market may be appreciably redu.ced. The Commission will, therefore, 
generally tend to take an unfavourable view wherever joint ventures are formed 
by large firms in different Member States with the object or effect of coordinating 
their conduct in the market. Exemption will also be refused where there is no 
need for close cooperation between the firms to take the form of a joint venture, 
as where the benefits of an agreement could be achieved by less restrictive means. 
In such cases, however, before refusing exemption, the Commission will generally 
c(,'lsider whether the imposition of obligations and conditions can reduce the 
restriction of competition to the minimum indispensable to attain the objectives 
of the agreement. 
The duration of the exemption will depend on the individual circumstances of 
each case. The Commission may confine its authorization to a relatively brief 
period (between five and ten years) to stress the provisional nature of the coope-
ration in a joint venture. This would apply notably where the joint venture is 
formed to enable one of the parent companies to enter production more quickly 
1 Commission Decision of 20.1.1977; OJ L 48 of 19.2.1977; point 175 of this Report. 
2 Points 177 and 179 of this Report. 
3 Point 176 of this Report. 
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by having access to the knowhow and experience of the other. It could also apply 
where serious technical difficulties or particularly grave financial risks stand in 
the way of the development or manufacture of new products so that cooperation' 
between two or more firms is necessary for a transitional period, as in the case 
of Vacuum Interrupters. In contrast, in other cases the circumstances may be 
such that the objectives of cooperation can be attained only in the long term, 
and exemption would not achieve the required result unless it is given for a 
relatively long term. In the KEW A case, the Commission fixed this period at 
15 years. 
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§ 6 - Agreements not to compete 
60. The Commission has made clear its position on the application of Com-
munity competition law to non-competition clauses. 
By their very nature these clauses are manifest restraints of competition. There 
is no doubt as to their incompatibility with Article 85(1) wherever they sub-
stantially affect the operation of the market within the Community and trade 
between Member States. This rule applies to all agreements in which non-com-
petition clauses have their own distinct legal and economic effect. On the other 
hand a more flexible approach is required where such clauses are stipulated in 
mergers or upon the sale of a business. Here the question is whether the clause 
is acceptable as an integral part of the legitimate purpose of the main agreement. 
61. The Commission has already pronounced on this point on· a previous 
occasion. In the SHY /Chevron decision1 it did not oppose an agreement entered 
into by the parent companies not to compete on their joint subsidiary's market. 
The agreement provided SHY with the assurance that Chevron would not reduce 
the value of the assets it transferred by competing. with the joint venture. The 
agreement not to compete was a condition precedent to the formation of the 
joint venture. In the KEW A case,2 on the other hand, the Commission regarded 
the commitment by the parent companies not to do business in the same field as 
the joint venture as a restriction of competition caught by Article 85, for the 
economic situation was different. The Commission considered in the SHY /Chev-
ron case that the parent companies were unlikely ever again to compete in the 
relevant market, whereas the possibility was present in the KEW A case. For 
these reasons the first case was regarded as a merger and the second as a 
restrictive agreement. 
Where a non-competition clause agreed by parent companies does not concern 
a joint venture's area of activity, it is generally to be considered a restriction of 
competition within the meaning of Article 85(1), whether the joint venture is 
regarded as a restrictive agreement or as a merger. In SHY/Chevron, for instance, 
the Commission agreed to give negative clearance on condition that the firms 
concerned abandoned a clause of this kind. 
62. In 1976 the Commission made its first decision on the acceptability of 
non-competition clauses in connection with an agreement for the sale of a busi-
1 OJ L 38 of 12.2.1975; Fourth Report on Competition Policy, points 114 to 119. 
2 OJ L 51 of 26.2.1976; Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points 44 to 47. 
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ness. In its Reuter/BASF decision! it found that such clauses are not prohibited 
by Article 85 where they are necessary to guarantee that the entire business 
assets will be transferred to the purchaser. The clause in such a case is ancillary 
to the agreement for sale of the business and for the purposes of the law of 
competition is regarded as being part of that agreement. The decision stresses, 
however, that the seller may be subjected only to restrictions which are indis-
pensable to attain the objective of the sale. Nor must the duration of such restric-
tions exceed the minimum required by the purchaser to take over the business. 
The Commission considers that non-competition clauses escape the prohibition 
.in Article 85 only where the assets transferred consist chiefly of goodwill or 
knowhow, these being the only areas where the buyer requires protection from 
the seller by reason of the knowledge in the seller's possession. The scope of the 
ban on competition must furthermore be confined to activities which directly 
affect competition, such as manufacturing, applications and sales. The seller may 
not be prohibited, as he was in the Reuter/BASF case, from all activities in the 
field covered by the contract, including research and development. The Com-
mission treated this limitation as being void ab initio. 
63. As regards the precise acceptable duration of the agreement not to com-
pete, the Commission has not yet finally established its policy. 
In the Reuter/BASF case the parties had implemented the clause for five 
years before the Commission's decision was made. The Commission considered 
that the period indispensable for attaining the objective of the agreement was 
already exceeded. 
1 OJ L 254 of 17.9.1976; points 137 to 139 of this Report. 
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§ 7 - Authorization of two new cooperation agreements 
in the steel industry 
64. At the end of 1976 the Commission authorized two rationalization and 
specialization agreements involVing the Northern Group and Southern Group of 
German steel firms, as a result of which the firms concerned will be able to 
improve coordination of their endeavours to find joint solutions to problems 
concerning production, the supply of preliminary products, specialization and 
rationalization. Such agreements may, especially at times of economic difficulty, 
make for more efficient use of production facilities available in "the Community. 
The authorizations, which were conditional, will expire on 31 December 1981.' 
In these two decisions the Commission stated that when it sets overall supply 
objectives for firms under the Community steel policy, such objectives may be 
set for these groups as authorized.2 The members of the groups may then allocate 
orders and coordinate sales within the group. The advantage of this is that the 
firms concerned are left with the responsibility in operational terms of adapting 
supply to sales possibilities. 
65. The European steel industry has felt the need to adapt its trade representa-
tion to the scale of the problems facing it. On 9 December it set up the European 
Association of Iron and Steel Industries (Eurofer), headquartered in Luxem-
bourg, on the basis of Article 48 of the ECSC Treaty, which recognizes the 
right of undertakings to form associations provided membership is voluntary and 
the association engages in no activity which is contrary to the Treaty. The main 
function of the new Association will be to represent the common interests of its 
members in relations with the Commission. 
The same basis was taken for the formation of an international association by 
steel trade associations and firms in Northern Europe early in 1976. This asso-
ciation was the target of heavy criticism as a potential threat to the unity of the 
Community steel market. 
1 Points 140 to 143 of this Report. 
2 OJ C 303 of 23.12.1976. 
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Main developments in national policies 
66. Since the Treaties entered into force the Commission has paid close 
attention to the development of national competition policies, seeking particularly 
to avoid conflict between national and Community law. 
As requested by Parliament, a brief outline of developments in the competition 
policy of Member States during 1976 is given below. Most of the information 
is taken from reports from the Member States to the Commission. In addition 
to new provisions of law, this survey also sets out plans for significant changes 
in the law and the main developments in the courts and in administrative practice. 
Since this is the first survey of national policies, the report for each country is 
preceded by a brief introduction to its competition law. 
67. There are substantial differences in the legal treatment of competition poli-
cies resulting from differences in legal traditions and degrees of industrialization 
and concentration, and from the competing priorities of competition, industrial 
and structural policies. However, this survey also shows that, despite differences 
of degree, there is a general tendency for all the Member States to strengthen 
their competition policy to safeguard active competition. For instance, the prin-
ciple of abuse is being dropped in favour of the principle of prohibition, resale 
price maintenance is being banned and merger control is becoming more stringent. 
The fact that Member States are improving their own merger control machinery 
highlights the need for rapid introduction of merger control at Community level. 
Belgium 
68. In Belgium the basic law on competition is the Act of 27 May 1960 for 
the protection against abuse of economic power. Belgian law does not regard 
monopolies and restrictive practices as dangerous and harmful per se. It is limited 
to suppressing abuse of economic power. 
69. However, the Belgian Government is proposing to lay before Parliament 
a bill on competition, the broad lines of which are as follows: 
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The bill will apply to enterprises engaged in industrial, commercial, financial or 
agricultural business. Public services are excluded, but public enterprise (orga-
nismes d'interet public) are within the law, unless this would prevent them from 
exercising their function. Restrictive practices, dominant positions and mergers 
authorized by statute or statutory procedure would also be excluded to that extent. 
The bill provides for preventive action, and is inspired by Community legislation. 
The rules on restrictive practices and dominant positions resemble those of 
Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty. However, they depart from Community 
rules at least to all appearances, in that restrictive practices and dominant firms 
with a turnover or market share below certain specified thresholds are not affected. 
Certain specific provisions deserve special attention. One, for instance, provides 
for block exemptions for certain practices, while another would authorize the 
Minister of Economic Affairs to prohibit certain types of practice if there are 
serious grounds for believing that market conditions and competition in a given 
industry are affected by the dominant position of one or more undertakings. 
Mergers involving enterprises with a turnover or market share above a certain 
threshold will require prior authorization. In the absence of a decision by the 
Minister of Economic Affairs within a specified period, the merger will be deemed 
to be authorized. 
Scrutiny will be in the hands of a special department empowered to commence 
proceedings. 
The Council for Competition will have two roles: to decide whether a given 
restrictive practice falls within the statutory prohibition and to advise the Minister 
on authorizations. However, it will have an advisory role only for mergers. 
The Council will be composed of judges, civil servants and other persons with 
special qualifications in the field of competition. The Chairman will be a judge. 
The final decision on authorization will rest with the Minister. 
Infringements of the statutory prohibitions will be punishable by fines if shown 
to be deliberate. 
In cases where a fine is imposed an appeal lies to the Council of State, which 
will have full jurisdiction on appeal. 
The bill contains provisions on residual jurisdiction and on the assistance which 
can be requested from national authorities under the Treaty of Rome and its 
implementing regulations. 
Individual Acts regulating specified industries remain applicable. For example. 
the Act of 14 July 1976 relating to public works. supply and services contracts 
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prohibits any act, agreement or collusive practice which may distort normal 
conditions of competition (Article 7). Tenders submitted by virtue of such an 
act, agreement or practice must be disregarded. If the act, agreement or practice 
leads to the award of a public contract, its performance must be halted unless 
the appropriate authority, giving reasons, decides otherwise. 
Denmark 
70. The basic law governing competition in Denmark is the Monopolies and 
Restrictive Practices Control Act of 1955, which has been amended several 
times. With the exception of resale price maintenance the Act does not prohibit any 
market position or practice. It is based on the principle of supervision and public 
knowledge. It subjects agreements and decisions to notification to the Monopolies 
Control Authority (MCA) if they exert or may exert a substantial influence on 
price, production, distribution or transport conditions either throughout Denmark 
or in local markets. At the request of the MCA, individual enterprises and 
combinations which have or may have a substantial influence are also subject to 
notification; and so are restrictive business terms stipulated by these enterprises 
or combinations. Restrictive agreements or decisions which are not notified within 
eight days after they are made are invalid. The notifications are entered on a 
public register and extracts are published in the State Gazette. 
71. The MCA consists of a Board and a Directorate. The Board deals with 
all cases of general interest, while the Directorate prepares the cases for the 
Board, carries out its decisions and takes decisions in minor cases delegated to 
it by the Board. 
The MCA has considerable powers of intervention which it may exercise if it finds 
that a restriction on competition results in, or may be assumed to result in, 
unreasonable prices or terms of business, unreasonable restraint of freedom of 
trade or unreasonable inequality in the conditions of trade. Where such restrictive 
practices cannot be brought to an end by negotiation, the MCA can issue an 
order which may: 
cancel, wholly or in part, the agreements, decisions or terms of business; 
prescribe that the prices, composition, weight or dimensions of articles be indi-
cated on the product; 
prescribe alterations in prices, margins and terms of business, or fix maximum 
prices and margins; 
order a firm to sell to specified buyers. 
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72. The question of what is 'reasonable' is to be decided largely on a case by 
case basis. In judging whether prices are reasonable, the MCA must refer to the 
standards of enterprises operated with appropriate technical and commercial 
efficiency. Price-fixing in general is deemed unreasonable while recommended 
prices are acceptable. Agreements on quotas have been considered unreasonable 
where they prevented a shift of production from less efficient to more efficient 
undertakings. Different rates of discount or bonus are allowed if based on turnover 
and if they follow objective and consistently maintained lines. Agreements 
establishing unilateral or bilateral exclusive dealing arrangements between large 
groups of suppliers and buyers have as a rule been regarded as harmful. The 
MCA has in general disallowed collective refusals to deal. Competition rules made 
by trade organizations have been cancelled or reduced to the status of recom-
mendations where they had harmful effects. The MCA has frequently intervened 
to supervise the terms of distributorship agreements. It has as a rule tolerated 
qualitative conditions set by undertakings for the appointment of distributors 
where they were justified on objective grounds. However, where such qualitative 
conditions have been applied in an arbitrary fashion or where the appointment 
of a distributor was based on the supplier's need rather than objective qualifica-
tions, the MCA has tended to intervene. 
73. While there is no power given to intervene in planned mergers, the MCA 
can demand notification of a merger and its provisions on competition after the 
merger has been effected. 
74. Further powers are given to the MCA by the Competitive Tendering Act 
1966 and by the Prices and Profits Act 1974. Some provisional amendments have 
been made to the Prices and Profits Act 1974. They will come into force in March 
1977, when the Profits Freeze and Price Curbing Agreements Act expires. The 
scope of the Act will be extended to include incomes policy as well as merely prices 
policy. Price supervision will be directed especially towards branches of trade 
protected from foreign competition, i.e. retail trade, construction and repair work 
and services. 
75. The new Drug Act, which came into force on 1 January 1976, transferred 
most of the control of drug prices from the National Health Service to the MCA, 
which put great emphasis on supervising the prices charged by manufacturers, 
importers and wholesalers of drugs. With respect to certain sedatives the MCA 
found that the prices charged by manufacturers and importers for sales to whole-
salers were unreasonable. It took the view that there must be limits to the profits 
on successful products after they had been on the market for a sufficiently long 
period of time to cover the necessary costs, including those of research. Accord-
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ingly, the MCA ordered the prices of certain drugs to be reduced by 20% as a 
temporary measure. The enterprises concerned, Dumex, Roche and Pharma, 
appealed to the Monopolies Appeal Tribunal, which ruled that the price reduc-
tions should not become effective until a decision had been reached on the merits. 
The Tribunal said, among other things, that there were considerable price 
differences between the products of the appellants, while the percentage price 
reduction would be the same for all of them. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
76. The basis for the competition policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 
is the Act against Restraints of Competition of 1957. This initially prohibited 
horizontal agreements, subject to limited exceptions, and created more flexible 
control of vertical agreements restricting competition and of abuse of a dominant 
position. As amended in 1973, the Act extends the prohibition to concerted 
practices, declares resale price maintenance agreements to be void, strengthens 
the control of abuse of dominant positions and establishes preventive control of 
mergers. 
The authority chiefly concerned is the Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) 
in Berlin, together with authorities in the Lander. As regards merger control, 
the Federal Minister of Economic Affairs has major powers in addition to those 
of the Cartel Office. He may authorize a merger prohibited by the Cartel Office 
where there are compelling reasons for doing so to safeguard the public interest. 
The Act of 1973 also set up a Monopolies Commission with five independent 
members. Its role is to publish periodic reports on the trend of business concen-
tration and on the application of the rules relating to firms in a dominant position 
and to merger contro1. 
77. On 28 January 1976 the con1601 of press mergers came into operation with 
the Third Act to amend the Act against Restraints of Competition. The new Act 
adapts the general merger control provisions to the special structure of the press 
sector. 
78. In 1976 the Monopolies Commission submitted its first biennial report. It 
concluded that since 1960 not only had there been a sharp increase in business 
concentration but also a widening of the disparities in size between firms. In 
'nearly half the mergers notified the acquiring firm was one of the hundred largest 
in the country and it was generally small- and medium-sized businesses that were 
acquired. The Monopolies Commission also reported that competition in banking 
and energy deserves special attention. It considers that the merger control arran-
COMPo REP. EC 1976 
SO 'POuey TOWARDS ENTERPRISES 
gements deal inadequately with restrictions of competition resulting from mergers 
between banks and non-banking firms. In the field of energy the Commission 
considered the priority of competition policy should be to promote the develop-
ment of the various producers along the most independent lines possible and to 
prevent concentration' through interlocking shareholdings. 
79. In 1976 the Cartel Office prohibited two mergers and one planned merger. 
Mergers involving firms in financial difficulties represent a growing proportion 
of the decisions involved in merger control. This was indeed the crucial aspect 
of the merger between Karstadt, Europe's largest department store group, and 
Neckermann, the third largest mail-order house in Germany, which was ultimately 
permitted. The Cartel Office took into account that if Neckermann collapsed, 
20 000 employees would be made redundant, and also that, even if the merger 
were prohibited, competition would probably be weakened in the long term. 
In the context of pre-merger control the Cartel Office blocked the plan for the 
sale of Sachs AG to Guest, Keen & Nettlefolds, on the grounds of the financial 
power of the combined group, but its decision was overruled by the Berlin 
Kammergericht (Court of Appeal). 
The current economic downturn and excessive competitive pressures have from 
time to time caused competition to be substantially distorted. In particular, more 
intensive competition at the distribution stage has led major firms increasingly 
to take advantage of the increased purchasing power they have acquired at a time 
of economic depression in order to extract special and unwarranted advantages 
from their suppliers. The means available under the law of competition are often 
inadequate to control firms exercising power on the demand side of the scale. 
For example, their market share may not be large enough to constitute a position 
of dominance. The rule against discrimination generally provides the best means 
of dealing with the problem of purchasing power, but a number of individual 
decisions are still necessary in order to clarity the scope of the rule. 
80. An important decision on control of the abuse of a dominant position is 
the judgment of the Federal Court of Justice in the vitamin B 12 case. In that 
case the Federal Cartel Office ruled that the firm Merck should reduce by 60%, 
and in·certain cases by as much as 70%, the price of the vitamin B 12 which 
it manufactures. On appeal the Kammergericht upheld the main part of the Cartel 
Office's ruling, altering only the threshold at which prices were considered 
excessive. The Federal Court reversed the ruling on the grounds that Merck did 
not have a dominant position. The Court confirmed that the term 'dominant 
position' (uberragende Marktstellung) should not be interpreted as meaning that 
a firm had no competition of any importance. The existence of a dominantposi-
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tion depended upon competitive conditions on the relevant market. The Federal 
Court also confirmed that the control of abuse of a dominant position under 
competition law does extend to excessive pricing. 
In 1974, in another case concerning excessive pricing in the pharmaceutical 
industry, the Cartel Office instructed Hoffmann-La Roche to reduce its wholesale 
price for Valium by 40% and for Libriumby 35%. 
This decision was upheld by the Kammergericht, though the required reduction 
was reduced from 40% to 28%. 
81. In the new edition of its handbook on cooperation . (Kooperations/ibel) 
published in March 1976, the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs mentioned 
the extensive opportunities for cooperation available chiefly to small- and 
medium-sized businesses under the Act against Restraints of Competition. In 1976 
firms took greater advantage than in the preceding year of these possibilities under 
the new restrictive practices law of 1973. 
82. The Cartel Office stated its views on price information agreements in 
industry in the form of a circular addressed to all those concerned. Recent 
decisions of the Federal Court of Justice had indicated the need for control of 
such arrangements. In its decision relating to aluminium semi-manufactures the 
Court found that price information agreements infringed both the prohibition 
against restrictive practices and against resale price maintenance where the figures 
exchanged concerned the prices charged in individual, specified dealings,. for 
this went against the need for secrecy which is inherent in competition. The Cartel 
Office circular is not aimed at conventional market statistics. 
The· Cartel Office has continued its successful action against infringements taking 
the form of price recommendations. Largely owing to the Cartel Office's efforts, 
the problem of advertising which misleads the consumer by offering discounts on 
unrealistically high recommended prices (Mondpreisemp/ehlungen) can be re-
garded as virtually solved. 
83. To improve the application of national competition law to cases having 
international ramifications, the governments of Germany and the United States 
have entered into a cooperation agreement on restrictive business practices, which 
entered into force on 11 September 1976. The agreement provides for mutual 
assistance between the two countries as regards investigations and proceedings, 
competition policy studies and possible changes in restrictive practice legislation; 
also concerned are activities related to the work on restrictive business practices 
of international organizations of which both parties are members. 
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France 
84. The main provisions currently in force are contained in: 
the Decree of 9 August 1953, replaced virtually unchanged by the Decree of 
24 June 1959 and the Order of 28 September 1967; 
Articles 3 and 4 of the Finance Act of 2 July 1963; 
the Act of 27 December 1973 regulating Trade and Artisanat. 
These laws comprise two categories of provision. 
First, are provisions prohibiting certain specific practices by one firm or a number 
of firms. These are: 
unwarranted refusal to meet a customer's order; 
unwarranted trade discrimination; 
making the sale of a product subject to the purchase of another or of a minimum 
quantity; 
resale price maintenance. 
Second, there are provisions governing restrictive agreements and the abuse of 
a dominant position. 
Agreements restricting competition are illegal and declared void, unless they 
qualify as one of the statutory exceptions. 
Any activity by one or more enterprises in a dominant position having the object 
or effect of distorting the normal operation of the market is also prohibited. 
85. Competition policy in 1976 was marked by the following developments. 
Firstly, following the principles set out in the 'Fontanet Circular', the authorities 
remained as active as ever in combating restrictive business practices such as 
resale price maintenance, refusal to deal and discrimination as to prices or terms 
of sale. The rules on the last of these points, having been stiffened by the Act 
of 27 December 1973, were applied more frequently and more systematically. 
Two individual cases merit special attention. An arrangement was negotiated to 
reduce the scope of the refusal to deal by firms in the luxury industries of 
jewellery and perfumes, which were employing excessively selective distribution 
methods. In both cases it was accepted that, in view of the status and reputation 
of the relevant products and brands, there were grounds for at least some selec-
tion of sales points. Precise qualitative and quantitative criteria were laid down 
so that selection could be made on an entirely non-arbitrary basis. 
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86. Secondly, the control of restrictive agreements has been stepped up. The 
Technical Commission on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions issued 
seven opinions in the first six months of 1976, as compared with seven in 1975 
and six in 1974. Both the Commission and the Minister . of Economic and 
Financial Affairs have taken a more rigorous approach in assessing agreements. 
Since 1975, three cases have been referred to the criminal courts, and for the 
first time, the Minister decided to take criminal proceedings against the recom-
mendation of the Technical Commission. This trend towards a tougher approach 
to restrictive practices. was also reflected in the drafting and tabling of a bill to 
stiffen the applicable penalties. 
87. Efforts on the part of the authorities to stimulate competition were accom-
panied by a sustained move to ensure fair trading and to persuade business to 
accept certain constraints. The aim has been to establish a satisfactory balance 
of power both vertically, between firms operating at successive stages of economic 
activity, and horizontally between competitors at the same stage. 
88. On 11 June the Government tabled before the National Assembly a bill 
for the control of economic concentration, and the suppression of unlawful 
restrictive practices and abuse of dominant positions. The aim is to sU~Jplement 
existing legislation by establishing merger control and by reorganizing the existing 
procedures and penalties so as to make them more effective. The bill defines 
very broadly the actions and agreements subject to control. The bill does not 
apply unless a transaction creates a market share above a certain threshold, 
namely 40% of the relevant market or markets in the case of horizontal mergers 
and 25 % in the case of vertical mergers. The government has dismissed the idea 
of compulsory prior notification. The bill gives companies the option between 
submitting voluntarily to premerger control or being subject to postmerger control 
at the initiative of the authorities. In both cases, the authorities will be able to 
give a ruling only after seeking the advice of the Technical Commission, which 
is bound to take account of the social and economic interests at stake. 
89. But, far from passively awaiting these new provisions, the authorities have 
sought to establish equal opportunities for all distributors by such measures as 
controlling investments in certain areas (supermarkets and so on), outlawing 
discriminatory terms of supply and, in an extreme case, restricting discounts 
(petrol). 
In its concern to ensure fair competition the authorities have continued to apply 
the powers to improve trade practices acquired early in June 1970 and explained 
in the Circular of 30 May 1970. There has been more activity than ever in 
attempts to prevent sales below cost, loss-leaders and misleading discount ad-
vertisements. 
COMPo REP. EC 1976 
54 POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES 
Apart from purely preventive measures, the Government attaches special import-
ance to providing consumers with better information, education and protection. 
The creation of a department of State with responsibility for consumer affairs 
and also for competition, by Decree of 14 October 1976, is evidence of this 
concern, as is the Government's approval of a programme of action on 26 May 
1976, to which priority has been attached under the VIIth Plan. This move to 
organize and promote the interests of consumers so as to achieve a better balance 
of power between manufacturers and sellers, on the one side, and consumers 
and users on the other is an integral part of French competition policy. 
Ireland 
90. The basic Irish legislation in the area of competition is the Restrictive 
Practices Act, 1972 repealing and replacing the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 
1953 and the Restrictive Trade Practices (Amendment) Act, 1959. 
This Act leaves untouched the old law's main principles and does not expressly 
declare any type of restrictive business practices to be illegal but provides a 
means for bringing them under public scrutiny in order to prevent abuses. 
However, it extends the scope of the earlier legislation to cover investigation 
into the provision of services as well as into the supply of goods. Banking, 
electricity and transport services are excluded. 
91. The 1972 Act also brought about significant institutional and procedural 
changes. The old Fair Trading Commission was replaced and its functions were 
divided between the newly created position. of the Examiner of Restrictive 
Practices and the Restrictive Practices Commission. The Examiner initiates in-
vestigations into suspected restrictive practices and to this extent has wjde power 
relating to the inspection of premises and records and the obtaining of informa-
tion by authorized officers. The Examiner can also recommend fair practice rules 
te the Commission and supervises their operation. The Commission's function is 
more of an adjudicatory nature. It holds public inquiries and submits to the 
Minister for Industry and Commerce a report of every inquiry, following which 
the Minister may prohibit certain restrictive or unfair practices by statutory 
order. The Commission itself is empowered to set fair practice rules which are 
not legally binding but serve as important points of reference for the Examiner. 
In addition the Commission has the general duty of studying and analysing the 
effect on the common good of methods of competition, types of restrictive prac-
tices, monopolies, market structures and the operation of multinational enterprises. 
92. A bill to control mergers, takeovers and monopolies, revised in 1974, is 
still before Parliament. It provides for prior notification to the Minister of any 
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proposed merger or takeover where the value of the gross assets or the annual 
turnover of any enterprise proposed to be merged or taken over is not less than 
£500000 or £ 1 000000 respectively. The Minister has discretion to clear the 
proposal or to refer it for investigation to the Examiner and (after receiving the 
Examiner's report) to the Restrictive Practices Commission. A proposal referred 
to them will be examined by the Commission in relation to certain criteria set 
out in the schedule to the bill. Having considered a report of the Commission 
the Minister is empowered to make an order prohibiting the proposed merger or 
takeover or prohibiting it except on specified conditions. The bill also proposes 
so to extend the powers provided for in the Restrictive Practices Act 1972, 
dealing with the abuse of its position by a monopoly as to permit it actually to 
be broken up. Proposeo amendments to the bill are at present being drafted. 
93. In 1976 competition policy in Ireland has been in a state of evolution. 
There has been increasing emphasis in the work of the Restrictive Practices 
Commission on analytical studies on issues of pressing public concern. Cases 
investigated by the Examiner of Restrictive Practices concerned a variety of areas 
such as the operation of restrictive trade practices, orders relating to intOXicating 
liquor and soft drinks, motor spirits, building materials and radio and te":evision 
sets, as well as investigations not involving statutory orders into such arer.ts as the 
supply and distribution of newspapers and magazines, certain licence agreements 
between oil companies and motor spirit retailers, premium rates for motor insu-
rance and the distribution of cinema films. 
Italy 
94. In Italy there is no effective control at present in the field of competition. 
Act No 834 of 16 June 1932 laid down specific rules governing the formation 
of and government control over trade associations. However, for lack of imple-
menting provisions this legislation has largely remained a dead letter. 
Current Italian legal regulation of competition and trade associations depends 
on certain Articles of the Civil Code, which goes back to 1942. These Articles 
are based on the principle that free competition must be subordinated to the 
public interest, a principle inherited from the days of the corporate State but 
confirmed by Article 41 of the present Italian Constitution. In consequence, 
Italian law disallows agreements in restraint of competition only if they are 
contrary to the public interest or if they do not satisfy certain specific rules laid 
down by the law. In particular, restrictive agreements must be in writing, their 
duration must not exceed five years, and they must be limited to a specific area 
or branch of activity. Legal monopolies are obliged to enter into contract with, 
and to supply goods or services to any customer in a non-discriminatory way. 
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A number of Articles contain the legal requirements for trade associations. 
After the Second World War several bills concerning the control of cartels and 
monopolies (dominant positions) were presented to Parliament. However, none 
of them has been adopted and. they have since lapsed. 
Community rules of competition. thus present virtually the only legal standards 
in this domain to be applied by Italian courts. 
Luxembourg 
95. Several different measures enable the Government to take action under its 
competition policy. The legislation concerned covers price control (Act of 
30 June 1961), the Grand Ducal Regulation of 9 December 1965 on resale price 
maintenance and refusal to deal and the Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 
17 June 1970. 
96. The Act of 30 June 1961 is the basis for intervention on prices. The main 
aim is to protect the consumer. The concept of a 'normal' price provides the 
general test where prices are not set by the Government. In case of dispute it is 
for the Minister of Economic Affairs and the courts to decide what is a normal 
price. 
General decisions on prices are taken by way of Grand Ducal Regulation. In 
urgent cases decisions may be made by Ministerial Order, though confirmation 
by Grand Ducal Regulation is still necessary. The Minister may take individual 
price measures. An important function is that entrusted to the Prices Office, an 
executive body which has powers of investigation, verification and surveillance. 
Staff of the Prices Office and the police and gendarmerie are empowered to report 
offences against the price control regulations. 
L.e main measures are as follows: 
Maximum prices 
As a rule maximum prices may be set individually for a given firm, article or 
industry. 
Notification of increases 
The general scheme of control provides for compulsory notification in advance 
of price increases. 
Rules concerning the normal price of imported goods 
A general regulation lays down standards for establishing the prices of imported, 
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branded products and articles by reference to the consumer prices for the same 
items in the country of origin. 
Resale price maintenance is generally prohibited, though certain exceptions are 
allowed by the regulation. Refusals to deal are prohibited if they serve as a 
means of circumventing the prohibition on resale price maintenance. 
97. The Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 17 June 1970 has enabled action 
to be taken against practices restrictive of competition, which are recognized as 
being contrary to the public interest. . . 
The Act does not extend to agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices which derive from a statutory provision or regulation. 
The basic principles are in many ways similar to those of Articles 85 and 86 
of the EEC Treaty. 
Netherlands 
98. Dutch competition policy is based on the 1956 Economic Competition Act, 
which provides for control of infringements in the form both of agreements 
restricting competition and abuse of dominant position. A dominant position may 
result from a monopoly or oligopoly situation, a restrictive agreement, a concerted 
practice or conscious parallelism. 
In both cases, the basis for intervention is a conflict with the public interest. 
Where the public interest so requires, certain clauses in restrictive agreements 
may be declared unenforceable by reason of their nature or of their objectives. 
Thus, collective resale price maintenance and individual resale price maintenance 
in respect of certain consumer durables have been prohibited. 
Before applying the Act, the Minister of Economic Affairs must first consult the 
Economic Competition Board, an expert body whose advice is not binding. An 
appeal against individual decisions lies to the College van beroep voor het 
bedrijfsleven (Business Appeals Tribunal). All restrictive agreements are notifiable, 
with the exception of agreements of minor significance and agreements in respect 
of export markets. They are entered on a register of restrictive practices, which 
is not open to public examination. 
99. The Minister of Economic Affairs is currently preparing two changes to the 
law. The first will replace the system of control of infringements by an authoriza-
tion system. The need for this derives, among other things, from the need to 
harmonize Dutch competition policy with the Community policy. The political 
and legal problems raised by a change of this nature are such that it is necessary 
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to decide what agreements will be subject to authorization. In this respect the 
Minister believes that the regulation of horizontal and vertical price maintenance 
must be given priority. . 
The terms on which pricing agreements may be authorized will vary, depending 
on whether the agreement is horizontal or vertical. 
Horizontal agreements may be authorized where: 
they are necessary as a means of ensuring that a fall in prices will not threaten 
the survival of efficient firms to the detriment of customers; 
they are the necessary means of an appreciable rationalization or improvement 
in the structure of an industry; 
they are necessary in order to promote cooperation to the ultimate benefit of the 
customer; 
they are necessary to enable the firms concerned to exert countervailing power 
against a dominant buyer on the relevant market; 
they are in the public interest in some other way that clearly offsets restraint 
on the freedom to establish prices; 
the restriction entailed by the agreement is of minor importance. 
Vertical agreements may be authorized where: 
the relevant goods are regularly sold at a loss; 
the agreement is an essential factor in broader cooperation between the firms; 
the absence of the agreement would restrict supplies to the consumer. 
The second modification would give the public access to registered agreements. 
There will be provisions in certain cases enabling firms to apply for total or 
partial exemption from the requirement of publicity. 
100. The Economic Competition Board has issued an opinion on Hoffmann-La 
Roche's prices for Valium and Librium, as requested by the Minister. 
At the end of 1975, the Board completed the inquiry begun in 1971 into collusive 
tendering. It stated that price-fixing agreements are virtually inevitable where 
contracts are put out on tender, since the tenderer is in a particularly vulnerable 
position. In the long term, the Board feels that there should be a special Com-
mission to undertake more detailed scrutiny of the broad problem of the structure 
of the construction market and the system of tenders. In the short term, it con-
siders that certain aspects of the agreements currently operating conflict with the 
public interest and should be declared unenforceable if the firms involved were 
unwilling to change them. The Board is particularly concerned with the amend-
ment of prices by tenderers, preference given to one tenderer and reimbursement 
of costs incurred by those whose tenders are not accepted. 
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Numerous complaints have been received concerning refusal to deal. In the ma-
jority of cases, firms terminated these practices after consultation without a formal 
order being necessary. 
United Kingdom 
101. The competition policy of the United Kingdom has been reflected in a 
series of laws enacted between 1948 and 1973. The Monopolies and Restrictive 
Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act 1948 established an independent Commission 
(the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission) to investigate matters 
referred to it by the (then) Board of Trade. On a reference the Commission 
investigated whether a monopoly situation existed. Restrictive agreements relating 
to the supply of goods were withdrawn from the Commission's competence by 
the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956. The Monopolies and Mergers Act 1965 
widened the powers of the Commission, in particular to enable questions involving 
the supply of services to be referred to it and to include the investigation of 
mergers. The law relating to monopolies and mergers was consolidated in the 
Fair Trading Act 1973. 
102. The Monopolies and Mergers Commission (as it is now called) is an inde-
pendent investigatory body whose members are appointed by the Secretary of 
State for Prices and Consumer Protection. It has no executive power but has the 
principal function of investigating and reporting on the following matters in 
particular instances referred to it: 
(a) the existence, or possible existence, of a 'monopoly situation'; 
(b) the creation, or possible creation, of a 'merger situation'; 
(c) the transfer of a newspaper or of newspaper assets. 
'The Commission may also report on the general effect of classes of practices 
which are commonly the result of, or preserve, monopoly situations, or which 
are uncompetitive (e.g. parallel pricing). 
A monopoly situation exists in the supply of a particular description of goods 
or services if either: 
(a) a person supplies at least a quarter of the goods or services of that description 
which are supplied in the United Kingdom, or in part of the United King-
dom; or 
(b) two or more persons who supply at least a quarter of the goods or services of 
that description which are supplied in the United Kingdom, or in part of the 
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United Kingdom, so conduct their affairs as to prevent, restrict or distort 
competition either between themselves or between persons to whom they 
supply. (This is known as a 'complex monopoly situation'.) 
A merger situation may be investigated where it creates or enhances a monopoly 
situation in the United Kingdom (or in a substantial part of it) or where the value 
of the assets taken exceeds £ 5 million. Special provisions deal with monopoly 
situations in relation to exports, and to newspaper mergers. 
103. The Fair Trading Act 1973 gave powers (with certain exceptions) to the 
Director-General of Fair Trading (who is appointed by the Secretary of State 
for Prices and Consumer Protection) to initiate monopoly investigations' by . the 
Commission. However, merger references are still made by Ministers, and Minis-
ters also retain the power (in relation to nationalized industries and in certain 
other cases, the sole power) to make monopoly references. On a monopoly 
reference the Commission may be asked to limit their report to the facts, or to 
consider whether the monopoly situation or practices of the monopolist operate, 
or might be expected to operate, against the public interest (as defined in the Act). 
The Commission presents its report to the Secretary of State (or to the Minister 
or to the Ministers by whom the reference was made). He has the discretion 
to accept or reject the recommendations made by the Commission and to enforce 
them by order if necessary. In practice, where he wishes to implement a report 
he asks the Director-General to negotiate undertakings with the firms concerned·. 
It is only exceptionally that he makes a statutory· order pursuant to a report. 
The observance of undertakings or orders is supervised by the Director-General, 
who generally keeps commercial activities in the United Kingdom under review, 
with a view to becoming aware of, and ascertaining the circumstances relating 
to, monopoly situations or uncompetitive practices. Orders are subject to Parlia-
mentary approval. 
104. The Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 required restrictive agreements 
relating to the supply or acquisition of goods to be entered on a public register 
and subsequently to be examined by a new court, the Restrictive Practices Court, 
to establish whether they were in the public interest in the light of criteria laid 
down in the Act. The Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1968 made provision for 
certain types of information agreement to be called up for registration. These 
powers have only been used in relation to information agreements about prices 
and about terms and conditions upon which goods are to be supplied. The 1968 
Act also made provision for certain' agreements to be exempted, in particular 
those of importance to the national economy and those holding down prices. It 
also enabled agreements' containing only insignificant restrictions to be continued 
without reference to the Restrictive Practices Court. Further. amendments were 
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made to the restrictive practices legislation by the Fair Trading Act 1973. Most 
important, the 1973 Act took the scheme laid down in the 1956 Act one step 
further by providing for the calling-up for registration of restrictive trading agree-
ments relating to the supply or acquisition of services. Professional services were, 
however, excluded. 
While horizontal price fixing and collective resale p~ice maintenance (which was 
banned) were dealt with by the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956, individual 
vertical resale price maintenance was not brought under control until the passing 
of the Resale Prices Act 1964. This Act prohibited the enforcement of minimum 
resale prices unless the Restrictive Practices Court found that such a practice was 
justifiable in relation to a particular class of goods. The Court has made an 
exception only in the case of books and medicaments. Thus, individual minimum 
price maintenance is no longer legal in the case of all other goods. 
The law relating to restrictive. trade practices and resale prices has been conso-
lidated in 1976 by means of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976, the 
Restrictive Practices Court Act 1976 and the Resale Prices Act 1976. 
105. The main development in United Kingdom competition policy during 1976 
was the exercise of the powers given by the Fair Trading Act 1973 to extend the 
restrictive trade practices legislation to agreements relating to the supply or 
acquisition of services. This was done by the Restrictive Trade Practices (Services) 
Order 1976 (1976 No 98). The Order relates to all services, with the exception 
of agreements relating to certain professional services and certain agreements in 
other fields where special considerations arise (these include certain agreements 
relating to international shipping, aviation, road passenger transport, insurance 
and certain financial matters). Thus, restrictive trade agreements concerning the 
supply or acquisition of the majority of services are now required to be registered 
with the Office of Fair Trading as in the case of agreements relating to the supply 
or acquisition of goods, and in the same way may be subjected to judicial exami-
nation by the Restrictive Practices Court in order to determine whether they are 
consistent with the public interest. The Order came into operation on 22 March 
1976 arid required service agreements to be entered by 21 June 1976 unless 
brought to an end before that date. 
106. One interesting question of interpretation of the Order has already been 
decided by the Restrictive Practices Court when a leading property company 
sought a declaration that the Restrictive Trade Practices Act did not apply to 
certain underleases and licences which were not subject to registration under the 
Services Order. The Court decided that the grant of a lease does not constitute 
in itself the supply of services within the meaning of the legislation and that only 
rarely will covenants in leases involve restrictions. 
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107. No other case has been decided by the Restrictive Practices Court during 
the cqurse of 1976, but two cases arising in the second half of 1975 are of some 
interest. In July 1975 the Restrictive Practices Court granted an application for 
the discharge of earlier Orders which restrained certain fishery associations in 
Scotland from operating minimum price and certain other agreements, to the 
extent of enabling the parties to be at liberty to participate fully as members 
of producers' organizations established pursuant to Regulation (EEC) 2142/70 
(now replaced by Regulation (EEC) 100/76). This Regulation provides for the 
common organization of the Community market in fishery products. 
In November 1975 the Restrictive Practices Court ordered that four telephone-
cable manufacturing companies concerned with certain agreements relating to 
tenders to the Post Office should be restrained from giving effect to the agree-
ments and should also be restrained from giving effect to or purporting to enforce 
any other registrable agreement unless it had been furnished for registration in 
due time. Such an order exposes the parties to the risk of action for contempt 
of court if they should fail at any time in the future to offer for registration in 
due time any registrable agreement relating to any matter. 
108. During 1976 the Director-General of Fair Trading initiated a number of 
references to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, requiring it to investigate 
the wholesale supply of petrol, of national newspapers and periodicals and metal 
fasteners for industrial use. 
109. During the year reports by the Commission were published on such matters 
as the supply of building bricks, of frozen foods for human consumption and of 
various services. 
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Relationship between Community 
and national competition law 
§ 1 - Parallel application of Community and national competition law 
llO. The proposed merger between Guest, Keen & Nettlefolds Ltd (GKN) and 
the German firm Sachs AG gave rise to two parallel merger control procedures 
in the course of last year. On the one side was the German Federal Cartel Office 
acting under German law and, on the other, the Commission acting under the 
Community rules of competition. . 
111. The German Cartel Office was required by Section 24 of the Act against 
Restraints of Competition to rule on the compatibility of the planned merger with 
German competition law. Under Section 24 a merger may be prohibited if it can 
be expected to create or reinforce a dominant market position, unless the merging 
firms prove that the merger will improve the conditions of competition in such 
a way as to offset the disadvantages stemming f!"om market dominance. The Cartel 
Office decided that Section 24 was applicable in this case and prohibited the 
GKN/Sachs merger. The main ground for its decision was that Sachs dominated 
the German market for certain components for clutches supplied to German motor 
manufacturers. Its dominant position would be considerably strengthened by the 
merger with GKN, even if this did not directly raise Sach's market share, and 
that the increased market dominance for the purpose of Section 24 resulted from 
the sole fact that in future Sachs would belong to a group with far greater financial 
power, GKN.l 
112. The same merger proposal was submitted for the Commission's authoriza-
tion under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty.2 Scrutiny of the plan showed that the 
implications for the Community steel market were not such as to give rise to any 
objection under the rules of competition. The Commission also considered 
1 The Cartel Office's order was annulled by the Kammergericht. The judgment is not yot final. 
2 Points 181 and 182 of this Report. 
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whether, in view of the effect of the merger on the market for clutches, there 
was abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 of the EEC 
Treaty. It concluded that, although Sachs dominated the market for clutches in 
Germany, and hence in a substantial part of the common market, the dominant 
position would not be reinforced by the merger with GKN to such an extent 
as appreciably to affect competition. The Commission therefore decided that it 
had no objection to the proposed merger under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty 
and gave authorization under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty. 
113. The two procedures thus resulted in diametrically opposite decisions. One 
and the same merger was authorized by the Commission and at first instance 
prohibited by the German competition authorities. And yet it cannot be said that 
this is a conflict between Community law and the internal competition law of Ii 
Member State to be solved by application of the rule that Community law 
prevailS. 
In its decision authorizing the merger under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty, all 
the Commission considered was the potential restriction on competition in the 
steel market. The Federal Cartel Office, on the other hand, considered the situa-
tion as regards competition on markets not covered by the ECSC Treaty. This, 
therefore, gave it the power to prohibit the merger without infringing the rule 
that Community law prevails. The Commission did not act under the rules of 
competition in the EEC Treaty, which would have restricted the freedom of the 
national authority to apply its own law. Its decision to refrain from action under 
Article 86 of the EEe Treaty in no way restricts the application of national law. 
Nor does the authorization given under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty prevent 
the Federal Cartel Office from prohibiting fue merger. Admittedly, the Com-
mission's decision must be regarded as a ppsitive, though indirect, measure to 
attain the general objectives of the Treaty, and thus prevails over conflicting 
measures taken by the national authorities. However, in this case the authorization 
was given after analysis of only a minor aspect of the merger, so that the Cartel 
Office's decision to prohibit the merger could not create a situation of conflict 
requiring application of the principle that Community law prevails. 
§ 2 - Cooperation between the Commission 
and the competition authorities of Member States 
114. Ata meeting held late in 1974, the Commission and government experts 
from the Member States considered in detail the problems arising from the 
relationship between Community and national competition rules. They concluded 
that there was no need for a regulation under Article 87(2)(e) of the EEC Treaty, 
COMPo REI'. EC 1976 
RELATIONSlUP BE1WEEN COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL LAW 6S 
but they agreed to increase the exchange of information between national author-
ities and the Commission, to consult each other where both Community and 
national law applied to the same case and to reduce the risk of conflict in indi-
vidual cases through more intensive efforts to bring Community and national 
competition policies closer together. 1 
115. The Commission has subsequently worked out guidelines to facilitate the 
attainment of these objectives. 
If there is to be a smoother exchange of information between the Commission 
and national competition authorities, practical measures of organization are 
required. The scope and content of the information to be supplied and the manner 
in which it is to be supplied have both to be clarified for this purpose. 
The Commission's obligations as to information for national authorities in the 
course of its proceedings are specified in Regulations Nos 17 and 1017/68. The 
Commission has specifically enumerated these requirements, whereby all formal 
legal or procedural acts must be notified to the national authorities. The Com-
mission has also expressed willingness to give those authorities full and timely 
information on proceeding under the ECSC Treaty, for which no obligation exists 
to provide information. 
The national authorities are under an obligation to inform the Commission when-
ever they themselves apply Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty or are aware 
that proceedings involving the EEC rules of competition are pending before 
national courts, or where they apply national law to situations which also· require 
to be examined under Community law. 
Other rules exist to improve the mutual process of consultation, one of the aims 
being to ensure that, in cases where both national and Community law are 
applicable, consultations will be held at the earliest possible moment. 
116. These proposals were discussed with the government experts on 9 December 
1976 and the principles approved by them. More detailed consideration will take 
place at another meeting, in 1977, when the possibility of closer cooperation 
in competition investigations will be examined. 
1 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, points 43 to 47. 
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Main decisions and measures taken by the Commission 
§ 1 - Article 85(1) applied to restrictive practices 
Horizontal market-sharing agreements 
Bureau national interprofessionnel de I'annagnac 
117. The Commission made a ruling on a decision taken by an association of 
undertakings having legal personality and entrusted with a number of statutory 
duties.1 This association was the Bureau national interprofessionnel de l'armagnac 
(BNIA) , Eauze, France. 
The BNIA represents the interests of armagnac producers, cooperatives, distillers 
and dealers. It has statutory legal personality and is responsible for quality control. 
Its members are appointed by the Minister of Agriculture and its decisions are 
taken in the presence of a government representative. The association in a general 
meeting had decided to ban deliveries of bulk armagnac aged four years or more. 
BNIA contended that this decision did not infringe Article 85, that it could not be 
regarded as a private association of undertakings for the purpose of that Article 
and that its temporary prohibition on supplies was in the public interest, since its 
purpose was to improve quality control and to suppress false indications of 
quality which had often occurred previously. 
The Commission however decided that the BNIA was indeed an association of 
undertakings and that it had acted outside the powers conferred on it by decree. 
The measure in question was of a private nature and was not connected with 
quality control; any improvement in quality control was the result of other 
measures taken by the BNIA, in particular the more stringent examination of 
indications of quality through sample testing. 
1 Commission Decision of 26 July 1976: OJ L 231 of 21.8.1976. 
COMPo REP. EC 1976 
                                                            66-7
68 POlley TOWARDS ENTERPRISES 
118. The Commission demonstrated in this decision that where associations of 
undertakings entrusted with certain statutory duties act beyond their powers and 
take measures to regulate the market, the object or effect of which is to promote 
the uniform conduct of its members, and thereby restrict competition, they cannot 
evade the rules of competition and hold the State responsible for their actions. 
Restrictive agreement relating to herbage seed 
119. At the request of three Member States, the Commission intervened in another 
case involving trade associations, on this occasion of an uncontested private 
nature, and ordered the Union interprofessionnelle des semences fourrageres 
(UISF) , Paris, to abandon its restrictive measures in relation to herbage seed 
imports from the other Member States. 
The UISF had concluded an agreement with its five member associations and 
five other French trade associations representing producers, breeders, distributors 
and importers of herbage seed. The agreement was based on a system of minimum 
guaranteed prices for breeders, threshold prices for imports of each variety and 
a range of levies in amounts varying according to variety. The levies broadly 
corresponded to the difference between the higher home-market prices and the 
substantially lower prices charged by producers in other Member States. The 
result was to align the price of imported seeds to the French-produced seed 
domestic price, and imports from the other Member States were thereby sub-
stantially impeded. 
In response to Commission representations, UISF immediately terminated the 
system. The amounts levied during the sowing season in which it operated (autumn 
and winter 1975) were around FF 2.5 million. UISF used the money for purposes 
of general interest to the seeds industry-for instance, by subsidizing agricultural 
training centres and by making contributions to relieve the effects of the drought 
in the summer of 1976. 
Agreement between Dutch transport insurers 
120. Companies engaged in insurance, co-insurance and reinsurance are subject 
to the rules of competition of the EEC Treaty in the same way as other under-
takings. 1 
1 Second Report on Competition Policy, points 54 to 57. In April 1976 the Court ofJusticereceived 
from the civil and criminal court of Milan a request for a preliminary ruling concerning compe-
tition between firms engaged in the settling of claims in respect of accidents caused by foreign ve-
hicles-Case 90/76. 
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As a result of ex officio enquiries, the Commission requested the Vereeniging van 
Transportassuradeuren in Nederland, an association comprising the major trans-
port insurers in the Netherlands, to abandon certain restrictions of competition 
arising from two rulings by the association directly or indirectly affecting insurance 
contracts in respect of risks located in other Member States. The first ruling 
prohibited the members from entering into reinsurance contracts with Dutch 
competitors not belonging to the association (notably mutual insurance companies), 
while the second imposed a requirement on the members to the effect that, where 
maritime insurance contracts were transferred from one member to another, the 
new insurer must obtain the approval of the earlier insurer both when accepting 
a contract in a new form and when continuing or varying an existing contract. 
121. The Commission considers that any restriction of competition by under-
takings engaging in insurance which serves to intensify the continuing isolation 
of national markets under current national legislation requires close examination 
under the competition rules of the EEC Treaty. Efforts are being made witllin 
the Community to harmonize the legislation in question.1 
Agreement between sand producers 
122. The Commission has also intervened with regard to a market-sharing 
agreement between competing manufacturers of homogeneous products. 
Two important producers of sand and operators of sand quarries in the Com-
munity, British Industrial Sand Ltd (BIS), a subsidiary of Hepworth Ceramic 
Holdings Ltd, and Sablieres et Carrieres Reunies (SCR) , a Belgian limited com-
pany, abandoned a long-term agreement which had been notified to the Com-
mission after the Commission had informed them that the agreement infringed 
the provisions of Article 85(1) in a number of respects. 
123. The stated object of the agreement was to share markets between com-
petitors in the Community. The agreement accorded exclusivity to BIS in the 
United Kingdom and to SCR in the remainder of Europe for sales of certain 
kinds of sand. Each party had also agreed that it would not supply certain 
machinery for the production of sand or operate quarries for the excavation of 
sand in the other's territory. 
In addition, BIS, which is itself a producer of glass-making sand, was committed 
to purchase from SCR minimum quantities of such sand, for a period of at least 
33 years from the date of the agreement. The minimum quantities were to be 
1 Tenth General Report, points 173 to 177. 
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annually adjusted to amount to not less than one third of BIS's total annual sales 
in the United Kingdom. In the view of the Commission, this commitment restricted 
BIS in its own production and its access to alternative sources of supply. 
If the minimum purchase requirement under the agreement had been expressed 
in absolute quantities, rather than as a proportion of BIS's total requirements, 
BIS would have been in a position to increase the proportionate share of its own 
or of alternative supplies over those from SCR in any expansion of its total needs 
of glass-making sand. This provision could therefore be seen as a particularly 
serious limitation on production and markets within the meaning of Article 
85(l)(b). 
124. Purchases between competitors of homogeneous products, such as sand, 
are likely to result, regardless of cost differences, in an upward alignment of prices 
on the part of the purchaser, as between his reselling price of the purchased 
products and the price of the products made by himself. These considerations gave 
the Commission another ground to take exception to the notified agreement. 
125. The agreement further made provision for the maintenance of interlocking 
directorships between themselves. This exchange of directors enabled the parties 
to keep in close contact with each other for the duration of the agreement. This 
arrangement meant that the parties were at all times able to ensure that each was 
complying with its obligations and that the parties had continuing opportunities 
and inducements to reveal their business policies and decisions to each other and 
to influence each other's conduct, so as to concert their trading practices.1 
Agreement between manufacturers of nitrogenoUs fertilizers 
126. In the course of a review of the competitive situation in the Community 
fertilizer market2 the Commission found that the Belgian manufacturer Fison-
UCB SA and the German manufacturers Ruhrstickstoff AG and Hoechst were 
0t- ..;rating a reciprocal supply arrangement. The Commission concluded that the 
arrangement was incompatible with Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, and the 
companies concerned have terminated the arrangement. 
1 See the judgment given by the Court of Justice on 16 December 1975 in the 'sugar' case that every 
trader must independently decide the policy he proposes to follow in the common market. Although 
this requirement does not deny traders the right to adapt intelligently to the way their competitors 
are behaving or can be expected to behave, it is completely opposed to any direct or indirect contact 
between traders where the object or effect of such contact is either to influence the market condl ct 
of an existing or potential competitor or to reveal to him market policy decisions and intentions. 
See also Fifth Report on Competition Policy. point 22. 
2 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 145; request for information addressed by the Com-
mission to the Dutch selling agency CSV on 26 June 1976: OJ L 192 of 16.7.1976; points 188 to 
191 of this Report. 
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The companies are major manufacturers of nitrogenous fertilizers, and particularly 
of the most widely used simple nitrogenous fertilizer in the Community, calcium 
ammonium nitrate. 
Calcium ammonium nitrate is sold in Belgium and Germany by the companies 
in question and their competitors at list prices which include the cost of carriage 
to the station or port of destination. The manufacturers grant rebates on these 
prices at rates which are in practice uniform, so that the same net price is charged 
throughout each of the two countries. German prices are between 12 and 13% 
higher than Belgian prices. 
127. The reciprocal supply arrangement operated as follows: 
Every month Fison-UCB sold Ruhrstickstoff an agreed quantity of calcium 
ammonium nitrate. The fertilizer was delivered, not in Germany, but to Ruhr-
stickstoff's Belgian customers. The sacks in which it was packed bore Ruhrstick-
stoff's name. Ruhrstickstoff sold Fison-UCB equivalent quantities which v::~re 
supplied in Fison-UCB's sacks to Fison's customers in Germany. The price for 
these reciprocal sales was the same; it was calculated from the Belgian price 
which, as seen above, was lower than the German price. The two parti~s were 
free to determine the price for sales to their own customers, but in prat;;tice the 
price was always the same as, or only very slightly below, that charged in the 
country of destination. Actual freight costs were compared with the higher costs 
which would have been incurred if each company had sold direct, and the two 
companies shared the difference. 
Fison-UCB and Hoechst operated a similar system, although for smaller quan-
tities. 
In the 1975/76 agricultural marketing year the volumes traded under the system 
represented roughly one-third of the total quantity of calcium ammonium nitrate 
exported by the firms concerned and roughly a quarter of all exports to Germany 
and to Belgium. Fison-UCB and Ruhrstickstoff AG had intended the system to 
continue to operate in 1976/77 and to increase the quantities. 
128. The parties alleged that in the absence of the system, the cost of freight 
and small profit margin would have prevented them from supplying their export 
customers. They also alleged that their freedom to set their own prices remained 
intact. 
The Commission held that the system restricted trade between Belgium and 
Germany, and considered it quite inconceivable for long-term reciprocal supplies 
between competing manufacturers to continue if one of the two parties were to 
compete with the other on the latter's domestic market so as to cause fear for 
part of its market share. Even in the absence of formal price collusion, the Com-
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mission considered that the system led to coordination between the companies on 
distribution policy, and had adverse effects on trade between Member States. 
Agreements restricting the use of goods 
Beecham Pharma • Hoechst 
129. As a result of representations made by the Commission, two undertakings 
-Hoechst AG, Germany and Beecham Pharma GmbH, a German subsidiary of 
Beecham Ltd, UK-amended certain restrictive provisions of a supply agreement 
which had been notified to the Commission. The agreement was for the supply 
of bulk ampicillin by Beecham Pharma to Hoechst. Ampicillin is a raw material 
used in the manufacture of pharmaceutical specialities (antibiotics). The agreement 
originally provided that the ampicillin was to be resold only in the form of medi-
cines packaged for consumer sale, so that bulk resales were in effect prohibited; 
furthermore, the medicines could be sold only for human consumption and only 
in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Austria. 
130 . . The prohibition of bulk resales was a substantial barrier to entry by com-
petitors to the Community ampicillin market. Hoechst was denied the opportunity 
of disposing of these goods as it wished and of processing these goods in Com-
munity countries other than Germany. Similarly, other undertakings which had 
the capability to process ampicillin and might have obtained it from Hoechst were 
also deprived of the opportunity to penetrate the relevant market or to improve 
their competitive position in the market. 
131. The obligation to sell the medicines solely for human consumption and the 
corresponding prohibition on manufacture and sales for veterinary purposes 
amounted to an unjustifiable restriction on Hoechst's freedom of use of goods 
w" :ch it had bought. Finally, the obligation to confine its sales within the EEC 
to the German market was in effect an export prohibition. 
132. These three provisions gave the seller complete control over the use of the 
product by the buyer. In the Commission's view, already expressed on several 
occasions/ restrictions on the form in which a raw material may be resold or on 
the uses to which it may be put are quite as prejudicial to the maintenance of 
free competition in the Community as geographical market sharing. 
1 Commission Decisions in the European sugar industry case (OJ L 140 of 26.5.1973; Second Report 
on Competition Policy, point 28); the Chiquita case (OJ L 95 of 9.4.1976; Fifth Report on Compe-
tition Policy. point 71); and the Brazilian coffee case (Fifth Report on Competition Policy. point 33). 
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133. In view of the scale of the restrictions, the Commission informed the two 
parties that it intended to adopt a provisional decision under Article 15(6) of 
Regulation No 17, requiring them immediately to abandon the restrictions on 
pain of fines. The agreement was amended in response to the Commission's 
objections, and Hoechst is now free to dispose of the ampicillin it buys from 
Beecham Pharma in accordance with its own business policy. The Commission 
therefore concluded that there was no need for a formal decision. 
Information agreements 
European paper machine wire manufacturers 
134. As a result of representations from the Commission, European manufac-
turers of metal and plastic paper machine wires used for draining off water from 
pulp, organized in national associations in Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom and in the International Association of Paper Machine Wire Manufac-
turers (OFITOMEP), deleted a number of restrictive provisions from an infor-
mation agreement entered into at the end of 1972. 
135. Under the agreement in its original form the members undertook to send 
the following documents, through any existing national association, to the 
OFITOMEP Secretariat-General: 
(i) lists of prices and discounts and terms of delivery and payment, to be sent 
two to three weeks from the submission of these documents to the customer 
or from their entry into force. The Secretary-General was authorized to 
distribute these lists to other members; 
(ii) copies of invoices for deliveries to all countries except the USA, within ten 
days of issue, giving the name of the customer, the type of wire, the measure-
ments and price of the wire, and any discount or favourable terms. Subsequent 
discounts or favourable terms similarly to be notified as soon as they were 
granted. 
The OFITOMEP Secretariat-General was authorized to use this information to 
prepare market statistics and, at the request of a national association or a member 
firm, to inform it if a particular price had been paid by a particular customer for 
a given type of wire, in order to prevent users of paper machine wires from 
playing one supplier off against another. 
Such a system, in which the data needed for independent price formation are not 
compiled individually by firms but are supplied collectively to the firms con-
cerned, established links of commercial solidarity and interdependence with regard 
to prices which would not have existed in a genuinely competitive market. 
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136. After hearing the Commission's objections to the agreement, the firms 
involved agreed to stop informing each other of price lists, discounts and terms 
of sale, to send their copies of invoices to OFITOMEP or to the national asso-
ciation without giving the name and address of the customer and to use these 
copies in future solely for the preparation of statistics. 
This action against an information agreement is another illustration of the Com-
mission's opposition to 'open price systems'.l 
Restraint of trade clause 
Agreement between Reuter and BASF 
137. This case required. the Commission to examine the compatibility of a 
restraint of trade clause on the assignment of a business with the rules of com-
petition of the Community.2 
138. Acting on a complaint from Mr Gottfried Reuter, a research chemist and 
entrepreneur, the Commission decided3 that the contractual restraint on com-
petition imposed on him when he sold the Elastomer Group to BASF infringed 
Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty.4 
The Decision was based on the following facts. Between 1969 and 1971 Mr Reu-
ter, of Lemforde, near Hannover, sold his entire shareholding in the Swiss limited 
company Elastomer AG, which he owned, to BASF AG, Ludwigshafen. Elastomer 
was the holding company of a group of firms with plants in several countries both 
within and outside the Community. 
The group manufactures polyurethanes, which are synthetic substances increasing-
ly used in a large number of industries for the production of various finished 
goods. The commercial value of the group consisted primarily of the knowhow 
and goodwill developed by Mr Reuter. 
In the contract of sale dated 25 June 1971 Mr Reuter undertook that for a period 
of eight years he would refrain from engaging in any direct or indirect activities 
in the field covered by the contract, whether in Germany or elsewhere. All activi-
ties relating to polyurethanes, research and development, manufacture, industrial 
1 Dutch sporting cartridges agreement (Third Report on Competition Policy, point 55); Non-ferrous 
semi-manufactures and Ships' cables (Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points 39 and 40). 
8 Points 60 to 63 of this Report . 
. 3 Commission Decision of 26 July 1976: OJ L 254 of 17.9.1976. 
4 BASF has appealed against .this tDecision to the Court of Justice (Case 96/76): OJ C 254 of 
27.10.1976. 
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application and marketing were included in this restraint. Every form of activity 
was prohibited, including the holding of shares . in other undert¥ings and the 
making of association and consultancy agreements. 
139. The Commission found that the restriction on research and development 
was intended to eliminate Mr Reuter as a potential competitor from the poly-
urethane market, and was thereby a clear infringement of Community competition 
law. 
The restriction on commercial activities-manufacture, application of knowhow 
and sales-which taken separately might have been acceptable subject to certain 
conditions, such as being for a reasonable duration, was considered by the Com-
mission to have become unlawful by the time of the Commission Decision, five 
years after the business had been transferred. 
§ 2- Authorization of cooperation and rationalization agreements 
140. The Commission gave authorization1 under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty 
to two cooperation and rationalization agreements in the steel industry. The 
agreements, referred to the Commission in June, were to supersede the agreements 
expiring on 31 December 1976.2 In July 1971 the Commission had authorized 
four specialization agreements, being the successors to four joint sales agencies 
(Walzstahlkontore) which had been authorized by the High Authority in March 
1967. These four specialization agreements, made for the manufacture of lamin-
ated products as well as the purchase and sale of a limited number of products, 
had been concluded between four groups of steel producers in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The four groups consisted of the following undertakings: 
the Western Group-Thyssen, Krupp, Wuppermann, Ibach, Rotzel and Laucher-
thal; 
the Northern Group-Maximilianshiitte, Klockner-Werke and Peine-Salzgitter; 
the Westphalia Group-Hoesch, Rheinstahl, Witten and Siegener AG; 
the Southern Group-Dillingen, Schwabische Hiittenwerke, the undertakings of 
the Otto Wolff Group and Arbed plants in Germany. 
With the exception of the Westphalia Group these specialization groups had 
discontinued the joint sales carried on by the four agencies, setting up instead 
investment consultation and coordination procedures; the Southern Group organ-
1 By Decision of 20 December 1976: OJ L 45 of 17.2.1977. 
2 OJ L 201 of 5.9.1971; OJ L 9S of 9.4.1976; OJ L 270 of 2.10.1976. 
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ized joint buying of raw materials, the Northern Group had an office for the 
allocation' of orders and the Westphalia Group was engaged in joint sales as in 
the time of the earlier agencies. However, the main provisions of the agreements 
concerned rationalization and specialization. 
On 31 March 1974 Thyssen and Rheinstahl withdrew from their respective groups, 
in order to satisfy a condition imposed by the Commission when authorizing their 
merger on 20 December 1973. 
All that remained from 1 January 1975 were the Northern and Southern Groups. 
At the request of the members the Commission extended its authorization for 
two six-month periods ultimately expiring on 31 December 1976 whilst the new 
agreements were examined. 
141. The two agreements authorized by the Commission involve two distinct 
groups of undertakings: 
I. A 'Northern Group' which embraces the following concerns: 
Eisen- und Stahlwalzwerke Rotzel GmbH, 
Eisenwerk-Gesellschaft Maximilianshtitte mbH, 
Fried. Krupp Htittenwerke AG, 
Klockner-Werke AG, 
, Siegener AG, 
Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter AG, 
Stahlwerke Stidwestfalen AG, 
Theodor Wuppermann GmbH. 
Rotzel, Krupp, Stidwestfalen, Siegener and Wuppermann are new members of 
the Group. 
These eight companies, all of them German-based, vary considerably in size. 
Krupp (with its subsidiary Stidwestfalen), Klockner, Peine-Salzgitter and MaxhUtte 
offer a relatively wide range of products. Rotzel, Siegener and Wuppermann are 
small, each of them specializing in a single product. 
The authorization relates in the main to agreements on joint production of a 
variety of steel products: 
agreements on joint galvanization between MaxhUtte, Klockner and Peine-Salz-
gitter, 
agreements on joint production of coated sheet between Klockner and Siegener, 
agreements on deliveries of intermediate products between Krupp and Rotzel, 
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agreements on deliveries of intermediate products between Peine-Salzgitter and 
Maxhiitte, 
agreements on deliveries of intermediate products between Krupp and Wupper-
mann. 
Krupp, Klockner and Peine-Salzgitter are also planning to coordinate their 
production programmes more closely in the interests of rationalization. 
Together, members of this group account for some 29% of German crude steel 
production and 9.4% of Community output. 
II. A 'Southern Group' consisting of the following concerns: 
Aktiengesellschaft der Dillinger Hiittenwerke, .... 
ARBED-Acieries reunies de Burbach-Eich-Dudelange SA, Luxembourg, acting 
on its own account and for the account of: 
ARBED-Felten & Guilleaume Drahtwerke GmbH and 
Eschweiler Bergwerksverein, 
Stahlwerke Rochling-Burbach GmbH, 
Otto Wolff AG, acting on behalf of: 
Rasselstein AG and 
Stahlwerke Bochum AG, 
Neunkircher Eisenwerk AG. 
With the exception of ARBED all of these are medium-sized companies based in 
Germany. By reason of the financial links between them, the above companies 
constitute no more than three entities: 
1. the ARBED Group, including ARBED-Luxembourg (new member of the 
Southern Group), Felten & Guilleaume, Eschweiler and Rochling-Burbach, 
in which ARBED has a 50% interest; 
2. the Otto Wolff Group, comprising Rasselstein, Bochum and Neunkirchen; 
3. Aktiengesellschaft der Dillinger Hiittenwerke, which is controlled by the 
Marine-Wendel Group. 
In addition to specializing in finished and final rolled products and attempting to 
find a mutual basis for producing pig iron, crude steel and semi-finished products, 
the companies concerned intend to expand their joint purchasing of iron ore. 
In this group, the works located in Germany account for about 11.5 % of crude 
steel production in the Federal Republic of Germany. With ARBED-Luxembourg, 
the group represents 7.4% of Community production. . 
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142. Under the common steel policy the Commission has decided that in periods 
of seriously reduced economic activity delivery objectives by product group will 
be set for groups of undertakings depending on a common centre of decision, for 
groupings authorized under Article 65 of the EEC Treaty or for individual 
undertakings. 
143. At times when the system is in operation, at the instance of the Commission, 
therefore, overall delivery objectives will be set for the groups now authorized. 
Under their agreement they will then proceed to allocate orders and coordinate 
sales within these limits. At other times they will have to market their own 
production through their own sales organization. 
The Federal Republic of Germany is the main sales territory for these companies. 
On this market they will be competing with other large German or Community 
undertakings, such as the companies belonging to the Thyssen Group (which 
accounts for 10% of Community crude steel output), the Marine-Wendel Group 
(8.3%), Estel (7.7%), Denain-Nord-Est Longwy (6.5%) and Cockerill (4.6%). 
Other competitors are the more specialized concerns like those in the Korf Group, 
other small- and medium-sized producers in France and Belgium and producers 
from outside the Community, which are very active in this market. 
In these circumstances, the Commission considered that the agreements are not 
such as to give the companies in question the power to determine prices, to control 
or restrict production, or to shield them from effective competition from other 
companies in the common market. The agreements were therefore authorized. 
§ 3 - Article 85 applied to distribution 
Junghans distribution system 
144. The Junghans decision1 was one in a series of Commission decisions on 
various distribution systems. It applies to clocks and watches the principles set 
out by the Commission in its decisions on the motor industry,2 consumer elec-
tronicss and perfumes' and clarifies the Commission's views on systems based on 
distribution through the specialist trade. 
145. Gebriider Junghans GmbH, Schramberg, a subsidiary of Karl Diehl, Nurem-
berg, manufactures Junghans and Diehl clocks and watches. It sells them in all 
1 Decision of 21.12.1976: OJ L 30 of 2.2.1977. 
2 BMW: OJ L 29 of3.2.1975; Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 86. 
8 SABA: OJ L 28 of 3.2.1976; Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 54. 
4 Dior and Lanc6me: Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 93. 
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the Community countries through a network of approved dealers, consisting of 
wholesalers and retailers in the Federal Republic of Germany and of sole distri-
butors and retailers in the other Member States. 
To promote the sale of its products, Junghans set up a uniform distribution system 
operating throughout the common market. 
The main features of the system are the application of specific criteria for admis-
sion of specialist retailers to the network and for determining distribution chan-
nels; the legal basis is provided by a standard form agreement on distribution by 
sole distributors and wholesalers and a standard form agreement on distribution 
by retailers. 
The agreements require Junghans not to supply distributors who are outside its 
distribution system. For their part, distributors are not allowed to supply unauthor-
ized retailers. At the first level of distribution all wholesalers as a rule qualify for 
approval, no conditions being attached. Thereafter, retailers are selected on 
objective, non-discriminatory criteria: all retailers may be approved if they have 
qualified staff and suitable premises and can offer the customer a specialist service 
including adequate repair facilities. 
146. The Commission decided that this obligation to work solely through the 
specialist trade was not in restraint of competition for the purpose of Article 85(1). 
The only dealers excluded from the system are those who are not capable of 
selling watches and clocks in a manner satisfactory from the customer's point of 
view or of providing the necessary ancillary services. 
147. The Commission also decided that the prohibition on exports of the relevant 
goods to non-EEC countries by Junghans distributors did not appreciably restrict 
competition within the common market. Since customs duties will be levied twice 
when goods cross the Community's customs frontier, Junghans distributors and 
customers in the Community will as a rule have no interest in obtaining from a 
non-member country goods exported there by another Junghans distributor. How-
ever, the Commission stated that this view applied only until 1 July 1977 as 
regards exports to countries with which the Community has free-trade agreements 
since, after that date, imports and exports between the Community and such 
countries will no longer be subject to customs duties. 
148. As for the obligation for German wholesalers to pursue no active sales 
policy outside Germany, exemption under Article 85(3) was available only for 
those of Junghans' sole distributors that are established in countries where Jung-
bans' products account only for a very small share of the market. 
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Export prohibitions and similar measures 
Theal/Watts 
149. In this case, which was very similar to the Grundig-Consten case,! the 
Commission fined a British firm and a Dutch firm for using trademark rights and 
export bans in order to protect an exclusive dealing agreement. 2 The firms are 
Cecil E. Watts Ltd, Sunbury-on-Thames, which manufactures devices for cleaning 
and maintaining records, and its Dutch sole distributor Theal BV (now known 
as Tepea BV). Amsterdam. 
In 1972 Dutch wholesalers decided to take advantage of the fact that prices in 
the United Kingdom were lower than Dutch prices by effecting parallel imports of 
Watts products into the Netherlands although Watts had prohibited its British 
wholesalers from exporting. 
Between 1972 and 1975 Theal brought court proceedings against four Dutch 
retailers, one of whom-Mr J.D. Wilkes-made an application to the Commission 
in 1974. 
On Theal's application the court issued orders enjoining each retailer from selling 
goods manufactured by Watts which were not obtained from Theal. The injunc-
tions were based on the fact that the sales infringed Theal's rights in respect of 
the trademarks borne by Watts' goods. 
The goods were genuine Watts products and the trademarks were lawfully affixed 
in the country of origin. Theal also threatened other retailers with proceedings 
on the same grounds. 
150. Apart from the fine of 10000 u.a. imposed on each of the firms for its 
infringement of clearly established rules of competition, the Commission also fined 
Theal 5 000 u.a. for providing incorrect information. When notifying the exclusive 
dealing agreement Theal had omitted to mention its right to use Watts trademarks, 
Miller International 
151. Miller International Schallplatten, Quickbom, near Hamburg, was also fined 
70000 u.a. (OM 256 200) for prohibiting exports. S 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, point 47. 
2 Decision of 21.12.1976: OJ L 37 of 10.2.1977. Theal has appealed against this decision to the 
Court of Justice. . 
Decision of 1.12.1976: OJ L 357 of 29.12.1976. Miller has appealed against this decision to the 
Court of Justice: Case 19/77. . 
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Miller, a subsidiary of the American corporation MCA Records Inc., itself con-
trolled by MCA Inc., Universal City, manufactures records, tapes and cassettes 
which it distributes under the Europa and Sonic labels. 
The terms of sale for these goods applying to German and other buyers and the 
exclusive dealing agreement with the French sole distributor contained express 
export prohibitions in respect of the relevant goods. 
Miller was seeking thereby to protect exclusive importers or licensees in other 
countries, notably in the Community. 
After the Commission objected to the export prohibitions as a result of a com-
plaint, Miller stated that it would no longer impose the prohibitions and would 
absolve its customers from the obligation to comply with them where they were 
still contained in old agreements. 
152. The Commission nevertheless fined Miller, since its infringement of the 
rules of competition was deliberate: the attitude of the Commission to export 
prohibitions has become well known. In the record industry itself WEA-Filipacchi 
Music SA has already been fined for the same reason.1 
Dutch Publishers' Association 
153. Commission inquiries carried out in 1974 in response to a parliamentary 
question2 revealed that several members of the Koninklijke Nederlandse Uitgevers 
Bond (Royal Dutch Publishers' Association) imposed on their Dutch customers 
a condition prohibiting the export of their books to Belgium and the reimport of 
such books from Belgium to the Netherlands. This resulted in an artificial barrier 
to trade between the Dutch and Belgian markets. In particular, parallel imports 
to Belgium which might have been economically significant became impossible, 
which provided the Dutch publishers' subsidiaries and sole distributors in Belgium 
with absolute territorial protection. 
154. In 1975 most of the publishers concerned responded to the Commission's 
objections by deleting the offending clause from their terms of sale of their own 
accord. Only Elsevier Nederland, Agon Elsevier and Deltos Elsevier, all members 
of the Elsevier Group, retained the clause and notified their terms of sale to the 
Commission. 
Following preliminary examination the Commission informed these companies 
that the prohibitions on exports and reimports infringed Article 85 of the EEC 
1 Decision of 22.12.1972: OJ L 303 of 31.12.1972; Second Report on Competition Policy, point 40. 
I Written Question No 26/13 by Mr Vredeling: OJ C 80 of 9.7.1974. 
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Treaty and did not qualify for exemption; the companies thereupon also agreed 
to de1ete them. Since the offending terms had been notified, no fines were imposed. 
155. By taking this action, the Commission not only made cross-frontier trade in 
books between the Netherlands and Belgium easier but also substantially 
broadened the range of choice available to Dutch and Belgian book buyers. This 
matter is of considerable practical significance, since there are no language barriers 
between the Netherlands and parts of Belgium. 
French mineral water producers 
156. The Commission also acted to improve trade in mineral waters between 
Member States. The three main French producers-the Perrier-Vichy Group, 
SA des eaux minerales d'Evian-les-Bains and Societe generale des eaux miner ales 
de Vittel-accounting for an aggregate 95 % or so of the French market (Perrier 
approximately 47%, Evian approximately 26% and Vittel approximately 22%), 
dropped the export prohibition which they had .imposed on French wholesalers. 
Furthermore, they no longer refuse to act for their French customers who 
re-export in obtaining reimbursement of the duties levied on beverages consumed 
in France but not payable on exports. Although French regulations provide that 
only producers may obtain reimbursement-for they alone are able to make the 
necessary application to the revenue authorities-French wholesalers are in 
practice no longer obliged to pay the duty when they export mineral water. 
Export prohibition and minimum resale price maintenance 
General terms of sale of Gerofabriek 
157. The Commission by decision declared unlawful the general terms of sale 
notified by Gerofabriek, Zeist, Netherlands, which produces silver-plated and 
stainless-steel tableware and particularly stainless cutlery.1 
The general terms of sale which Gerofabriek applied for the distribution of its 
products contained serious restrictions of competition. 
Gerofabriek required dealers to sell only at the retail level, thus ;>reventing them 
from supplying other dealers at the same level of distribution who might have 
been able to sell the goods on different terms, perhaps more favourable to the 
consumer. 
1 Decision of 22.12.1976: OJ L 16 of 19.1.1977. 
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Benelux dealers were prohibited from selling in other Member States without 
Gerofabriek's consent, this being tantamount to an export prohibition. Finally, 
Gerofabriek required its dealers to maintain minimum resale prices in Belgium 
and the Netherlands. The prices which it imposed differed between the two 
Member States, being higher in Belgium than in the Netherlands~ 
Apart from the export prohibitions, resale price maintenance was liable to 
influence trade between Member States by deflecting the natural flow of trade 
from the direction which it might have taken if dealers had been free to set their 
own prices. 
158. By this decision, which is in accordance with judgments given by the Court 
of Justice/ the Commission has again demonstrated its opposition to systems of 
minimum resale price maintenance imposed by a producer on dealers. 
§ 4 - Article 85 applied to agreements relating to industrial 
and commercial property rights 
Patent licensing 
Agreement between Peugeot and Zimmem 
159. The Commission has reasserted its views on a number of anticompetitive 
clauses in patent licensing agreements. This case concerned the 1963 agreement 
between the motor manufacturers Peugeot, Paris, and two French inventors, Fer-
nand and Bernard Zimmern, in respect of patents for single-screw rotary com-
pressors. The agreement was notified in 1974. 
The original version of the agreement contained, among others, the following 
restrictions of competition: 
(i) indefinite extension of the agreement through the lodging of every fresh 
improvement patent; 
(ii) exclusive manufacturing rights in the EEe countries where the inventors 
currently hold patents (France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands); 
(iii) exclusive sales rights in those countries and in Belgium, Denmark and 
Luxembourg, with a prohibition for the licensors, their other licensees and 
1 See e.g., judgment of 17.10.1972 in VCH (8/72): [19721 ECR 977; Second Report on Competition 
Policy, point 23 and judgment of 26.11.1975 in Papiers peints (73/74): [19751 ECR 1491; Fifth 
Report on Competition Policy, point 26. 
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the American firm Marc Wood International, Inc., assignee of the British 
patents, to export to Peugeot's exclusive territory; 
(iv) prohibition for Peugeot to export to the United Kingdom, the territory 
covered by the assigned patent. 
160. The Commission had already stated in earlier decisions1 that an exclusive 
manufacturing licence for a specified territory within the EEC might in certain 
circumstances qualify for exemption under Article 85(3). Such was the case here, 
where the licensee had an incentive to make the investment required for the 
development of the licensed technology; this contributed to promoting technical 
and economic progress. The Commission had already stated alsol! that an export 
ban might be exempted where it involved no more than temporary protection for 
the parties to the contract or for several licensees against each other and such 
protection was necessary in order to reduce the risk inherent in the investments 
required for penetration of a new market. 
161. In the present case the exclusive rights and export ban did not qualify for 
authorization, however. Their indefinite duration. and territorial scope raised a 
substantial barrier to entry to the Community market by other technologically 
competent firms. 
The restrictions were of particular importance in that, apart from piston and blade 
compressors, the licensed technique is the only one which can compete with the 
double-screw compressor technique of the Swedish group Svenska Rotor Maski-
nen, so widespread both in the Community and elsewhere. 
In response to Commission objections the agreement was replaced by a non-
exclusive licence for manufacturing in France and for sales throughout the Com-
munity, including the United Kingdom. The parties have also the right to with-
draw from the agreement: the licensee may give a short period of notice and the 
licensors may invoke insufficient working of the licensed technique. 
Copyright licences 
162. In the British Broadcasting Corporation and the Old Man and the Sea cases, 
dealing with copyright, the Commission stated that in the matter of copyright 
licences it would apply the same principles as with patent licences. In these two 
cases it concluded that the rules on competition were infringed by clauses directly 
or indirectly restricting exports. 
1 Davidson Rubber: 0] L 143 of 23.6.1972; Second Report on Competition Policy, point 46. Kabel-
metal/Luchaire: 0] L 222 of 22.8.1975; Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 66. 
2 AOIP/Beyrard: 0] L 6 of 13.1.1976; Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 63. 
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BBe 
163. The BBC had a licence from a Dutch company to broadcast its animated 
cartoons for children. Like other television companies in the Community the BBC 
granted sublicences to toy manufacturers and printing works to manufacture 
associated products to meet demand from children generated by the broadcast. 
The Valley Printing Company Ltd, a Yorkshire firm, had a sublicence of this kind 
from the BBC. It wished to sell its products in the Netherlands, but the BBC 
attempted to prevent this at the Dutch licensor's request. 
In response to a complaint filed with the Commission by the Bradford Chamber 
of Commerce on behalf of Valley Printing, the Commission investigated the BBC's 
conduct in relation to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. Thereupon the BBC and 
the Dutch firm undertook not to impede exports of these copyright products in 
future; the Commission was therefore able to terminate proceedings without 
issuing a formal decision.1 
The Old Man and the Sea 
164. Here the Commission acted on a complaint from Ireland that the Penguin 
edition of Hemingway's The Old Man and the Sea was available neither in Ire-
land nor in the United Kingdom although it was freely available in other common 
market countries. 
The licensee of the copyright in this book for the entire common market, Jonathan 
Cape Ltd, had given Penguin Books Ltd the right to publish a paperback edition 
in a territory extending to all the Member States with the exception of Ireland 
and the United Kingdom. 
Shortly after the Commission intervened, Jonathan Cape entered into a new 
agreement with another publisher for Community-wide publication of several of 
Hemingway's works, including The Old Man and the Sea. 
The new paperback edition of this book has now been available in Ireland and 
the United Kingdom since last September. The Commission was therefore able 
to close its inquiries into this case. 
1 This action by the Commission demonstrates that a public broadcasting company, entrusted with 
the operation of services of general economic interest within the meaning of Article 90 of the BEe 
Treaty, is subject to the rules in the Treaty. and notably the rules on competition, in its commercial 
exploitation of copyright. 
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Market-sharing through trademarks 
Agreement between two manofa~turers of knitting yam 
165. In a provisional decision1 under Article 15(6) of Regulation No 17 the 
Commission came down against an agreement to share out markets for knitting 
yarn entered into in 1964 by Sirdar Ltd, Wakefield, Yorkshire, and Fils de Louis 
Mulliez SA, Roubaix, France. Under the agreement each of the two firms agreed 
to refrain from using its own trademark in the other's country; 
Sirdar nevertheless pursued an action in the English High Court, based largely 
on the 1964 agreement, although in the course of the proceedings Mr Justice 
Graham said: 
'It seems to me on the basis of previous common market cases already 
decided in the EEC Court ... , the Commission are correct in saying that this 
agreement offends against Article 85'.2 
Sirdar also maintained its opposition to United Kingdom registration of the 
Phildar trademark by the French firm. 
166. The Commission therefore commenced formal proceedings against the two 
firms under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, with a view to replacing its provisional 
decisionS by a final decision under Regulation No 17. 
In answer to the argument that the 1964 agreement prevented neither party from 
exporting to the other's territory under trademarks other than Phildar and Sirdar, 
the Commission emphasized the practical and commercial difficulties of establish-
ing a new mark,particularly where the existing trademarks are already well 
established. 
It also noted that, in a number of Member and non-Member States other than 
Fr~ce and the United Kingdoin, the Sirdar and Phildar trademarks existed side 
by side and knitting yarns were sold under them without apparent difficulties. 
The 1964 agreement expressly accepted and even encouraged this. The Commis-
sion concluded that the purpose of the restrictive clauses relating to France and 
the United Kingdom was not to avoid confusion between the marks but rather to 
protect the home market of each of the two firms. 
-----
1 Commission Decision of 5 March 1975: OJ L 125 of 16.5.1975; Fifth Report on Competition Policy, 
point 68. 
2 [1975] 1 CMLR 378 to 380. 
3 Sirdar applied to the Court of Justice for annulment of the decision on grounds of a procedural 
defect, but later withdrew its application: Case 34/75, removed from the register by Order of the 
Court dated 7 April. 
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In response to Commission objections, the two companies began negotiations 
which, on 28 January 1976, culminated in the total abandonment of the 1964 
agreement and in the withdrawal of the British firm's opposition to registration 
of the Phildar trademark in the United Kingdom. 
The Commission was accordingly able to close its formal proceedings. 
Nicholas/Vitapro 
167. In one of the first decisions which it ever took under Article 85 of the EEC 
Treaty1 the Commission gave approval by way of negative clearance to a 1962 
agreement between a French company, Nicholas Freres, and a British company, 
Vitapro (UK) Ltd. The agreement created a market-sharing arrangement in Vita-
pointe hairdressing products supported by the assignment of British and Irish 
trademarks and patents from the French company to the British company. The 
Commission gave its approval since the French company retained as its marr:et 
all the original six EEC countries so that at the date of the decision (30 July 
1964) the agreement did not split up the then common market into dif1erent 
markets. 
168. The entry of Ireland and the United Kingdom into the Community funda-
mentally altered the situation, since the 1962 agreement became capable of par-
titioning the enlarged common market. The Commission therefore reopened the 
case, as it is entitled to do since all negative clearance decisions are based on the 
facts available at the time. Even so, it was found unnecessary to take further action 
under Article 85, since in the meantime the interests of both parties in Vitapointe 
products have been brought together in the hands of one British company, Fisons 
Ltd, so that the potential barriers to trade between Member States created by 
the 1962 agreement have been eliminated. 
169. Apart from this, just as the Community has in general grown more outward-
looking over the last decade, so in particular has the Commission's attitude 
changed towards agreements of this type which have the effect of isolating the 
common market from imports from outside the Community. 
A recent example is its attack on the former worldwide market-sharing agreements 
for Columbia gramophone records which came to light in the EMI/CBS cases.2 
At the Commission's invitation the Court of Justice recognized in its judgment 
that 'a restrictive agreement between traders within the common market and 
competitors in third countries that would bring about an isolation of the common 
1 OJ 136 of 26.8.1964; Eighth (EEC) General Report (1965), point 60. 
2 Cases 51, 86 and 96/75: points 22 to 27 of this Report. 
COMP.REP. EC 1976 
88 POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISI!S 
market as a whole which, in the territory of the Community, would reduce the 
supply of products originating in third countries and similar to those protected 
by a mark within the Community, might be of such a nature as to affect adversely 
the conditions of competition within the common market'. 
§ 5 - Article 86 applied to abuse of dominant position 
Hoffmann-La Roche 
170. The Commission issued a decision1 under Article 86 of the. EEC Treaty 
against Hoffmann-La Roche (Roche), a multinational group with its headquarters 
in Switzerland and the world's leading vitamin manufacturer. 
Roche had entered into exclusive or preferential supply contracts with a number 
of major bulk vitamin users who incorporated the vitamins into their own 
medicines, foods and feedingstuffs. 
171. Whether to compensate for the exclusivity· or to encourage a preferential 
link, the contracts provided for fidelity rebates based not on differences in costs 
related to the quantities supplied by Roche but on the proportion of the customer's 
requirements covered. Furthermore, the rebates were not calculated separately 
for each group of vitamins but were aggregated across all purchases from Roche, 
so that Roche was able to benefit from the fidelity arrangement even in respect 
of those vitamins for which it does not hold a dOp:linant position on the market. 
The clause giving Roche the opportunity to align its prices on lower prices charged 
by competitors could have made the system built upon the contracts somewhat 
less restrictive, but in fact, as only prices offered by 'reputable' manufacturers in 
the customer's own country could be considered, the upshot was that Roche was 
in a position to decide whether or not to bring down its prices and thereby keep 
th'" sale. 
172. After finding that each group of vitamins constitutes a separate market, 
since they are hardly if at all interchangeable, the Commission concluded that 
Roche dominated the common market for the seven relevant groups-Vitamins A, 
B2, B6, C, E, biotin (H) and pantothenic acid (B3). The principal reasons for the 
finding of dominance were: the importance of Roche's market shares for individual 
vitamins (between 47 and 95%); the fact that Roche manufactures a far broader 
range of vitamins than any of its competitors; the volume of its sales; its technical 
and commercial advantages over the competition; and the barriers to entry for 
1 Decision of 9 June 1976: OJ L 223 of 16.8.1976. Roche has appealed to the Court of Justice. 
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new competitors on the vitamins market raised by the scale of investment required 
and by the need for long-term capacity programming. 
The Commission considered that Roche was abusing its dominant position by 
concluding exclusive or preferential contracts since the effect of the contracts was 
to tie the most important buyers of bulk vitamins to it and to prevent its chief 
competitors from supplying them. The decision imposed a fine of 300 000 u.a. 
-or DM 1 098 000, as Roche has an important subsidiary in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
173. The decision follows the policy always taken by the Commission and upheld 
by the Court of Justice-notably in the 'Sugar' casel-that the grant of fidelity 
rebates by dominant firms is incompatible with the common market. 
Giving judgment on 16 December 1975, the Court stated in this connection2 that 
a fidelity rebate cannot be analysed in the same way as a quantity rebate calculated 
solely on purchases from the relevant manufacturer but as a form of price con-
cession designed to deter customers from placing orders with competing manu-
facturers. With fidelity rebates the net prices vary from one customer to the next, 
even where they buy the same quantity, where one of the customers has also 
bought supplies from another manufacturer. Fidelity rebates which may reinforce 
dominance are incompatible with Article 86. 
§ 6 - Joint ventures 
174. The Commission has developed its case law in a number of cases concerning 
joint ventures.3 
Vacuum Interrupters 
175. The first such case concerned Vacuum Interrupters Ltd, a joint subsidiary 
established by Associated Electrical Industries Ltd and Reyrolle Parsons Ltd to 
facilitate and accelerate the launching of a new product hitherto manufactured 
by neither of the two companies. The Commission gave an exemption pursuant 
to Article 85(3) valid until 1980.4 
The vacuum interrupter is a particular type of circuit breaker for use in switchgear, 
and is currently at an early stage of development. It has the advantages of being 
more efficient and more durable than the liquid and air types now in general use. 
1 Second Report on Competition Policy, point 48; Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 24. 
2 International sugar industry cases: [1975] ECR 2007 and 2008. 
3 Points 53 to 59 of this Report. 
4 Commission Decision of 20 January 1977: OJ L 48 of 19.2.1977. 
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It is because of these advantages that undertakings in Japan, the USA and later 
the United Kingdom have become interested in this type of switchgear. The two 
parties in this case considered that if research was to achieve any long-term 
success the design and development of the device would entail financial and 
technical resources on a scale that neither of them could undertake separately. 
They therefore decided to create a joint venture for the development of this device, 
each of the two parent companies providing finance and personnel. The object 
of the new company is to develop and manufacture vacuum interrupters for incor-
poration into switchgear manufactured by the parent companies or by competing 
heavy electrical engineering companies. 
The Commission found that the agreements as notified restricted competition 
within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty since, in order to develop a 
specific product, two major British switchgear manufacturers had chosen to 
cooperate within a joint venture rather than to compete with each other. In view 
of the circumstances of the case, however, the Commission gave an exemption 
from the date of the accession of the United Kingdom to theEEC until 1980. 
Conditions have been attached to the exemption, requiring notification of all 
changes in the capital structure and in the business activities of the joint venture. 
The Commission decided that the consumer was allowed a fair share of the benefit 
resulting from formation of the joint venture. Durable, efficient interrupters will 
become available at a reasonable price. Although these interrupters are currently 
available only for low-power applications, they should in future be capable of use 
with higher voltages. 
The Commission will review the situation when the exemption expires in 1980. 
De Laval/Stork 
176. The second case concerned De Laval/Stork, a joint venture of the American 
De Laval and the Dutch Koninklijke Machinefabrieken Stork BV undertakings, 
established to develop, manufacture, maintain and sell steam turbines, compres-
sors and pumps. The joint venture will enable Stork to extend its activities and 
De Laval to undertake production in Europe. De Laval, which is already pro-
ducing in the United States, will supply the requisite knowhow in return for the 
provision of premises and labour by Stork. The licences granted to the joint ven-
ture are partly exclusive and partly non-exclusive, and each of the parent com-
panies has a 50% shareholding. The sales territory covers the entire Community, 
most of the rest of Western Europe, the Middle East and South Africa. 
Article 85(1) applies to the formation of this joint venture since the result will be 
coordination of the two partners' commercial activities. The case cannot be con-
sidered one of partial merger since the partners continue to be competitors on 
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the relevant markets. De Laval will continue making the same products in the 
USA (a near geographical market), whereas Stork will continue producing other 
types of turbine (a similar product market). In certain circumstances the two 
partners retain the right to supply their goods on the relevant markets as com-
petitors of the joint subsidiary. 
In this case the Commission announced! its intention of issuing a favourable 
decision of limited duration and with certain conditions and obligations attached. 
Other cases 
177. Other cases were settled without a formal decision being necessary since 
the undertakings involved responded to Commission objections by abandoning 
their original schemes. 
178. In one such case the two parent companies were to have had an equal share-
holding and board representation in a joint venture. One of these undertakings 
was well established both in other Community countries and in certain non-
member countries, whereas the other was a relatively new market entrant although 
it was already in production. The object of the joint venture was to assist the 
parent companies to improve their French market share as against their more 
powerful competitors already present in this market. A trademark was to be 
adopted in common to ensure adequate pUblicity. The products themselves were 
to be s}lbstantially the same as the products manufactured and distributed in other 
countries under the parent companies' own trademarks. 
The Commission informed the two undertakings that it had doubts as to the 
compatibility of these arrangements with Article 85. It was not convinced that 
two undertakings of that size, already in business as manufacturers and distributors 
in neighbouring geographical markets, were incapable of expanding their business 
on the French market otherwise than through a joint venture. The Commission's 
criticism was directed in particular to the fact that the joint venture's business 
was to extend to marketing and that the common trademark for distribution in 
France was different from the trademarks owned individually by the two parti-
cipating companies. It felt that this would not promote sales at Community level 
but on the contrary would impede effective competition between the products 
of the two firms and of the joint venture. This joint venture agreement between 
competitors for sales in a restricted part of the common market is caught by 
Article 85(1) and is highly unlikely to qualify for Article 85(3) exemption. The 
Commission dismissed as not warranting exemption the argument that the plan 
was necessary in order to balance the market. 
1 OJ C 292 of 11.12.1976. 
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179. Another case involved an arrangement to set up a joint venture to manu-
facture certain semi-finished products. 
The main distinguishing feature' of this case was that the two undertakings were 
creating additional production capacity on a large scale, representing the equivalent 
of a substantial proportion of the capacity already operated by one of them. 
There was to be equal representation in the joint venture. One of the parent 
companies was to provide knowhow, premises and labour; the other, the larger 
and more powerful of the two, was to provide the requisite finance. The two 
parents were to take equal proportions of the joint venture's output at a selling 
price calculated on a cost-plus basis. The larger of the two was required to use 
its share of this production chiefly for processing into finished products whereas 
the other sold its share to outsiders without processing, these sales representing 
the . bulk of its own turnover. 
The firms concerned have a substantial share of the Western European market 
for finished products and a sizeable share of the market for semi-finished products. 
The Commission informed them that the creation of their joint venture in the 
form envisaged would constitute a breach of Article 85. In an oligopolistic market 
the common determination of the joint venture's business policy would inevitably 
lead to coordination of commercial activities between the parent companies and, 
in particular, to the alignment of prices. 
§ 7 - Merger control (Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty) 
Main authorizations given 
180. The most important Commission decisions under Article 66 of the ECSC 
Treaty in relation to the steel industry were those concerning Guest, Keen & 
Nettlefolds Ltd and Sachs AG, British Steel Corporation and Walter Blume 
GmbH, British Steel Corporation and Six Hundred Metal Holdings Ltd, the 
formation of North Sea Iron Company Ltd and Klockner and MaxhUtte. 
GKN/Sachs 
181. The Commission authorized GKN, Smethwick, Warley, West Midlands, to 
acquire 75% of the capital of Sachs AG, Munich,l The takeover would give GKN 
the. power to control Sachs and the firms under its control. 
GKN, which ranks thirteenth among British firms, is a holding company heading 
a group of more than two hundred firms, several of them covered by Article 80 
of the ECSC Treaty. The main activities of this group are, in order of importance, 
mechanical engineering (automotive components, industrial equipment), structural 
1 Commission Decision of 29 July 1976: Bull. Ee 7/8-1976, point 2126. 
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steel engineering, the manufacture and distribution of iron and steel products and 
the manufacture of fasteners. In 1974 GKN's consolidated turnover was 
£1 137770000, and its employees at the end of December 1974 totalled 
120340. 
As a holding company, Sachs controls ten firms, the most important being Fichtel 
& Sachs AG, which, with its subsidiaries, mainly produces automotive com-
ponents, bicycles and motorcycles, stationary engines and agricultural machinery. 
In 1974 the turnover of the Sachs group was DM 1052630409 (£186306267), 
and its employees totalled 16898 at the end of that year. 
182. The Commission concluded that the main effect of the takeover would be 
a higher degree of vertical integration and a possible increase in the rate of self-
sufficiency in iron and steel products. But the firms concerned would not be 
enabled to evade the rules of competition under the ECSC Treaty by establishing 
an artificially privileged position involving a substantial advantage in access to 
markets. The transaction therefore satisfied the tests for authorization laid down 
in Article 66(2). 
However, the market more particularly affected by the takeover is not the steel 
market but the market for automotive components, particularly clutches, which 
is covered by the EEC Treaty. Scrutiny in the light of Article 86 of the EEC 
Treaty showed that the Commission had no grounds for opposing the takeover 
on the facts in its possession. 1 
BSC/Blume 
183. The Commission authorized BSC to acquire 75% of the capital in Blume, 
steel stockholder of Stuttgart.2 
Following this, BSC, whose steel sales in Germany have hitherto been insignificant, 
will be able to work through Blume's distribution network with its fifteen sales 
offices, most of them in the Ruhr and the south-west, which account for 2.5% 
of all German stockholder sales. The arrival of BSC products on the German 
market-here it has so far had only a small presence-may help to intensify 
competition. 
BSC/Six Hundred Metal Holdings 
184. BSC was also authorized to acquire 33.3% of the shares in Six Hundred 
Metal Holdings Ltd (SHMH), which controls a large number of scrap under-
takings.s 
1 Points 110 to 113 of this Report. 
2 Commission Decision of 30 March 1976: OJ L 94 of 9.4.1976. 
3 Commission Decision of20 July 1976: Bull. EC 7/8-1976, point 2127. 
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The acquisition will enable BSC to exercise joint control over SHMH with the 
George Cohen 600 Group Ltd (600 Group), which holds the other 66.7% of the 
shares in ~HMH. The share of the British scrap market controlled by BSC and 
the 600 Group together will be around 10%. 
North Sea Iron Company Ltd 
185. A group of companies engaged in production and distribution in the private 
sector of the steel industry in the United Kingdom was authorized jointly to 
establish a company to be called North Sea Iron Company Ltd. 1 The object of 
the joint venture is the construction and operation of an iron ore direct reduction 
plant on the north-east coast of England. 
The companies concerned are: Sheerness Steel Company Ltd, Sheerness, Kent; 
Consolidated Gold Fields, London, with its subsidiary, Tennant Trading Ltd, a 
company engaged in the distribution of ferro-alloys; Tube Investments Ltd, 
Birmingham; and Manchester Steel Ltd, Manchester, a subsidiary of· Elkem-
Spigerverket (UK) Ltd. 
The North Sea Iron Company plant will produce prereduced iron, or sponge iron, 
which is a high-quality substitute for scrap as a charge for electric steel furnaces. 
The direct-reduction process is relatively new in the Community, where the only 
plant already producing sponge iron on a commercial scale is in Germany. 
1J00kner/~xbutte 
186. The Commission authorized Klockner-Werke AG, Duisburg, to acquire a 
majority holding in Eisenwerk-Gesellschaft Maximilianshiitte GmbH, Sulzbach-
Rosenberg (Maxhiitte).2 
This created a new steel-producing group, which ranks fourth in Germany in 
crude steel production (following Thyssen, Estel (Hoesch/Hoogovens Group) and 
Krupp-Siidwestfalen) and third in rolled products (ahead of Krupp-Siidwestfalen) . 
. :rn the Community it ranks thirteenth in the production of pig iron and crude steel 
and fifth for the two main groups of products (permanent-way material and 
merchant bars) rolled by the merging companies. The transaction is not important 
for: the special steels sector. 
The merger will enable Klackner-Werke to make up for part of its shortfall in 
semi-finished products, which exists despite its 49% holding in Hamburger Stahl-
1 Commission Decision of 12 November 1976: Bull. EC 11.1976, point 2121. 
2 Commission Decision of 22 December 1976: OJ L 43 of 15.2.1977. 
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werke (the other 51 % being held by Korf) , by taking supplies from MaxhUtte, 
which has its own iron ore mines and oxygen steelmaking works. Likewise the 
merger will assure deliveries of coils from Klockner-Werke to MaxhUtte, which 
bas no wide hot strip mill and covers much of its requirements by purchases from 
Klockner. Cooperation between the two companies was hitherto organized on a 
contractual basis in the context of the Northern raiionalization group. 
187. Since the new group will not occupy a dominant position in any of the 
major steel product groups, it will remain within the limits necessary to guarantee 
that it will not be in a position to conduct a sales and pricing policy which 
disregards competition from other Community producers and imports from non-
Community countries. The transaction, then, does not hinder effective competi-
tion within the common market; nor does it affect the degree of vertical integra-
tion or the self-sufficiency of the group as a whole to an extent incompatible 
with the ECSC Treaty. 
§ 8 - Procedural questions 
188. In scrutinizing the operation of the Dutch straight nitrogenous fertilizers 
selling agency (Centraal Stikstof Verkoopkantoor BV-CSV) , the Commission 
asked for information on its business activities and on its relations with mimu-
facturers whose products it was selling. The information was needed for an 
assessment of the effect of the joint sales in the Netherlands and outside the 
Community on individual exports to Community countries by CSV member 
manufacturers. 
When CSV refused to comply, the Commission ordered it, by decision issued 
under Article 11(5) of Council Regulation No 17 of 1962 to provide the informa-
tion within eighty days on pain of a periodic penalty payment of 1 000 u.a. per 
day of delay.1 
CSV had justified its refusal on the ground that some of the information requested 
concerned exports made by CSV outside the EEC under an agreement combining 
all European manufacturers· of nitrogenous fertilizers under the control of Nitrex 
AG, a company formed in ZUrich, Switzerland, to supervise the application of 
the agreement. According to CSV's legal advisers it was quite possible that if 
officers of CSV who were also directors of Nitrex provided the Commission with 
the documents requested they would be regarded by the Swiss authorities as 
1 Decision of 2S June 1976: OJ L 192 of 16.7.1976. 
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having committed an offence punishable by imprisonment and possibly fines 
under Article 273 of the Swiss Criminal Code.1 
189. In its decision the Commission stated that it needed the information it had 
asked for to· appraise the effects of CSV's conduct on competition within the 
Community and that the information was available within the Community. Both 
the Commission as an authority and individual members of its staff were required 
by the Treaty itself and by Regulation No 17 to refrain from divulging confidential 
information. The fact that some of the information requested had been com-
municated to a cartel domiciled in Switzerland and governed by Swiss law did 
not deprive the Commission of its right to receive it. . 
190. This, then, establishes the principle that where information obtained or 
requested by the Commission under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty is regarded 
by the law of a non-member country as a business secret, this is no reason for 
preventing the Commission from enforcing the rules on competition within the 
Community. 
191. CSV has complied with the Commission decision by providing the relevant 
information. 
1 Article 273 of the Swiss Criminal Code reads (translation): 
'A person who endeavours to discover a manufacturing or business secret in order to pass it on to 
a public or private foreign organization or to a foreign company or to their staff, and a person who 
reveals a manufacturing or business secret to a public or private foreign organization or to a foreign 
company or to their staff, shall be guilty of an offence punishable by imprisonment or, in serious 
cases, by imprisonment with hard labour. The court may also order payment of a fine.' 
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Chapter I 
State aids 
§ 1 - General 
192. In the case of regional aids, one of the Commission's major concerns has 
been to ensure that the coordination principles it has developed are generally 
applied. This presupposes that all assistance granted by Member States should 
be in line with Community requirements, which means that it should be 
measurable. But some 50% of all regional assistance at present granted by 
Member States is in forms that cannot be measured. Technical work is now well 
on the way towards overcoming this problem. 
The Commission has continued its systematic examination of national regional 
aid systems and was able to state its view on the French system. Sufficient 
progress has now been made to enable it to comment on several other national 
systems in 1977 . 
As regards aid to specific industries, the Commission made sure that Member 
States' measures concerning shipbuilding complied with the provisions of the third 
Directive adopted by the Council the previous year, and that those for textiles were 
in line with the objectives set out in its 1971 framework for aids in this sector. 
The Commission has also had occasion once again to confirm its general position 
that applying export aids in intra-Community trade is incompatible with the com-
mon market. Finally, in giving its views on a number of cases involving aids to 
small- and medium-sized businesses it defined its position on aids for these firms. 
§ 2 - General regional aid systems 
Principles of coordination of national regional aid systems 
193. Ensuring general application of the principles of coordination for regional 
aids adopted by the Commission and communicated to the Council on 26 Feb-
ruary 19751 involved a certain amount of technical work. 
1 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points 85 to 87. These coordination principles do not apply 
to aids provided by these systems if they concern products listed in Annex II to the Treaty. 
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Two complementary factors in the common method used for evaluating aids in 
accordance with these principles needed to be adjusted. These were the 'reference 
rate', corresponding to the· rate at which firms can normally borrow to finance 
their investments, and the 'updating rate', by which the current value of a grant 
received may be determined over a subsequent period. These rates are required 
to calculate and compare the intensity of aids such as concessionary loan schemes 
or interest-relief grants. Once this work is completed, the Commission will be 
able to apply separate representative reference rates for each Member State; they 
will also be used as updating rates. 
The coordination principles also laid down that the ceilings of intensity of aids 
applicable to Ireland, Northern Ireland, the Mezzogiorno and West Berlin should· 
be fixed at the maximum theoretical level of intensity attainable by the measur-
able aids being granted there at 1 January 1975. As will be seen in the sections 
on each country below, agreement was reached on these ceilings through bilateral 
negotiations. 
194. The main objective of this work was to overcome the difficulties involved 
in certain opaque regional aids. Point 4 of the principles of coordination, on the 
transparency of aids, states that 'the Commission will pursue with experts from 
Member States the technical studies already begun with aview to finding standards 
of measurement capable of making comparable all forms of regional aids in 
force in the Community'. 
Only certain forms of regional aid can be measured and compared by this com-
mon method of assessment, i.e. those which can be expressed as a net grant-
equivalent in relation to new investments. The Commission and experts from 
the Member States therefore tried to work out a method for measuring and 
making all existing forms of aid comparable, and examined these matters at a 
multilateral meeting held on 17 November 1976. 
The Commission drew up a list of aids which cannot be measured by the existing 
method-which are known as 'opaque' as opposed to 'transparent' aids. This 
showed that, though these opaque aids were sometimes of minor importance or 
were not in fact applied, in all they accounted for almost 50% of the Member 
States' budgetary expenditure on regional policy. Since these aids are not covered 
by the principles of coordination at present, a way of measuring them must be 
found without delay. 
195. The list of opaque aids also shows that they are related to many factors 
other than investment and that some are not at all dependent on investment. 
For those dependent on new investment, but not necessarily related to the amount 
of investment, there are methods which will enable them to be measured and 
compared with the transparent aids covered by the coordination principles. 
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A direct method of measurement has been worked out for State guarantees and 
reductions in rent of industrial property. 
However, no advance system of measurement has been found for tax concessions 
(notably reductions in profits tax) granted at the time of a new investment 
extending over a number of years, because of the variability of the factors (for 
example, the amount of profits) to which the aid is related. The Commission 
therefore suggested that the Member States concerned should themselves measure 
the aid in each individual case and stop granting it when it reached a certain 
level. 1 
Aids for job creation are another kind of aid that has been considered opaque 
since they could not be measured in relation to investment. In their regional 
policy, certain Member States stress the need to make use of unemployed or 
badly employed working capacity. Aids for job creation in the form, for example, 
of a fixed amount for each new job created are one of the favourite means used 
for this purpose-whether for labour-intensive manufacturing firms2 or for service 
industries. Although· these aids are usually granted for new investment, t~lis is 
not a condition. Like investment aids, they aim to stimulate, but unlike them 
they place a strategic value on employment, so it would seem illogical ';0 base 
them on the amount of investment. 
To measure this type of aid, within the coordination principles, it is planned 
to introduce two denominators, to be used as points of reference for all aids for 
new investments. The first denominator would be the existing method of assess-
ment, where aids are expressed as a percentage of new investment; the second, 
new denominator would enable the aids to be expressed in units of account per 
job created. All aids for new investment would be measured' by reference to one 
or the other of these two denominators. Existing coordination arrangements 
would be adjusted and a supplementary ceiling-again tailored to the socio-
economic situation of the region concerned-would be set alongside the previous 
ceiling. One or other of these ceilings would have to be respected. 
The final category of aids granted for new investment and considered opaque 
hitherto are those granted upon the transfer of a firm to an assisted area. When 
the aid granted is proportional to the number of workers affected, it is planned 
to measure it by reference to jobs created and treat it as a special case of job 
creation. When the aid is based on costs incurred by the actual transfer, it will 
be dealt with in the same way as tax concessions for investment. 
1 Certain other miscellaneous aids granted at the time of an investment but dependent on various 
other factors could also be measured in this way. 
2 Aids for job creation in labour-intensive industries correspond to investment aids in capital-
intensive industries. They provide relief in respect of the burden arising from use of the main 
production factor. 
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196. A way still has to be found to measiIre aids towards firms' operating costs, 
i.e. aids not connected with or dependent on new investment. These are mainly 
intended to reduce labour costs for all or some firms in an assisted area, taking 
the form eithe.r of a fixed weekly or annual amount per worker or of an exemp-
tion from a certain percentage of social security contributions; aids for replace-
ment investment in the form of subsidies or tax reliefs for depreciation; or 
reductions in profits tax in relation to exports. These aids are to be measured 
by reference to their basis: aids for replacement investments, for example, are 
to be based on the amount invested. 
197. Taking account of the progress made and the administrative and methodo-
logical questions which arose at the multilateral meeting on 17 November, the 
Commission will put forward early in 1977 more detailed proposals on ways of 
measuring opaque aids and coordinating them. 
Specific statements of view on certain national regional aid systems 
198. Applying Article 92 et seq of the EEC Treaty, the Commission has con-
tinued scrutinizing regional aid systems introduced in the Member States to 
establish whether they are compatible with the common market. 
In analysing the socia-economic situation in the several regions, it once again 
came up against a shortage of regional statistics at the appropriate levels and 
often a lack of comparability of statistics between one Member State and another. 
This problem will have to be studied more systematically, and the Commission 
is currently considering it from all angles. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
199. The Commission found no reason to object to a number of amendments 
inf"oduced by the Federal Republic of Germany to the law on assistance for 
Berlin,! namely: 
(i) reducing or discontinuing tax privileges granted in respect of turnover tax 
for certain products supplied by firms in Berlin to firms in the Federal 
Republic and increasing them in respect of services; 
(ii) extending to the energy sector the investment premium scheme (at the rate 
of 25 %) already covering Berlin manufacturing firms. . 
The Commission considered that, in view of Berlin's special situation, these 
amendments came under the derogation provided for in Article 92(2)(c) of the 
1 Bundesgesetzblatt of 30.12.1975. 
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EEC Treaty in respect of 'aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the 
Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division of Germany'. 
Moreover, as has been shown already the coordination principles applying to 
regional aids lay down that in the case of West Berlin regional aid ceilings would 
be fixed at the maximum intensity possible fot measurable aids being. granted at 
1 January 1975. Commission and German officials were able to reach agreement 
on what the ceiling should be, but this does not concern aids covered by the 
provision in Article 92(2)(c) which are designed to offset the economic dis-
advantages caused to Berlin by the division of Germany. 
200. In their 1975-78 and 1976-791 plans the German authorities introduced a 
new method of designating development regions,2 and examination of these general 
regional aid schemes was continued. The results will be discussed with the German 
authorities early in 1977. 
Belgium 
201. The downturn in economic activity in mid-1975 induced the Belgian 
Government to take steps to stimulate a recovery. It had submitted to the Com-
mission a draft to give effect to the complementary regional aid provided for in 
the Law on Economic Expansion of 30 December 1970.3 This aid intended to 
encourage firms to go ahead with investment schemes they would otherwise have 
tended to postpone because of the economic situation; it was to apply for six 
months onIy.4 The Commission did not object, and the Belgian authorities brought 
the measure into operation by a decree on 23 May 1975.5 In the face of continuing 
recession and rising unemployment, the Belgian Government twice extended the 
scheme for a further six months by the decrees of 31 December 1975 and 15 June 
1976. The Commission did not object to these extensions. 
202. As regards the Law on Economic Expansion of 30 December 1970, contacts 
continued between the Belgian authorities and the Commission on the designation 
of development areas. Under Decision 72/173/EEC of 26 April 1972,6 the 
Belgian Government was to send the Commission a new plan designating these 
areas. 
1 Bundesdrucksache 7/4742 of 13.2.1976. 
2 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 90. 
3 Moniteur beIge of 1.1.1971. 
4 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 96. 
5 Moniteur beIge of 29.5.1975. 
6 OJ L 105 of 4.5.1972. 
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Denmark 
203. Examination of the Danish aid scheme introduced by Law No 219 of 
7 June 19721 on regional development is nearing completion. 
This law provides for three types of aid: subsidies (mainly subsidies for invest-
ments and for the transfer of firms), concessionary loan schemes and State 
guarantees; the rules on how these may be coupled together are fairly complicated. 
The Danish development areas fall into two categories-standard development 
areas and special development areas; they each cover roughly the same amount 
of territory and together account for about 50% of the country and about 30% 
of the population. The investment subsidies may only be granted in the special 
development areas. 
The coordination principles of 1975 established the ceilings applicable at 25 % 
of investment, in net grant-equivalent, for the special areas2 and 20% of invest-
ment for the standard areas. 
Examination of the scheme dealt with the form and intensity of aids, the locations 
where they could be applied, the observance of 'Community ceilings and the 
socio-economic grounds for classifying the regions concerned as assisted areas. 
When last contacted, the Danish authorities hoped they could provide quickly 
additional information before the Commission came to its final decision. The 
Commission will state its view at the start of 1977 after having examined this 
information. 
204. As regards the question of the German-Danish frontier,a the Commission 
was informed that the outcome of the bilateral talks between Danish and German 
authorities had proved satisfactory to both parties. 
205. In April 1976 the French Government informed the Commission of a 
reform of the French regional development premium system which came into 
force on 15 April 1976.4 The procedure under Article 93(2) initiated in 1972 in 
respect of this system as it existed previously therefore lapsed. 
1 This law does not apply in Greenland; Lovtidende A of 7.6.1972. 
2 Apart from three areas where the ceiling is 20%. 
3 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 100. 
4 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 88. 
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The reform covered the following three categories of aid: the regional develop-
ment premium (PDR), the premium for the location of certain service industries 
(PLA 1) and the premium for the location of research activities (PLAR)." 
In September 1976 the French Government also informed the Commission of 
certain changes it had introduced to the geographical locations covered by the 
PDR and PLAT respectively, and the establishment of a 'special rural aid'2 
applicable until 31 December 1977. 
All these changes conform to the new guidelines of French regional policy. As 
far as industry is concerned, the policy seems to be to provide further encourage-
ment for job creation, to direct industry towards small- and medium-sized towns 
and rural areas; it keeps the development of sophisticated service activities mainly 
for large towns and also aims to ensure that the size of newly established firms 
fits in with the host environment. As regards services, the new arrangements 
change the nature of the PLAT from an investment aid to a job-creation aid. 
This move takes account both of the relatively modest results obtained so far in 
decentralizing service industries away from the Paris area and the low cost of 
investments in this sector. 
Aid percentages in relation to investment have hardly been altered, but the 
amount per job created has increased. The former geographical priority areas 
have generally been retained: the west, the south-west, the Massif Central, areas 
with predominantly declining industries in the process of conversion, and the 
border areas in the north and the east. 
206. After examining this new scheme the Commission reached a decision on 
22 December 1976 and on the basis of Article 92(3)(c) of the EEC Treaty took 
a generally positive view of this new French system of regional development pre-
miums. A number of conditions were made, however, concerning time limits in 
classifying certain areas in the east of the country as premium areas, the varying 
of the premiums according to area, the measurability of some of the premiums 
and the observance of Community ceilings set for France by the coordination 
principles of 1975.3 
As regards the second feature of the French system of regional development 
aid-tax concessions-the procedure under Article 93(2) initiated in 1973 is 
still in operation.4 One of the major concessions, exemption from trade tax, can-
not at present be measured, and therefore the Commission will only be able to 
1 Decrees Nos 76-325, 76-326 and 76-327 of 14.4.1976, concerning the PDR, PLAT, and PLAR 
respectively (Journal officiel de la Republique fram;aise of 15.4.1976). 
2 Decree No 76-795 of 24.8.1976 (Journal officiel de la Republique fran911ise of 25.8.1976). 
3 The Commission's study will be outlined in greater detail in the next Report on Competition Policy. 
4 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 88. 
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state its view on this issue when the technical work on the opaqueness of certain 
regional aids is completed. 
Ireland and the United Kingdom 
207. Work has commenced on exammmg whether the general regional aid 
schemes in Ireland1 and the United Kingdom2 are compatible with the common 
market. The bilateral contacts required to determine the maximum possible in-
tensity of measurable aids in operation on 1 January 1975 and consequently the 
aid ceilings applicable to Ireland and Northern Ireland have been completed. One 
single ceiling was set for Northern Ireland and eight for Irehind by reference 
first to four categories of regions-the Gaeltacht, the designated areas (mainly 
the west of the country), the Shannon area and the non-designated areas (the 
rest of the country)-and second to the type of operation (the setting-up of firms 
or the modernization and conversion of firms). There are therefore two ceilings 
for each category of region. 
Italy 
208. The Commission had been notified in 1974 of a draft law to reform the 
aid system for the Mezzogiorno for the period 1975-80.3 It came up against a 
number of difficulties before becoming law, and it was only when law No 183 of 
2 May 19764 was passed that the Italian Government was empowered to take 
steps to give it effect, which includes certain provisions requested by the Com-
mission: greater transparency, regional specificity of aids and closer coordination 
with industrial development projects undertaken at national level or by the 
autonomous regions. 
However, the law will not apply until the implementing measures referred to 
above have been introduced. They will determine the precise nature of the aid 
for the Mezzogiorno. Discussions on this will continue between the Italian 
Government and the Commission, which will be stating its view in the light of 
all these measures as a whole. 
As laid down in the coordination principles on regional aid, bilateral contacts on 
aid for the Mezzogiorno were held to determine the maximum intensity attainable 
1 Principal statutes: Industrial Development Act 1969, Finance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956, 
Finance Act 1969. 
2 Principal statutes: Great Britain-Industry Act 1972, Local Employment Act 1972, Scottish and 
Welsh Development Agency Acts 1975; Northern Ireland-Industrial Investment Acts (Northern 
Ireland) 1966-1971, Industrial Development Acts 1966-1971, Selective Employment Payment Act 
1966. 
3 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 95. 
4 Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica italiana No 121 of 8.5.1976. 
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by the measurable aids being granted in the Mezzogiorno at 1 January 1975, and 
this ceiling will now have to be respected for aid to this region. The ceiling 
differs according to the area, the type of project and the size of the firms involved. 
209. The Commission also took a decision on a draft law1 for the autonomous 
region of Sicily providing for certain aid measures to promote economic recovery 
in the sulphur-mining areas of Sicily. 
Within the framework of a general development programme for the south-central 
area of Sicily which, in addition to its main objective, industrial development, 
will also take in agriculture, tourism and infrastructure, the draft law provides 
for new aids to be applied alongside those already existing under legislation for 
the Mezzogiorno as a whole. These aids will encourage the development of new 
industrial activities in the areas of Sicily affected by the decline in sulphur-mining 
and maintain the level of income and employment. 
Provision is made especially for assistance to small- and medium-sized firms as 
follows: 
(i) employment premiums, over a period of three years, amounting to Lit 
200 000 a year for each new regularly occupied job; 
(ii) supplementary grants, at a rate of 20% of those provided for the same 
purpose by current national legislation for the Mezzogiorno.2 
The table below shows the theoretical incidence of these aggregates of aids: 
-----.---------
Size of firm 
Small 
(fixed investment between 
Lit 100 million and I 500 million) 
Medium 
(fixed investment between 
Lit 1 500 million and 5 000 million) 
Grants for fixed investment expenditure 
on buildings and equipment 
National Law I 
853/71 (Cassa) 
15% 
to 
20% 
Additional 
20% 
7"/. 
3% 
4"/. 
I 
Total for 
mining districts 
42"/. 
54"/. 
18% 
24"/. 
1 The parts of Sicily areall depopulated areas where this 45 % rate applies. 
1 Enacted as Law No 42 of 6.6.1975, Gazzetta Ufficiale No 246 of 15.9.1975. 
2 Although a new law for the benefit ot the Mezzogiorno has been promulgated, it is not yet in 
effect. Current national legislation therefore means Law No 853/11, which was the only one in 
operation when the Sicilian draft law in question was framed. 
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210. The Commission examined the socio-economic situation of the Sicilian 
provinces where the recipient areas are mainly located: Caltanisetta, Enna and 
Agrigento. 
Net per capita incomes range between 54% and 66% of the national average. 
Since this is 65% of the Community average, the net per capita incomes only 
amount to between 35% and 42% of the Community average. For Sicily as a 
whole net per capita income is 46% of the Community average. This figure is 
below the lowest national net income per capita in the Community, i.e. that of 
Ireland (50%), whose population (approximately 3 million) is smaller than that 
of Sicily (4.7 million). 
The popUlation of the three provinces has declined considerably. Between 1961 
and 1971 (census years), a net fall of between 4% and 12% was recorded (the 
annual average being 0.4% to 1.2 %). The population of Sicily as a whole 
declined by 1 % (annual average 0.1 %), as against an increase of some 7 % in 
the total population of Italy (annual average 0.7 % ). 
Emigration rates from the provinces of Agrigento, Caltanisetta and Enna (17 % , 
22%, 24% respectively) for the period 1961-71 were with a few exceptions 
higher than in any other Italian provinces. The average annual emigration rate 
for these three comes out as 1.7%, 2.2% and 2.4% respectively, whereas for 
the whole of Sicily it is 1.3 %. This last figure is the highest in the Community 
and well above those recorded in other regions where the socio-economic condi-
tions closely resemble those of Sicily (Northern Ireland 0.4%, Ireland 0.5%). 
Despite this substantial emigration, the employment situation is poor. In 1973 
the percentage of persons in employment in Sicily amounted to only 25% of the 
total population, as against an Italian average of 32%. 
In other Community regions with socio-economic conditions similar to those in 
Sicily, this percentage is higher (Ireland 34%; Northern Ireland 38%). Unem-
ployment is considerable. In 1973 the unemployed totalled 5.7% of the Sicilian 
labour force, ~ figure very close to Ireland's approximate 6%, which was the 
highest in the Community. 
The difficulties affecting the sulphur industry in these areas are illustrated by the 
fact that 36500 jobs in that sector were lost between 1956 and 1975. Between 
1961 and 1971 the hardest-hit communes saw 13276 jobs disappear, which 
corresponds to an overall average decline of 27.%. Over the same period and 
in the same communes, the share of each sector in total employment reveals an 
exceptional decline in agricultural employment (50% and over) and a 20% 
reduction on average in industrial employment. 
These figures on the assisted areas show that the employment situation is even 
more critical here than in Sicily as a whole. Between 1968 and 1973 agricultural 
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employment in the region of Sicily dropped from 32% to 26% of the total 
(Community average 8.1 %), while the share of industrial employment stayed 
much the same-falling from 32% to 31 % (Community average 44% iii 1973). 
211. Having established that the areas involved did indeed have exceptionally 
low standards of living and serious underemployment, the Commission decided 
that the supplementary grant provided for by the draft law, although it would be 
above the intensity ceiling for measurable aids set for the Mezzogiorno by the 
coordination principles, could be considered compatible with the common market 
under Article 92(3)(a) of the BEe Treaty. The coordination principles do allow 
the Commission to grant, in specifically justified cases, exceptions to the ceilings 
it established. 
As regards the employment premium, which is a new form of opaque aid within 
the meaning of the common method of" evaluating aids-the Commission decided 
not to object to its introduction provided this did not prejudge the outcome of 
the technical work now in progress on the measurability of aids. 
Netherlands 
212. In 1975 the Dutch Government modified its general regional aid system.1 
The assisted areas were extended by the setting-up of new growth points in areas 
in difficulty which had not been included in the traditional assisted areas in the 
north and south of the country. Aid had already been granted to some of these 
growth points between 1967 and 1971. A number of changes were also made 
to the aids themselves and to the terms on which the assistance is granted. 
The Dutch authorities have been tackling high and persistent unemployment out-
side the Randstad for a number of years and felt that they should encourage 
employment more by slightly increasing the absolute maximum amount of the 
subsidy granted for investments creating large numbers of jobs. There will now 
be two options: a 25 % investment premium up to a maximum of Fl 3 500 000 
with an additional premium of 6 percentage points in the case of the premium 
being paid over 5 years, or a 15% investment premium plus an additional 
employment premium of Fl 10000 per job, the total of both premiums not to 
exceed 20% of net subsidy-equivalent. A maximum of FI 4 000 000 will also 
be set for the second option. In terms of net subsidy-equivalent, there is no 
difference between these two options. 
The Dutch aid scheme has been examined in the light of these changes, and 
discussions with the Dutch authorities are nearing completion. The Commission 
will be able to state its view on this scheme early in 1977. 
1 Ministerial Notice No 1275/III/1260 PI POR/REP of 7.5.1975; Staatscourant No 90 of 14.5.1975; 
Staatscourant No 175 of 11.9.1975. 
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§ 3 - Aid systems for specific industries 
Shipbuilding 
213. The decline in new orders and the cancellation of earlier commitments in 
the shipbuilding industry cannot be regarded solely as conjunctural phenomena; 
current and prospective new orders indicate that the industry is facing a serious 
worldwide crisis characterized by a structural surplus of production capacity. The 
dearth of new orders has led to mtense price competition, with the bulk of new 
orders being taken by the Japanese industry. In these circumstances there is a 
danger that Member States will individually increase their aids to the industry 
in an effort to maintain its level of activity and to mitigate the effects on un-
employment of the unfavourable conjunctural situation. Such unilateral action, 
however, would be at least partly at the expense of other Community producers. 
The Commission has therefore been particularly concerned to ensure that the 
Member States respect the rules contained in the third Directive of the Council 
on aids to shipbuilding.1 
Italy 
214. The assistance granted to shipbuilding, ship conversion and ship repairing 
in Italy under Law No 878 of 27 December 19732 was due to expire at the end 
of 1976. This law provided for grants to be paid at the following rates in 1976: 
4% of value for shipbuilding (production aids); 
5% of value for ship conversion and repair (production aids); 
10% of investment in building and repair yards. 
The Italian Government informed the Commission of its intention to extend the 
aids for shipbuilding, ship conversion and repair up to the end of 1977. 
The rate of assistance would be reduced in 1977 to 3.8% for shipbuilding and to 
4.8% for conversion and repair. Because of difficulties experienced by yards in 
raising finance on the capital market and the consequent threat to the rationaliza-
tion and modernization of the industry, the investment grants would not be ex-
tended and assistance would instead be provided in the form of a long-term loan 
for up to 70% of investment expenditure with a reduction of 5% in the rate of 
interest. The scheme also included a new production aid in the form of a grant 
of 5% of the value of materials used in shipyards. 
1 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points 101 to 104. 
2 Third Report on Competition Policy, point 98; Gazzetta Ufficiale No 5 of 5.1.1974. 
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215. Although the Commission understood the reasons which had led the Italian 
Government to propose these measures, it raised a number of objections to the 
proposals. First, the Commission noted that the third Directive on aids to ship-
building, although authorizing Italy to continue to grant production aid for ship-
building and ship conversion, required that this should be progressively reduced. 
The new aid for the purchase of materials would more than offset the proposed 
reduction in existing production grants, so that production aid would in fact be 
increased. Second, aids should not be granted for investment to increase capacity 
since this would aggravate the industry's structural problem and would therefore 
be against the common interest. 
In the light of these objections the Italian Government decided to withdraw its 
proposal to purchases of materials and agreed not to grant aid for investments 
which would increase capacity in the industry. The Commission was therefore 
able to inform the Italian Government that it no longer objected to the implemen-
tation of the proposals. However, as regards the production aid for ship repair, 
which is not authorized by the third Directive, the Commission considered that 
distortions of competition with ship repairers in the Marseilles region could be 
justified only for a limited period by the disturbances caused by the prolonged 
closure of the Suez Canal. 
United Kingdom 
216. In 1975 the United Kingdom decided to introduce a scheme of cost-escala-
tion cover for exports to non-member countries of certain capital goods, including 
ships. Under the scheme producers would be able, in return for a premium of 
1 % of the amount covered, to insure themselves against increases in the costs 
of eligible inputs to the extent that these increases were above the threshold and 
below the ceiling provided for in the scheme. 
Inputs imported from the other Member States and built into ships were not 
eligible for this cover. The United Kingdom Government subsequently informed 
the Commission that it proposed to introduce a new aid scheme specifically for 
the shipbuilding industry. This new proposal involved, in particular, the provision 
of cost-escalation insurance in respect of sales by British shipyards to national 
shipowners on the same terms as already existed for sales to non-member coun-
tries. 
The United Kingdom Government argued that, with respect to the shipbuilding 
industry, these two cost-escalation schemes were essential so as not to jeopardize 
the future of the United Kingdom industry. It would be very difficult to introduce 
restructuring and rationalization programmes after the nationalization of the in-
dustry if the temporary loss of orders brought insolvency to yards viable in the 
medium term. The United Kingdom Government was particularly concerned that 
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the industry overestimated inflationary trends, with the result that is was quoting 
unreasonably high fixed prices when bidding for contracts. It was therefore argued 
that the budgetary cost of the joint schemes would in fact turn out to be relatively 
small. 
217. The Commission's general position on schemes of cost-escalation insurance 
is that they may not be applied in trade between Member States because this would 
be incompatible with the Treaty and that they create unacceptable distortions of 
competition between the Member States in the markets of non-member countries. 
As regards the latter aspect, the Commission has proposed that the Council issue 
a directive requiring that, after a transitional period during which the terms of the 
schemes are made progressively more restrictive, such schemes should be abolished 
by the end of 1978 in trade with non-member countries.1 
With respect to shipbuilding the Commission noted that the joint cost-escalation 
scheme could not be approved by it on any of the grounds provided in the Treaty, 
particularly in view of the fact that the joint schemes involved production aids 
and could not therefore be considered as facilitating the development of the 
industry. As was the case with the similar French scheme, the Council alone 
could grant authorization. However, the Commission was unable to propose 
an amendment to the third Directive on aids to shipbuilding unless certain condi-
tions were met. In particular, it asked the United Kingdom Government to extend 
the cost-escalation cover to component products imported from the other Member 
States and thereby eliminate a discriminatory provision which was incompatible 
with the Directive and which it had previously required the French Government 
to abolish.2 
218. Following the United Kingdom Government's agreement to modify the joint 
scheme in this way and to give the Commission details of all cases accepted for 
cover under it, the Commission was able to propose to the Council an amendment 
of the third Directive on aids to shipbuilding with a view to authorizing the United 
Kingdom's joint scheme of cost-escalation insurance until the expiry of the Di-
rective at the end of 1977. As was required in the case of the French scheme, the 
proposed amendment provided that the terms of the scheme should be made 
progressively more restrictive. The Council approved the amendment on 18 No-
vember 1976. 
Offshore installations: United Kingdom 
219. Article 93(1) of the EEC Treaty requires the Commission, in collaboration 
with Member States, to keep under constant review all existing systems of aid and 
1 Bull. EC 5-1976, point 2307. 
2 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 152. 
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to propose to the Member States any appropriate measures required by the pro-
gressive development or by the functioning of the common market. As part of this 
constant review the Commission examined the aids granted by the United King-
dom in the form of an interest relief grant of 3 % annuallyl for up to eight years to 
finance purchases for use on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf of fixed off-
shore installations, their component parts and services provided in connection with 
their manufacture and installation. This aid is only provided in respect of equip-
ment manufactured in the United Kingdom. 
The United Kingdom Government had introduced the scheme in order to enable 
United Kingdom suppliers to compete with those in certain non-member countries 
who were able to offer export credit on favourable terms. 
220. The Commission noted that the scheme could be considered as an aid either 
to the suppliers or to the purchasers of fixed offshore installations. Considered as 
an aid to the suppliers it was originally justified by the need to enable the United 
Kingdom industry to become established in the face of strong competition from 
certain non-member countries. However, the increasing importance of the offshore 
supplies sector in the Community and the rapid growth of the UK market for this 
equipment had resulted in a considerable increase in competition within the Com-
munity. The distortions of competition created by these production aids had there-
fore increased and could no longer be justified on any of the grounds contained 
in Article 92 of the EEC Treaty. 
If on the other hand the scheme was considered to be an aid to the purchasers of 
the equipment with the objective of accelerating the exploitation of the United 
Kingdom's hydrocarbon resources it was in line with the Community's policy 
of increasing its independence in the energy field and it could therefore be con-
sidered compatible with the common market provided that the discrimination in 
favour of United Kingdom suppliers was eliminated since this discrimination was 
adversely affecting trade to an extent contrary to the common interest and was 
not contributing towards the said objective. 
For these reasons the Commission decided to propose to the United Kingdom 
Government that the scheme be modified so that aid was also granted in respect 
of equipment purchased from the other Member States. 
221. The United Kingdom Government argued that, since the level of aids had 
remained unchanged and the share of the other Member States on this market has 
not fallen since the introduction of the scheme, distortions of competition could 
not be regarded as having increased. It therefore saw no justification fo:r the modi-
fications proposed by the Commission. 
1 Industry Act, 1972. 
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After a re-examination of the question the Commission concluded that the points 
made by the United Kingdom Government could not be considered as refuting its 
earlier position. Aids whose effects on competition were relatively small when an 
indus~ry was being established could cause serious distortions once the industry 
and the market had expanded. Producers in other Member States, even if they 
maintained their market share, could only do so by accepting lower profit margins, 
which would leave them in a weaker competitive position. 
The Commission therefore decided to initiate the procedure under Article 93(2) 
of the EEC Treaty in respect of the scheme. 
Textiles 
222. The need for structural adaptation of the textile industry has been described 
in previous reports. The ability of this industry to compete in a market characterized 
by relatively slow growth against highly competitive imports from the developing 
world and State-trading countries depends critically on the necessary structural 
and technological transformations being undertaken. However, it should be em-
phasized that different sectors of the industry are affected by these problems in 
differing degrees. 
These transformations pose a threat to employment in an industry which is a 
major employer and which tends to be concentrated in areas where it is frequently 
the only significant employer. Most Member States have, therefore, felt obliged 
to intervene to avoid or at least to mitigate employment problems. The Com-
mission is, however, aware of the effects of aids granted to the textile industry in 
one Member State on its competitors in the other Member States. It is therefore 
concerned to minimize distortions of competition and trade within the common 
market. To this end it has always sought to ensure that national aids assist rather 
than frustrate structural change. Thus in 1971 it addressed a communication to 
Member States! in which it set out the principles to which schemes of aid to this 
industry should conform: 
(i) aids should be such as to assist the adaptation of the industry by facilitating 
joint research and development activities, by eliminating excess capacity, by 
converting firms to non-textile activities or by promoting horizontal or vertical 
integration; aids should not simply seek to maintain uncompetitive production. 
(ii) aids to investment must be warranted by acute employment problems and must 
be confined to sectors facing serious difficulties of adjustment; they should 
not lead to an increase in the production capacity of such sectors. 
1 First Report on Competition Policy, point 171. 
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223. A number of Member States have in recent years shown a tendency to adopt 
aid schemes for particular sectors of the industry. Thus the United Kingdom has 
introduced sectoral schemes for the wool textile industry! and the clothing in-
dustry2 and the Netherlands has taken action to assist the wool, cotton, textile 
printing and clothing sectors. 3 The cases described below are further examples of 
this tendency. 
This development has obliged the Commission to take decisions on aids on the 
basis of more narrowly defined sectoral situations rather than on the basis of a 
general industry-wide assessment, since the situation in the various sectors of the 
industry sometimes varies quite markedly. 
The Commission is therefore examining, in collaboration with the Member States, 
how to adapt the existing general principles so as to take account of this factor. 
It will reaffirm its opposition to aids which increase productive capacity, but only 
in respect of sectors where there is structural overcapacity or where demand is 
stagnating. 
Further, in sectors where overcapacity and low demand have caused prices through-
out the Community to collapse aid should only be granted to companies converting 
to other activities. In order to encourage increased productivity and competitive-
ness with imports from non-member countries aids may be given to improve 
production techniques and for applied research, provided that the results are made 
available on commercial terms and without discrimination throughout the Com-
munity. 
Thus modified, the general principles elaborated in 1971 will continue to guide the 
Member States in the preparation of aid plans for this industry and the Commis-
sion in its appraisal of these plans. These principles will also guide the Commis-
sion in its assessment of applications for the various forms of Community finance, 
for instance from the European Regional Fund or the European Investment Bank. 
Belgium: Clothing industry 
224. The Belgian Government informed the Commission of its intention to inter-
vene to promote the restructuring of the clothing industry, a sector which has been 
particularly affected throughout the Community by competition from non-member 
countries. 
In order to benefit from the aid, which was to take the form of an interest-free 
loan of FB 15000 per employee repayable by the end of 1983, companies must 
1 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, points IS3 to ISS; Industry Act, 1972. 
2 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points 107 to 109; Industry Act, 1972. 
3 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points 110 and 111. 
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undertake to participate in the State restructuring programmes, must prove their 
commercial viability' and must retain at least 90% of their workforce. Moreover, 
provided their financial resources are adequate, they would be required to make 
within one year investments in this or other industries to create new employment 
225. The Commission considered that the selectivity built into the aid scheme, 
in particular its concentration on viable enterprises, should ensure that the re-
structuring was sucessfully carried out and that the industry'S viability was in-
creased. As there was no likelihood of any increase in the industry's total pro-
ductive capacity the Commission decided that the scheme conformed to its general 
principles as outlined above and raised no objections to it. 
Italy: Aid to five companies 
226. The Commission regularly examines significant specific cases of aids granted 
under general aid systems.1 It receives advance notification of these cases in ac-
cordance with arrangements made with the Member States concerned when the 
Commission is considering general aid systems. 
In December- 1975 the Italian Government informed the Commission that under 
Law No 464 of 19722 it intended to grant aid to five companies in the textile and 
clothing industries. Of the, five companies four were medium-sized manufacturers 
of clothing and were to take over insolvent undertakings. The fifth company, a 
larger manufacturer of a range of textile products, was to receive assistance to 
modernize its capital equipment. In all cases the restructuring programmes provided 
for significant increases in production capacity. 
While it was not opposed to the restructuring operation as such the Commission 
took the view that the increases in capacity were inCOmpatible with its principles 
on State aids to the textile industry. It therefore initiated the procedure laid down 
in Article 93(2) of the EEC Treaty in respect of these aids. 
As a result the Italian Government agreed to modify its proposals in certain 
respects so as to prevent any appreciable increases in capacity in some of these 
cases. It also requested the Commission to take account of the fact that three of 
the firms were located in an area heavily dependent on the textile industry in 
which a large number of firms had closed down resulting in significant capacity 
reductions overall. 
The Commission, therefore, decided that it should no longer oppose the aids to 
four of the companies. For the fifth company, a manufacturer of raincoats, it re':' 
1 Second Report on Competition Policy, points 116 to 118 and Fifth Report on Competition Policy, 
point 135. 
2 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 168. Gazzetta Ufficiale No 218 of 23.8.1972. 
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quested the Italian Government to modify its proposals so as to avoid any increase 
in capacity. The Italian Government subsequently informed the Commission that 
it had modified the company's restructuring programme. 
The Netherlands: Cotton and allied textiles 
227. The Netherlands Government informed the Commission that, in order in 
particular to protect employment, it intended to grant aid to the cotton and allied 
textiles (rayon and linen) sector. This aid would take two forms: 
(i) interest-free loans related to companies' 1974 fiscal depreciation and em-
ployment at January 1976. The loans would be repayable in equal instalments 
in 1980 and 1981~ unless the companies presented restructuring programmes, 
in which case the loans would be converted into grants. 
(ij) investment grants to meet up to 20% of the costs of restructuring programmes 
proposed in the period 1976-78. 
The Netherlands Government indicated that these aids would be used in part',cular 
to increase productivity and to improve product quality, and that there wmIld be 
no overall increase in capacity. 
228. An earlier Netherlands aid scheme for restructuring a variety of sectors, in-
cluding cotton, in the textile industry was described in the Fifth Report on 
Competition Policy.1 The Commission did not object to these earlier aids, but 
requested that the detailed reorganization schemes for each sector be transmitted 
to it for approval. The Commission therefore had certain doubts about the justifica': 
tion for a further aid scheme for the cotton and allied textile sector particularly as 
the new scheme was also intended to promote restructuring and since the re-
organization schemes, which were to have been prepared without delay, had not 
yet been transmitted to it for approval. 
Moreover, the proposed interest-free loans were not linked to a restructuring pro-
gramme. For companies which did not subsequently undertake such programmes 
they would amount to a stop-gap production aid. This would be contrary to the 
Commission's principles. described above on aids to the textile industry. There 
was a grave risk that measures of this character would affect trading conditions to 
'an extent contrary to the common interest and provoke other Member States to 
grant further aids to the sector. 
For these reasons the Commission decided to initiate the procedure provided for 
in Article 93(2) of the EEC Treaty in respect of the proposed aids. 
1 Points 110 and 111. 
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Paper and board industry: The United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
229. Although demand for paper and board is likely to continue to expand at 
a relatively rapid rate in the future, the industry's growth prospects in the Com-
munity are threatened by its relatively high dependence on imports of woodpulp. 
This may pose serious problems if, as is forecast, a shortage of woodpulp materi-
alizes in the next decade. 
The understandable wish of wood pulp suppliers to seli finished products rather 
than raw materials will exacerbate the situation. The industry is therefore likely 
to depend increasingly on indigenous raw materials of which, despite afforestation 
and reafforestation programmes, waste paper will undoubtedly remain the most 
important. 
230. The paper and board industry in the United Kingdom has been particularly 
affected by these adverse factors. Between 1965 and 1974 its output remained 
virtually static while consumption grew by nearly one third. Overseas producers, 
located principally in Canada and Scandinavia, increased their market share from 
just over a quarter to just under a half. Although the industry's usage of waste 
paper increased from 34% of total fibre requirements in 1960 to 45% in 1974, 
dependence on imported woodpulp remains considerable because of the paucity 
of forest reserves in the United Kingdom. 
In order to assist the industry to reduce its dependence on imported raw materials 
the United Kingdom Government decided upon a scheme of aid under Section 8 
of the Industry Act 1972 involving a total of £ 23 million. Grants were to be paid 
to the paper and board industry at a rate of 25 % for the installation of new plant 
and machinery for treating and processing indigenous raw materials, for the con-
struction of storage facilities for waste paper and for significant increases in 
working capital requirements resulting from the introduction of new manufacturing 
processes and at a rate of 15% of the cost of new buildings or alterations to existing 
p'lildings. 
In all cases assistance would only be granted where the. project formed part of an 
overall plan for using indigenous raw materials more efficiently and did not simply 
involve normal renewal and maintenance. In addition, manufacturers of plant and 
machinery were to be eligible for grants covering up to 25 % of the cost of 
designing and developing prototype plant and machinery specifically for use in 
the treatment and processing of indigenous raw materials in the production of 
paper and board. 
Sine the objectives of these measures were in line with its own proposals on the 
recycling of waste paperl and since trade and competition between the United 
1 Bull. EC 3-1974, point 2247. 
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Kingdom and the other Member States are relatively slight in this field the Com-
mission decided not to raise any objections to the scheme. 
231. For the same reasons the Gommission raised no objections to the measures 
to promote the increased usage of waste paper by the paper and board industry 
of which it was informed by the Netherlands Government. Aids would be given 
in the form of grants to cover 25 % o·f the costs of investments involving the use 
of a variety of advanced techniques such as. de-inking and dispersion. l The bud-
getary cost of the scheme would be Fl 10.6 million. To be eligible projects should 
contribute not only to an increased usage of waste paper but also to a reduction in 
woodpulp requirements or to an improvement in product quality. It was expected 
that the paper and board industry would, as a result of these aids, increase its 
consumption of waste paper by around 40%. 
Machine tools: The United Kingdom 
232. Demand for machine tools is largely dependent on the level of investment in 
the metal goods industries, which is in turn dependent on the general lev'~l of in-
vestment. Cyclical fluctuations in the level of investment are further arr.plified in 
the consequent fluctuations of the volume of new orders for machine tools. Since 
there is a lag between changes in the general level of economic activity and changes. 
in the level of investment and a further lag before the latter affects demand for 
machine tools, the machine tool industry also suffers from difficulties in the re-
cruitment of skilled labour during cyclical upturns. 
The machine tool industry can of course take certain counter-cyclical measures 
itself, particularly in export markets. In the case of the United Kingdom's industry, 
however, the cyclical problems have been exacerbated by its diminishing com-
petitiveness. Thus between 1966 and 1973 imports rose from 26% to 39% of 
apparent consumption while its share of the EEC market declined from 26% to 
11 %. These trends posed a serious threat to the future viability of the industry. 
The United Kingdom Government had indeed already had to intervene to rescue 
several companies in serious financial difficulties. 
233. The British Government therefore decided to introduce a scheme of as-
sistance2 to encourage the industry to modernize and to become more competitive. 
Under the scheme the following aids were to be provided: 
(i) loans at favourable rates of interest towards the costs of· developing new 
products; 
1 Technique for homogenizing waste paper pulp and other pulp. 
2 Industry Act, 1972. 
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(ii) grants at rates of 20% and 15% after deducting any Regional Development 
Grants for investment in new plant and machinery or in new buildings or 
extensions respectively; 
(iii) loans at favourable rates of interest for restructuring operations; 
(iv) loans at favourable rates of interest to finance stockbuilding during the cyclical 
trough up to 31 December 1976. 
234. The Commission did not object to the assistance for the development of new 
products, for investment and for restructuring as it felt that these aids would enable 
the industry to increase its competitiveness and thus assure its future commercial 
viability without affecting trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common 
interest. It also noted that assistance for the development of new products was 
given in a number of the other Member States as part of general aid programmes 
for research and development. 
On the other hand, the Commission considered that the proposed aids for stock-
building would not encourage companies to make the fundamental changes neces-
sary for commercial viability. Indeed the effect might well be the opposite of that 
desired, since companies would be able to increase their rate of production and the 
need to change might therefore seem less urgent Moreover, there was a risk of 
serious distortions of competition since United Kingdom companies would be able 
to build up stock relatively cheaply and would be well placed to take advantage 
of the upturn in demand, thus increasing the difficulties of their competitors in the 
other Member States who have also suffered from the adverse conjuncture. 
In view of the Commission's objections the United Kingdom ,Government decided 
not to proceed with the stockbuilding proposal, and the Commission was able to 
inform the United Kingdom Government that on this basis it had no objections 
to the scheme. 
235. The stockbuilding of machine tools was subsequently undertaken with finance 
plJvided by the National Enterprise Board (NEB) on terms different from those 
originally envisaged in the aid scheme. The Commission will examiIie this activity 
in the context of its general appraisal of the NEB. 
Electronic data processing 
236. In countries with advanced economies electronic data processing has played 
an increasingly important role in a wide range of activities. The rapid growth 
experienced in the past is expected to continue. Nevertheless European computer 
and EDP equipment manufacturers face an uncertain future, since they are too 
small to be effective competitors in a world market dominated by companies from 
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non-member countries. This weak competitive position has resulted in inadequate 
profitability and in consequent difficulties in financing research and development, 
investment in new equipment· and the preparation of software. These difficulties 
have led to technological backwardness in some areas, which has further weakened 
their competitiveness. 
The Commission therefore considers that aids to assist the development of the 
European data-processing industry can in general be justified, particularly where 
they form part of a coordinated European approach. The effects of one Member 
State's aids on other European producers are, moreover, likely to be relatively 
small since competition is mainly with producers in non-member countries. 
The Commission examined . aid measures proposed by the French and German 
Governments for this sector and in each case sought the views of the other Member 
States. 
France 
237. For the reasons set out above the Commission did not raise any objections 
to the French Government's new strategy for its computer industry. The Compagnie 
Internationale pour I'Information (ClI) was to withdraw from Unidata and form 
a joint company, ClI-HB, with Honeywell-Bull, itself a subsidiary of the Honey-
well Group. In order to enable the merger to overcome the initial difficulties, aid 
would be provided on a temporary and progressively reduced basis during the 
period 1976-79. The French Government expected that the new grouping would 
be commercially viable by the end of this period. 
Assistance would be provided in the following ways: 
(i) an annual grant starting at FF 500 million in 1976 falling to FF 100 million 
in 1979; 
(ii) these annual grants would be reduced if ClI-HB's sales to the public and 
semi-public sector exceeded the levels expected on the basis of the current 
combined sales of the two companies; alternatively, if sales fell below these 
levels, the grants would be correspondingly increased; 
(iii) ClI's losses in November and December 1975 would be offset by a grant 
from the State, which would provide a further FF 135 million to cover sub-
sequent losses; 
(iv) ClI-HB would be eligible for loans on current market terms from the Fonds 
de Developpement Economique et Social up to a total of FF 150 million, 
which would take the place of those previously granted to ClI. 
The Commission requested the French Government to take steps to create con-
ditions favourable to a resumption of European collaboration. 
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Germany 
238. The third German data processing programme1 provides for aids to en-
courage: 
(i) the development of data processing applications in education, in research and 
in administration; 
(ii) research and development by the computer industry; 
(iii) the development of data processing by the Gesellschaft filr Mathematik und 
Datenverarbeitung, a public research establishment. 
The State will contribute up to 50% of the cost of research and development pro-
jects carried out by the private sector and up to 100% of the cost of work carried 
out by research establishments or public bodies. Grants to projects considered to 
be ready for commercial exploitation will be repayable. Repayment will not, how-
ever, be necessary if the anticipated results of the projects are not attained or if 
they turn out not to be commercially viable. 
The programme covers the period 1976-79 and involves a total budget of DM 1 575 
million, of which more than half will be devoted to promoting the use of data 
processing and a further third to research and development by the computer 
industry. 
F or the reasons set out above the Commission decided not to oppose the im-
plementation of the measures. However, for aids for smaller computers and for 
computer peripherals, the Commission considered that, in view of the fragmenta-
tion of this sector of the industry, there was special need for coordination in the 
common interest between the Member States in order to avoid a duplication of 
effort. Such coordination would moreover be in line with the Council Resolution 
of 15 July 1974.2 The Commission therefore made its agreement to the aids for 
this sector conditional on an undertaking by the German Government to keep it 
informed of the projects it intended to support. This will enable the Commission 
to take steps to ensure adequate coordination of the efforts made by Member 
States in this field. 
Aids financed by parafiscal charges 
Italy: Aids to the press 
239. The Commission considers that aids to the press are not in general in-
compatible with the common market in terms of Article 92(1) of the EEC Treaty 
1 Second Report on Competition Policy, point 106. Drittes DV-Programm 1976-1979 des Bundes-
ministers fiir Forschung und Technologic, Bonn. 
2 OJ C 86 of 20.7.1974. 
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since this is not a sector where there is competition between the producers in the 
various Member States. The Commission's principal concern in this area is there-
fore to ensure that the terms on which such aids are granted do not result in 
distortions of competition and trade in other ways. 
Thus in 19741 the Italian Government, following the Commission's intervention, 
made a number of modifications to its system of aids granted to the press by the 
Ente Nazionale per la Cellulosa e la Carta (ENCC). In particular the aid granted 
to newspapers and periodicals in the form of a premium calculated on 'the basis 
of the quantities of newsprint used would now be granted also in respect of news-
print imported by printing firms directly from the other Member States without 
passing through the intermediary of the ENCC. 
240. However, without notifying the Commission of its intentions, the Italian 
Government introduced, by a law of 6 June 1975,2 a new system of aids to the 
press to be administered ·by the ENCC and apparently involving a similar 
discrimination against newsprint imported directly from the other Member States. 
The Commission therefore initiated the procedure provided for in Article 93(2) 
of the EEC Treaty against this new aid system. 3 
The Italian Government informed the Commission that there was in fact no 
discrimination and that the sole object of the procedure for granting the aid 
through ENCC was to ensure that the newsprint was used for printing newspapers 
and periodicals. 
The Commission nevertheless decided in June 19764 that the Italian Government 
should publish this statement so that the firms concerned would be aware of their 
opportunity to qualify for assistance under the law of 6 June 1975 when importing 
paper directly from the other Member States. The Italian Government subsequently 
informed the Commission that it had abided by this decision. Letters had been 
sent to the associations of publishers of newspapers and. periodicals and to the 
ENCC, which had published a copy in its monthly bulletin for September 1976. 
The Commission decided that it could consider the matter closed. 
§ 4 - Aids to exports 
241. The Commission has already stated its views on the granting of export aids 
in trade between Member States in its previous Reports on Competition Policy. 5 
It considers that Member States' action in artificially stimulating sales in other 
1 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 161. 
2 Gazzetta Ufficiale No 149 of 9.6.1975. 
3 OJ C 184 of 13.8.1975. 
4 OJ L 185 of 9.7.1976. 
5 First Report on Competition Policy, points 187 and 188; Second Report on Competition Policy, 
points 112 to 114; Third Report on Competition Policy, point 111. 
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member countries is incompatible with the general principles of a common market 
where a customs union has existed since 1968 and in particular with the free 
movement of goods. No derogation can be applied to these aids whatever their 
intensity, form, grounds or purpose. This view was confirmed by the Court of 
Justice1 in its judgment in 1969 on the French preferential rediscount rates out-
.lined below. 
242. In the past therefore, the Commission has required abolition in trade between 
Member States: 
(i) of price guarantee systems that France and Italy applied or might have applied 
to export transactions; 
(ii) preferential rates which the Belgian and French central banks applied to the 
rediscount of credits to Belgian and French exporters and also the preferential 
rate applied by the Medio Credito Italiano to medium-term loans granted to 
Italian . exporters. . , 
From 1972 onwards, following complaints, the Commission also looked into 
tax concessions granted in France to French firms setting up establishments abroad.2 
Over a three-year period these firms could legally deduct from their taxable profit 
in France certain operating expenditures and costs relating to the setting-up of 
study centres, sales offices, construction sites ·or industrial plants. This income is: 
not taxable in France however, but abroad, where this expenditure may be taken 
into account for the determination of taxable income. 
This opportunity for double deduction was in effect similar to a non-reimbursable 
grant. It therefore constituted an aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the 
EEC Treaty since it promoted the export of goods and services on the part of 
French firms to other Member States and moreover, infringed the rules on right of 
establishment, which lay down that Member States must refrain from facilitating 
through aids the establishment of their nationals in other'Member States. Following 
initiation by the Commission of the procedure under Article 93(2) of the EEe 
Treaty, the French Government repealed this measure. However, the action did 
not entail the immediate abolition of all these aids and the Commission took a 
decision prohibiting this system. 3 
243. In 1976 the Commission received a complaint froin a trade organization 
concerning assistance granted by the Italian Government for the promotion of 
Italian toy sales on the French market. The Commissic;m had not received prior 
notification of this assistance as laid down in the EEC Treaty. 
1 Joined Cases 6 and 11/69: [1969] ECR 523. 
2. Second Report on Competition Policy, point 113; Third Report on Competition Policy, point 111. 
3 OJ L 253 of 10.9.1973. 
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After checking on the information provided by the plaintiff, it appeared that this 
assistance was granted by the ICE (Istituto Nazionale per i1 CommerCio Estero) in 
the form of a grant covering approximately two-thirds of the expenses for joint 
sales campaigns covering all information media (television and radio broadcasts, 
press advertisements, catalogue distribution, posters). These campaigns were to 
be spread over three years (1975-77). 
The French market had been selected by the Italian authorities and businessmen 
because its population and social and cultural background made it most likely to 
absorb Italian toys and because it was already a major outlet for this Italian in-
dustry whose exports to France were equivalent to 10% of French production and 
approximately one-third of French purchases of foreign toys. 
In view of· its general attitude towards export aids in trade between Member 
States, the Commission deCided to initiate the procedure under Article 93(2) in 
respect of this assistance. By financing a major proportion of advertising ex-
penditure on increasing sales of Italian toys in France, the Italian State was bearing 
costs which in normal circumstances should be borne by the firms themselves. This 
assistance amounted to almost 1 % of the Italian toy industry's total sales in France. 
It was decided that it was likely to affect trade and competition between Member 
States to an extent contrary to the common interest. 
244. While dealing with this case, the Commission received complaints and re-
quests for information from certain Member States and other trade organizations 
questioning further similar measures taken by the ICE involving the markets of 
other Member States and industries: footwear, clothing and textiles. 
Although the sums involved were small, the effects of the assistance could have 
been particularly harmful for they involved industries experienCing considerable 
difficulties in marketing both in Europe and in their traditional external markets 
owing to increasing competition from manufacturers in East Europe and from 
those with cheap labour· sources; they were also having to deal with a drop in 
demand caused by the recession. These aids might also have magnified the con-
sequences of the devaluation of the lira which were already making Italian com-
petition stiffer on the markets of certain Member States. 
The Commission therefore decided to extend the action it had initiated concerning 
toys by opening a new procedure under Article 93(2) of the EEC Treaty in 
respect of all the aid systems administrated by the ICE for Italian industries. It 
also took the opportunity1. of reminding the other Member States of its views on 
1 Shortly before this the Commission had obtained the French Government's agreement to stop 
granting assistance for similar promotion campaigns for its children's clothing industry on the 
German market. 
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this matter and instructed them, if they were applying similar aid schemes, to 
discontinue them immedi~tely in trade with other Member States. 
245. Following initiation of this procedure, the Italian Government made a number 
of comments to the Commission refuting the fact that this assistance was in-
compatible with the common market. It held, in particular, that the assistance 
could not affect competition and trade between Member States since: 
(i) similar measures existed in the other Member States and in non-member 
countries; 
(ii) the assistance was granted for advertising campaigns promoting Italian toys, 
footwear or clothing as a whole and not individual products of firms; 
(iii) the aid intensity was very low, in view of the small amounts earmarked for 
this purpose. 
The Italian Government added that the Commission's action could put non-member 
countries at an advantage for they could continue to use similar measures for 
their sales within the common market. 
The Commission did not find these objections valid. The other Member States 
had confirmed that they were not applying similar measures in trade between 
Member States. If it had received a response to the contrary the Commission 
would have extended its action and not left the Italian scheme in force. Moreover, 
whether the advertising in question was general or not, the aim and effect of the 
Italian assistance was to facilitate the penetration of certain Italian products on 
the markets of other Member States. The Italian Government's action could not 
be taken any other way. The Italian authorities themselves stressed, at least in 
one case, toys, that the assistance granted amounted to almost 1 % of total annual 
sales by the Italian industry on the French market; this was not a negligible amount. 
Since in some cases the industries concerned were experiencing difficulties in the 
Community, even a limited advantage given to Italian firms could substantially 
worsen the situation of their Community competitors. Finally, consideration of the 
fact-which had not been established-that non-member countries could use similar 
measures to support their sales within the Community would have constituted a 
precedent and enabled Member States to outbid each other under the pretext of 
counteracting the measures of non-member countries. 
Having taken account of these considerations, the Commission finally adopted on 
8 December 1976 a Decision' instructing the Italian Government to discontinue, 
without delay, the financial assistance granted by the ICE for advertising cam-
paigns launched by certain Italian industries on the markets of other Member 
States, since it was irreconcilable with the principles of a common market, partic-
ularly the free movement of goods. 
1 OJ No L 270 of 2.10.1976. 
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§ 5 - Aids to the environment 
246. 'In November 1974 the Commission sent a memorandum to the Member 
States setting out the 'Community approach to State aids in environmental matters'.1 
It informed them of the guidelines it intended to apply in assessing the compati-
bility of this type of assistance. These specified that for a transitional period (1975-
80) and to make up for the fact that the Community was lagging behind in matters 
of environmental protection, the Member States would be able, within certain 
limits, to grant assistance for investments to combat pollution made by existing 
firms, without them necessarily being warranted by difficulties experienced by the 
recipients in fulfilling their obligations. Assistance faIling outside these con-
ditions or granted after 1980 would only be permitted if warranted by particular 
industrial or regional difficulties. 
The Commission has had to make use of these guidelines on numerous occasions. 
247. The Commission had initiated a procedure under Article 93(2) of the EEC 
Treaty in respect of a German scheme providing for accelerated tax depreciations 
in respect of investment to combat pollution maqe by existing firms,2 and had in-
formed the German Government that it could only agree to these arrangements if 
the aids complied with the guidelines. 
As initially proposed, the German scheme broadly complied. The depreciation 
arrangements were intended to help existing firms with investments carried out 
to conform to new environmental obligations. The assistance was on!y to be 
available for additional investment in plants in operation at 1 January 1975 and 
the rate under the German accelerated depreciation scheme (approximately 10% 
of investments in net subsidy-equivalent) was below the ceilings fixed by the guide-
lines (45% in 1975 and 1976; 30% in 1976 and 1977; 15% in 1979 and 1980). 
The only problem concerned the period of the scheme's application which had not 
been fixed at 31 December 1980 as laid down in the guidelines. Since the German 
Government amended its scheme in this connection, the Commission decided 
to close the procedure it had initiated. 
248. At the same time, the Commission also closed the procedure it had initiated 
in respect of a Belgian scheme providing for non-reimbursable grants for in-
vestments carried out by firms to purify their waste water.3 
1 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, points 180 to 183. 
2 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 183; Drittes Steuerreformgesetz, Article 1(168) of 
26.10.1973. 
3 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 183. 
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This Belgian scheme was introduced by a Royal Decree1 under the Belgian law 
of 26 March 19712 on the protection of surface waters from pollution. Like the 
German scheme, many of its provisions already complied with the guidelines for 
the transitional period. The assistance was intended to enable firms to construct 
purification plants required by obligations under the above law. It would only be 
granted for additional investments carried out by businesses in operation at 1 J a-
·nuary 1975 and the investment had to be completed by 1979 at the latest. 
However, although the aid intensity remained within the limits established for the 
initial years, the 1979 rate was higher than in the guidelines (21 % in net subsidy-
equivalent instead of 15 % ). 
The Belgian Government had a new Royal Decree published repealing the previous 
one and changing the rates of aid, thus complying with the Commission's guide-
lines. 
249. The French Government took steps to protect the environment under the 
agreements concluded with certain sectors of industry. Under these agreements, 
the firms in the sectors concerned undertook to substantially reduce their harmful 
effluents. They could then receive certain aids for the investments they would have 
to make. 
The Commission examined the various agreements and found a number of com-
mon features. The maximum rate, in net subsidy-equivalent, amounted to approx-
imately 26% of the recipient's investments and included subsidies financed 
from the State budget and various other forms of assistance (interest-free loans, 
grants and concessionary loans) granted by the Agences financieres de Bassinss 
from their charges to water users. 
The Commission examined agreements with the following sectors of industry: 
Sugar factories: in August 1974, the Commission had initiated the procedure 
under Article 93(2) of the EEC Treaty in respect of assistance provided for under 
this agreement in view of the fact that firms normally bear the cost of investments 
they are obliged to make to comply with laws on the environment and unless it 
can be proved that this. causes difficulties in the industries concerned, assistance 
cannot be granted to exonerate these firms from all or part of this obligation. 
Upon examining this assistance again in the light of the guidelines of the Com-
munity approach established later, the Commission noted· that the aids were 
within the limits it laid down for the transitional period. The investments eligible 
1 Of 23.1.1974, Moniteur Beige of 15.2.1974. 
2 Moniteur Beige of 1.5.1971. 
3 Public bodies responsible for water management in each of the six 'catchment basins' into which 
France was divided by Law No 64-1245 of 16.12.1964. 
COMPo REP. EC 1976 
STATE AIDS 129 
for assistance were part of a programme for reducing pollution caused by waste 
waters from sugar factories. The aids were to be granted for investments carried 
out in plants operating at·1 January 1974; they would have to be carried out 
by 31 December 1976 and the rates of assistance were below the ceiling fixed 
by the guidelines. 
Alcolwl distillation; yeast and starch manufacture: the agreements with these 
industries only differ from the above as regards the period of implementation. 
The investments receiving assistance had to be carried out by 31 December 1978 
and the rates were below the limits laid down by the guidelines. The Commission 
therefore did not object to them. 
Wool washing: the assistance provided for by this agreement exceeded the limits 
of the guidelines on aids to be granted during the transitional period and there 
were no justifiable industrial or regional difficulties. The investments eligible for 
assistance could be carried out until 1 July 1980 and the rate was 26% as against 
15% laid down in the guideline on investments to be made in 1979 or 1980. 
However, the Commission was able to authorize this assistance for it established 
that this sector was open to severe competition from . certain non-member countries 
and in difficulty on account of restructuring. Its resources were not sufficiently 
adequate and it was unable to comply therefore with the stringent obligations 
imposed by this agreement as regards purification of its effiuents. 
250. In 1975 the Commission also initiated the procedure under Article 93(2) 
in respect of the aid provisions in an Italian bill on water protection. Industrial 
plants operating at the time the law came into force could receive assistance for 
investments they would have to make to comply with the new obligations imposed 
by the law. The law merely outlined the type of assistance: guarantees and interest 
relief grants on loans taken out for these investments. This was general assistance, 
not required on account of special difficulties experienced by certain sectors or 
regions, and the Commission therefore decided that it did not comply in all 
circumstances with its guidelines on aids for environmental purposes. It was not 
restricted to plants in operation at 1· January 1975 and investments carried out 
in these plants until 31 December 1980. Moreover, since the other conditions 
for the granting of this assistance were to be defined at a· later date, the Com-
mission could not be sure that the rate would not exceed the ceilings it had 
established. 
However, when the law was finally adopted,1 the aid scheme concerned had been 
amended to comply with the Commission's request and the aids were only to be 
1 Law No 319 of 10.5.1976, published in the 'Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana' No 141 
of 29.5.1976. 
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granted for investments carried out in plants operating at 1 January 1975. All 
the other conditions. concerning the granting of this assistance· would be defined 
in subsequent regional laws and would be in line with the guidelines' remaining 
provisions. 
The Commission therefore decided to close the procedure, but it drew the Italian 
Government's attention to its obligation to provide prior notification at the plan-
ning stage, as laid down in the EEC Treaty, of bills to be drawn up in this 
connection at regional level. 
251. The Danish Government also informed the Commission of· a bill designed 
to facilitate investments carried out by existing firms to adapt their plant to the 
requirements of the Danish law on environmental protection (Law No 372 of 
13 June 1973). The assistance would take the form of interest relief grants, 
possibly accompanied by a State guarantee, on loans taken out for this purpose, 
and grants. 
The Commission decided that this scheme fell within the bounds of the Com-
mission's guidelines. The assistance was intended to help firms meet the obliga-
tions arising out of this law. It would only be grantoo for additional investments 
to be carried out in plants in operation at 1 October 1974. However, the bill laid 
down that the rates of the aids would be established by further legislation and 
assistance could have been granted for investments carried out after 31 December 
1980. 
The Danish Government then agreed to include in this legislation the limits fixed 
in the guidelines on this matter and in February 1976 the Commission decided 
that it had no objection to the draft law/provided that the Danish Government 
informed it of this legislation in advance. This condition was fulfilled in March 
1976. The Commission was able to establish that the rates of the aids and the 
deadline for carrying out the investments were in line. with the guidelines and 
definitively confirmed to the Danish Government that it had no objection to the 
implementation of this planned aid scheme. 
252. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany informed the Com-
mission of a draft law,2 which was to come into force on 1 January 1981, 
providing for a levy on all waste water discharged both by firms and local 
authorities. The rate would gradually rise from DM 12 per unit of pollution· in 
1981 to DM 40 from 1986. 
1 Lovtidende A No 682 of 23.12.1975. 
2 Bundestagsdrucksache 7/5088 of 28.4.1976. 
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The bill provided for automatic exemption from the levy for three years· for all 
such firms and local authorities undertaking to construct purification plants after 
1981 (Article 10(3) of the bill). 
The Commission's view, confirmed by the judgment of the Court of Justice in 
Case 173173/ has always been that exoneration from a compulsory general charge 
imposed by the State, whether or not of a fiscal nature, constitutes an aid within 
the meaning of Article 92 et seq. of the EEC Treaty. In this case, firms would 
continue to discharge their waste waters while the purification plant was being 
constructed, yet they would not have to pay the levy. 
This general aid measure did not comply with the Commission's guidelines on 
environmental protection aids; there were no specific industrial or regional 
grounds and it would apply after the deadline of 31 December 1980 laid down 
in the guidelines. The Commission therefore initiated the procedure under Article 
93(2) of the EEC Treaty in this connection. 
Moreover, the German bill contained other provisions for providing assistance: 
(i) when collection of the levies would have unfavourable consequences on the 
economic development of those liable. The Federal Government could then 
authorize by means of decree total or partial exemptions for certain firms or 
local authorities, industries or regions; 
(ii) proceeds from the levies could be used, on the basis of legislation introduced 
by the Lander, to finance measures to maintain or improve water protection 
and possibly take the form of assistance to firms. 
The Commission reminded the Federal Government that when the time came it 
should send prior notification of these provisions in accordance with Article 93(3) 
of the EEC Treaty. 
§ 6 - Aids to small- and medium-sized firms 
253. Several comments must be made on assistance to small- and medium-sized 
firms. 
They have a significant and sometimes major role in certain sectors. One of the 
criteria often used to define small- and medium-sized firms is based on staff 
numbers: up to 100 persons is a 'small' firm and up to 500 persons is a 'medium-
sized' firm. In many branches of industry the majority, even the great majority, 
of personnel and sales are covered by these two categories of firms. 
1 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, points 156 and 157. 
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They make an important contribution to stimulating the economy and although 
there is a trend towards concentration in certain industries, their· role will no 
doubt continue or even expand. New businesses continually spring up to replace 
or reanimate dying industries and make a substantial contribution to the renewal 
of economic structures and the maintenance of effective competition. They carry 
out numerous specialized tasks which--on account of their flexible structures 
and consequent ease of adaptation-'-they can better perform than very large 
companies (highly specialized or diversified production, subcontracting, services, 
technical innovation or launching of the new products). In many fields the size 
of these firms is undoubtedly optimum. Finally, the successful· outcome of certain 
policies often depends on a closely-woven fabric of small- and medium-sized 
firms. As far as regional economies are concerned, this type. of fabric is probably 
the best guarantee of a balanced economic and spcialdevelopment. They also 
make a worthwhile contribution to the training of labour and managerial staff. 
254. However, in trying to carry out their roles properly, they often come up 
against obstacles peculiar to this type of firm: 
(i) because of their size and sometimes their legal status, small- and medium-
sized firms do not usually have the same facilities as regards medium- and 
long-term finance both on the capital market and from banks. They are 
often short of capital resources and the usual financial channels cannot 
provide them with funds because of the risks involved in developing their 
activities--or cannot provide them without jeopardizing the .independence 
to which the managers of small- and medium-sized firms· attach such im-
portance. The memorandum on the Community's industrial policy, presented 
by the Commission to the Council in 1970 had already drawn attention to 
these problems; 
(ii) the small size of some of these firms is sometimes caused by a somewhat 
passive attitude rather than by real economic need. The way out of this 
. impasse, though not necessarily expansion, is at least greater specialization 
or joint work in certain areas; 
(iii) since their room for manreuvre and financial resources are more restricted 
and their activities sometimes less versatile, they cannot easily adapt or 
convert their facilities to meet the demands of technological, industrial or 
commercial developments which are a feature of modern life; 
{iv) they must now, therefore, plan and develop their activities in relation no 
longer to a regional or domestic market but extend it to Community scale 
and even beyond. This implies acquiring the facilities for obtaining informa-
tion on this extended market, diversifying production to meet its require-
ments, setting up the essential marketing network and purchasing ·the know-
how essential for overcoming the technical and legal barriers inherent in 
international trade. 
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255. In view of these considerations the Commission's views on assistance to 
small- and medium-sized firms is summarized below. 
No more so than at national level, can an all-purpose definition of small- and 
medium-sized firms be .established at Community level applicable to all Member 
States, all mdustries and all their problems. The concept of the small- or medium-
sized firm varies in relation to. all these aspects and the fact that an aid scheme 
concerns or does not concern this type of firm can only be assessed by the 
Commission in each individual case in a pragmatic fashion. 
In view of the significance of these firms in certain industries, the Commission, 
although favourably disposed, cannot exempt national measures taken in. favour 
of small- and medium-sized firins from the general provisions on aid schemes. 
When national aid schemes involve firms which because of their particular features 
or small size have little effect on competition or trade between Member States, 
the Commission may have little cause for concern, for instance in the case of 
assistance for artisanat firms or the professions, or similarly, assistance which 
because of the small sums in the individual cases or the minor importance (Jf the 
projects involved only applies to very small firms. 
As far as competition is concerned, the small- and medium-sized firm~ have a 
specific role to play. The assistance they receive must therefore be designed to 
enable them to fulfil this role effectively, but must not provide artificial protection 
which would shield them from the normal play of competition. Receiving operating 
aids of a conservatory nature would make them 'permanently assisted'; they would 
fail to make the necessary adjustments and exploit their potential to the full. 
Such assistance would not only be contrary to the general social and economic 
interest since it would restrict production. to unprofitable tasks but would also be 
against their own interests. 
State aids which enable small- and medium-sized firms to overcome their peculiar 
difficulties and play their· part in competition may receive favourable considera-
tion. They may cover: 
(i) loans at. preferentIal rates or guarantees providing them with credits for 
their investments, similar to those obtained by larger firms; 
(ii) the public authorities could set up specialized agencies to provide risk capital 
in the form of temporary shareholdings;l 
(iii) incentives for research and development in the forDi of grants-reimbursable 
or otherwise, setting up technology centres financed, possibly in part, by 
contributions from Drms in the industry concerned and carrying out research 
and development work for them which they could not do alone; 
1 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 171. 
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(iv) technical assistance with commercial or management policies (market sur-
veys); financial incentives to encourage the use of modem equipment (data 
processing equipment). 
256. In the light of this general approach the Commission has examined, in 
particular over the past two years, a certain number of proposals amending or 
setting up aid schemes for artisanat and small- and medium-sized firms. 
Denmark 
257. A Danish bill1 amended a previously existing aid scheme by which the firms 
concerned could already obtain low-interest loans for investments required for 
expansion, modernization or conversion. By granting these loans, the Danish 
Government intends to make allowances for the fact that these firms are usually 
short of capital and have difficulty in obtaining help from normal sources of 
finance (financial market or banks). To be eligible companies must employ no 
more than 75 persons, while the maximum amount of the loan in each case will 
be DKr 450000 (approximately 60000 u.a.) over 15 years, a two years' period 
of grace and an interest rate of between 9% and 13%. An annual amount of 
DKr 40 million (approximately 5 million u.a.) will be set aside for this assistance. 
A second Danish bilP stipulates that State guarantees may be provided for arti-
sana! and small- and medium-sized firms for bank loans they contract in order 
to carry out conversion and modernization projects required to put them back on 
their feet. This will be an exceptional and transitory measure restricted to two 
years and intended to enable the firms concerned to proceed, despite economic 
difficulties and when they may no longer use normal banking resources, with 
restructuration projects already under way (development and commercial launch-
ing of new products, research on new outlets, retraining of labour). The total 
amount of such guarantees is not to exceed DKr 100 million (approximately 
1" million u.a.) over two years. The firms' staff may not exceed 75 persons and 
in each case the maximum amount of the loans for which the guarantee may be 
granted may not exceed DKr 250000 (approximately 33000 u.a.). 
A third scheme introduces State guarantees for certain financial institutions set 
up by trade organizations to facilitate investments by small- and medium-sized 
firms. In the past these guarantees had been limited to the retail trade, but they 
will now also be extended to artisanat, small- and medium-sized businesses and 
services (notably distribution and road transport). The amount of the guarantee 
1 Law No 211 of 28.5.1975. Lovtidende A-1975. 
2 Law No 341 of 26.6.1975. Lovtidende A-1975. 
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. 
granted to anyone financial institution may not exceed its own capital and the 
total of the guarantees is limited to DKr 60 million (approximately 8 million u.a.). 
They will only apply to firms with less than 75 employees and in each case the 
maximum amount will be DKr 2 million (approximately 265000 u.a.). 
Ireland 
258. Finally, another scheme, in Ireland concerns legislation amending the 1969 
Industry Act enabling the Irish Government to grant two new forms of assistance 
through the Industrial Development Authority (IDA):l 
(i) a merger/restructuring scheme: interest relief grants and loan guarantees, 
normally up to a maximum of £500 000 (approximately 800000 EUA) in 
each case for loans taken out by small- and medium-sized firms for merger 
or restructuring projects; 
(ii) an enterprise development programme to encourage qualified individual~ to 
set up new firms: interest relief grants and loan guarantees up to a max:J1lum 
amount of £150000 (approximately 250000 EUA) in each case to help 
new firms establish their initial working capital. 
259. In view of its general position on this type of assistance, the Commission 
did not object to the aid provided for by these four draft laws since they only 
concern small- and medium-sized finns and a limited amount in each case and 
they are only to be granted for structural development, conversion or moderniza-
tion projects carried out by the firms. 
§ 7 - Application of the ECSC Treaty to State aids 
for the steel industry 
260. Faced by the most serious cnSIS 10 the steel industry since the war, a 
number of Member States took steps to assist their industries to overcome acute 
financial pressures which threatened not only to jeopardize the investment pro-
grammes required to maintain the industry's international competitiveness but 
also, in some cases, the very survival of certain companies. The Belgian, French 
and United Kingdom Governments notified to the Commission the details of the 
measures they proposed to take. The Commission examined the. compatibility of 
these measures with the provisions of Articles 4(c) and 67 of the ECSC Treaty.2 
1 Industrial Development Act, 1969, No 32. 
2 First Report on Competition Policy, points J89 and 190. 
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Belgium and France 
261. The Belgian Government informed the Commission of its intention to grant 
aid for investments in the steel industry in the form of a five-year exemption from 
land tax, accelerated depreciation, interest relief grants and, where they were 
judged necessary, State guarantees. It was also proposed to guarantee loans raised 
by firms to boost their working capital. 
The French Government informed the Commission of its intention to assist 
investment in the steel industry by granting loans from the Fonds de Developpe-
ment Economique et Social (FOES). The loans would be granted mainly for 
investment to modernize plant rather than to increase capacity and would meet 
rather less than half of the cost of the projects concerned. The terms of these 
loans would be the normal FOES terms. 
262. The Commission determined that, in both the Belgian and French cases, 
the aids were to be granted under general aid systems and that they involved no 
discrimination in favour of the steel industry. It therefore concluded that they 
were not caught by the prohibition contained in Article 4(c) of the ECSC Treaty. 
The Commission further decided that the measures were not such as to require 
action pursuant to Article 67 of the ECSC Treaty. 
United Kingdom 
263. The Commission also examined the United Kingdom Government's meas-
ures to finance stockpiling by the British Steel Corporation by means of loans 
from the National Loans Fund (NLF), a fund which uses the proceeds from State 
loans to finance the different recipients in the public and semi-public sectors, and 
additions to the firm's Public Dividend Capital up to a combined total of £70 
million. With respect to the NLF loans, the Commission was informed that there 
wf'uld be a departure from the Corporation's normal borrowing period (seventeen 
years) so as to relate the duration of the loans to the expected life of the stockpile 
(two years). 
After examining the principles governing the operation of the NLF, the Com-
mission concluded that the conditions on which the loan would be granted could 
not be regarded as a discrirriination in favour of the steel industry and that the 
prohibition contained in Article 4(c) of the ECSC Treaty was therefore inapplic-
able. It further concluded that the terms of the stockpiling scheme did not require 
it to take any action under Article 67 of the ECSC Treaty. 
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Chapter II 
Adjustment of State monopolies 
of a commercial character 
264. The Commission continued the work it had been engaged in since the end 
of the transitional period with respect to State monopolies of a commercial 
character1 with a view to the abolition in the Member States of State monopolies' 
exclusive rights and any other practices restricting the free movement of goods 
between Member States. 
This objective, laid down in Article 37 of the EEC Treaty, has been confirmed 
by three judgments of the Court of Justice given on 3 and 17 February 1976 in 
Case 59/75 (Manghera) concerning the Italian manufactured tobacco monopoly 
and in Cases 45/75 (REWE) and 91/75 (Miritz) concerning the German alcohol 
monopoly. The Court ruled that Article 37(1) requires the abolition from 31 
December 1969 of the exclusive right of a State monopoly of a commercial 
character to import from other Member States and that the provisions of this 
Article have been directly applicable in the Member States since that date. The 
Court also considered discriminatory and therefore incompatible with Article 37 
the levying of. a countervailing charge on imported products for the purposes of 
ensuring the sales of national production administered by the monopoly and also 
the levying of a tax on imported products different from that imposed on similar 
national products. 
As a result of the Commission's action, almost all monopolies have been elimin-
ated throughout the Community. 
265. As regards the alcohol monopolies, following the above judgments of the 
Court, Germany liberalized imports of ethyl alcohol from other Member States. 
The system of taxes, which varied within Germany according to the size of the 
distillery, the raw material used and the type of distillery but were uniformly 
levied on imported products, has been replaced by a standard tax, imposed both 
1 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 149 et seq. 
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on German and imported products. The countervailing charge on imported pro-
ducts has been abolished.1 
When imports of ethyl alcohol were liberalized, Germany began importing large 
quantities, above all from France and Italy. In order to continue marketing do-
mestic production, the German monopoly had to lower its selling prices consider-
ably; the monopoly is therefore suffering losses, since it is obliged to purchase 
all domestic production at high prices, as before. The monopoly's deficit will be 
made good by means of a State aid which has been formally notified to the 
Commission in compliance with Article 93 of the EEC Tr~aty. In addition, 
Germany and the Benelux countries have been authorized by the Commission, 
under Article 46 of the EEC Treaty, to impose countervailing charges on imports 
of ethyl alcohol. from France to compensate for the export aid granted by this 
Member State.12 
France has not yet taken any steps to comply with the provisions of Article 37 
of the EEC Treaty and the Court's new ruling. In April 1976 therefore, the 
Commission initiated the infringement procedure under Article 169 of the EEC 
Treaty in respect of this Member State. The Commission will refer the matter 
to the Court of Justice of the European Communities if the French Government 
fails to introduce measures to ensure the free movement of goods in this con-
nection. 
On 1 December 1976 the Commission also adopted an amended proposal for a 
Council Regulation on the common organization of the market in ethyl alcohol 
of agricultural origin and additional provisions for certain products containing 
ethyl alcohol; the draft was presented to the Council on 7 December 1976.3 
Council adoption of this Regulation would automatically solve both the problems 
caused by alcohol monopolies and those connected with the relative taxes. 
266. Although France and Italy have taken measures to adjust their respective 
tobacco monopolies in order to eliminate their exclusive rights concerning import 
and wholesale marketing of products from other Member States,4 they do not 
seem to comply with Article 37 of the EEC Treaty and the Court of Justice's 
recent ruling, particularly as regards maintenance of the retail sales monopoly 
and the two Member States' exclusive right to export, plus certain other aspects 
1 Law of 2.5.1976: Bundesgesetzblatt I of7 .5.1976 and circular of the Minister of Finance of 8.4.1976: 
Bundesanzeiger of 15.4.1976. 
2 Commission Regulation (BEC) No 851/76 of 9.4.1976: OJ L 96 of 10.4.1976. 
3 OJ C 309 of 31.12.1976. 
4 Italian Law No 724 of 10.12.1975: Gazzetta Ufficiale of 7.1.1976 and French Law No 76/448 of 
24.5.1976: Journal Officiel de la Republique Fran~ise of 25.5.1976. 
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of these new laws, considered incompatible with Article 37. With regard to retail 
trade in particular, the Court of Justice's recent ruling confirms· that Article 37 
and the principle of the free movement of goods require that any measure likely 
to lead to discrimination between domestic and imported goods at any stage 
between importation and purchase by the consumer, should be eliminated. 
Although the abolition of the exclusive right to wholesale marketing considerably 
improves the marketing system, the Commission considers that reserving retail 
marketing to the State could give rise to discrimination against products from 
other Member States, which is incompatible with Article 37 of the EEC Treaty. 
Moreover, tobacconists are not independent vis-a-vis the State which retains the 
exclusive production right in respect of manufactured tobacco; they sell both the 
State's products and those of its competitors, manufacturers in other Member 
States. . 
The Commission therefore is considering whether it should initiate the infringe-
ment procedure under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty against the Italian Govern-
ment and the French Government in this connection. 
267. The Commission decided that despite the changes to the Italian match 
monopoly, the system did not comply with Article 37(1) of the EEC Treaty, 
since the Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi was still dealing with taxes, the price 
fixing system, held to be potentially discriminatory, had not been amended, and 
the retail monopoly had been retained. The exclusive right of the Amministra-
zione Autonoma dei Monopoli di Stato (AAMS) for marketing should, under 
Article 6 of the Decree of 25 June 1973, have been discontinued by 31 December 
1975 at the latest at the same time as its exclusive right for wholesaling manu-
factured tobacco. This, however, was not mentioned in Law No 724 of 10 Decem-
ber 1975 on adjustments to the manufactured tobacco monopoly. The Commis-
sion therefore initiated the infringement procedure under Article 169 of the EEC 
Treaty against the Italian Government. 
268. In France no one may import and distribute refined petroleum products on 
the domestic market unless he holds a 'special permit'. These permits are in fact 
authoriZations to take advantage of the exclusive importation and marketing rights 
reserved for the State under the oil monopoly introduced by the law of 1928. 
In awarding them the French Government also specifies the maximum amount 
of motor fuel that each holder may sell annually on the market, irrespective of 
whether it has been imported or refined in France, domestically refined fuel being 
treated in exactly the same way as imported fuel. 
Following the complaint of a French oil importer, the Commission informed the 
French Government that these arrangements for oil no longer complied, in their 
current form, with the provisions of the EEC Teaty concerning the free move-
COMPo REP. EC 1976 
140 COMPE1lTION POLICY AND GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE 
ment of goods as interpreted by the Court of Justice' and in particular Article 
37(1). 
269. Following the Court of Justice's ruling, and in particular the judgment in 
Case 59/75 (Manghera), the Commission considers that: 
(i) Market sharing is contrary to the principle of the free movement of goods, 
. particularly when it takes the form of distribution quotas, allocated in the 
main to domestic producers, for it is in their interest to promote sales of their 
own produce; the French Government must therefore discontinue the alloca-
tion of maximum amounts of motor-fuel indicated on these permits; 
(ii) Monopolies' exclusive rights to import or market goods constitute discrimina-
tion against exporters from other Member States within the meaning of 
Article 37(1); the French Government must also therefore alter its special 
permits scheme and restrict it to rules laying down objective standards, con-
cerning the occupation of importer or distributor of oil products. 
270. Discussions were opened between the Commission and the French authori-
ties to determine the conditions for the French Government's adjustment of its 
oil arrangements in order to comply with the Court of Justice's ruling. These 
discussions will continue. 
However, Article 37(1) of the EEC Treaty directly affects the Member States' 
legal systems and prohibits them from retaining any measure opposing it. It 
follows therefore that in this case the interested parties have the right to 
observance of this provision and it is for them to assert it before the competent 
national courts. 
271. The Commission continued its efforts to ensure that the adjustment of 
monopolies in the original Member States in relation to the new Member States 
was progressing in accordance with Article 44 of the Act of Accession. 
As- regards the German alcohol monopoly, the abovementioned measures con-
cerning taxes are applied in full to potable spirits and products from all other 
Member States. Germany has thus already brought a major portion of its mono-
poly in line' with Article 44 of the Act of Accession and in doing so fulfilled its 
obligation to gradually adjust this monopoly. However, there is still discrimination 
against ethyl alcohol imported from the new Member States and this must be 
eliminated by 31 December 1977 at the latest, i.e. at the end of the transitional 
period provided for in the Article. 
1 Written Questions Nos 223/76 and 571/76 by Mr Fellermaier: OJ C 224 of 18.10.1976 and C SO 
of 28.2.1977. 
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The Commission noted that the French Government has taken no action on its 
Recommendation1 concerning the French alcohol monopoly and adjustment of tax 
arrangements for potable spirits. Following the recent ruling of the Court of 
Justice mentioned previously, the Commission addressed a new Recommendation 
to France. Under Article 44(2) of the Act of Accession, it has been recommended 
gradually to open its market to ethyl alcohol imports of agricultural and non-
agricultural origin from the new Member States and to eliminate the exclusive 
right to import this alcohol by 31 December 1977 at the latest.2 In a covering 
letter, the Commission also informed the French Government that it would be 
obliged to initiate the infringement procedure under Article 169 of the EEC 
Treaty if France failed to fulfil its obligation under Article 44 of the Act of 
Accession in respect of its alcohol monopoly vis-a-vis the new Member States. 
Failure to introduce measures during the transitional period constituted an infrin-
gement of this Article. 
1 OJ L 278 of 15.10.1974. 
2 OJ L 4 of 6.1.1977. 
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Public undertakings 
272. The Commission has been trying for many years, in pursuance of the Treaty, 
to eliminate distortions of competition resulting from Member States' intervention 
in the economy. Among the provisions conferring powers on the Commission in 
this field, and indeed imposing obligations on it, are those of Article 90. 
In the Commission's view the fact that a public sector, which in some cases is 
very large, exists in the economies of Member States means that the consequences 
for the States of their responsibility for the behaviour of those undertakings 
covered by Article 90 must be made as clear as possible. The undertakings in 
question are public undertakings, undertakings to which Member States grant 
special or exclusive rights, and those which they entrust with the operation of 
services of general economic interest or which have the character of a revenue-
producing monopoly. These undertakings may belong to the private or to the 
public sector.1 
After contacts with various interested circles, the Commission has in the last year 
begun a process of study and clarification with a view to defining the obligations 
set out in Article 90 more precisely. 
273. In the eyes of the Commission Article 90 does not of course limit in any 
way the principle contained in Article 222, which states that the Treaty shall in 
no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property 
ownership. The Member States r~main completely free to determine the extent, 
composition and internal organization of their public sector, and to introduce 
whatever reforms they believe necessary in their rules governing property 
ownership. 
Article 90 states: 
(a) first, 
in paragraph 1, that Member States may not use their 'public undertakings' 
to escape from their own obligations under the Treaty, nor cause under-
takings to violate theirs; and 
1 For ease of reference, the term 'public undertaking' is employed throughout this text to denote 
any undertaking covered by Article 90. 
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(b) second, 
in paragraph 2, that 'public undertakings' must respect the rules of the 
Treaty in the same way as other undertakings, except in so far as this might 
obstruct them in performing the particular tasks assigned to them. 
The Treaty's purpose here is to· ensure that the market conduct of these under-
takings does not impede the proper application of the rules of the Treaty, either 
as regards competition or as regards the unity of the market. 
This objective is both fair and logical. 'Public undertakings' benefit from the 
common market as much as other undertakings, and they should comply with 
the rules in the same way as the others must. 
That 'public undertakings' and the Member StaJes should respect the basic prin-
ciples of the Treaty is particularly important to 'the institution of a system 
ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted' (Article 3 (f). 
For where 'public undertakings' buy or sell goods or services on the market, they 
are liable to be in direct competition with other firms and their behaviour may 
affect trade within. the Community. 
As to the exception provided in Article 90(2) concerning the proper perforinance 
by 'public undertakings' of the particular tasks assigned them, the Commission 
believes that full application of the provisions of the Treaty implies full applica-
tion of the exceptions expressly provided. On this point it wiII keep to the 
administrative practice it follows in the case of other express exceptions, such as 
those arising directly from Article 36 or those allowed by the Commission under 
Article 115. This practice is founded on the principle of strict interpretation of 
these exceptions, a principle upheld by the Gourt of Justice on many occasions. 
This approach, while strict, is in no way restrictive. It allows the Commission 
to recognize constructively and realistically the legitimate wish of Member· States 
to safeguard the effectiveness of public undertakings aSsigned particular tasks 
while at the same time ensuring that the common market functions smoothly. 
It is in this light that the Commission intends· to assess both what is necessary 
for the performance of· any particular task referred to by a Member State and 
the interest of the Community.1 
274. The Treaty provides the Commisison with various ways of applying the 
principles stated in Article 90. 
Articles 85 and 86 allow it to act where an undertaking, whether or not falling 
within the scope of Article 90, appears to have taken part in an unlawful agree-
ment or to have abused a dominant position of its own accord. If, however, any 
1 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 14 July 1971 in Case 10/71 (port of Mertert) .. [1971] ECR. 
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such behaviour affecting freedom of movement between Member States was 
ordered or instigated by the State, it will depend on the nature of the State 
measure involved whether Article 90(3) or the procedure Jaid down in Article 169 
will be used. An example of this would be where a 'public undertaking' is con-
strained or encouraged systematically to favour domestic suppliers in breach of 
the provisions of Article 30. Article 92 et seq cover State aids granted to public 
undertakings. 
Article .90(3) allows the Commission to act where a Member State, whilepos-
sessing the necessary authority, fails to cause a 'public undertaking' to put an end 
to objectionable practices, i.e. practices which, had they been engaged in by the 
State itself, would have constituted an infringement of the Treaty. 
This does not rule out the possibility of injured parties themselves invoking 
against 'public undertakings' certain direCtly applicable provisions of the Treaty 
or instruments giving effect to the Treaty. 
Where a Member State has not got the necessary authority to correct objectionable 
behaviour on the part of a 'public undertaking', the Commission may invoke 
Article 90 to call on the Member State to fill the gap in its relationship with the 
undertaking in question. The Member State must then take the necessary powers 
and use them to· end behaviour incompatible with the common market. 
.This would be the case, to use the example already given, if a 'public undertaking', 
acting independently in this instance, systematically favoured national suppliers 
and the Member State did not possess· the powers necessary to make the under-
taking act in accordance with the principle of the common market. 
275. In order to avoid as far as possible situations like those outlined above, the 
Commission may, under Article 90(3), take preventive steps. It may calion 
Member States to take such general or specific preventive measures concerning 
their 'public undertakings' as are needed to ensure that the Treaty is complied 
with. This means that the Commission can have procedures and approaches 
initiated which are not necessarily linked to specific departures from the Treaty 
but which will serve generally to prevent them happening. 
In this way it can overcome the difficulties involved in applying the provisions of 
Article 90 caused by the lack of transparency in the accounts of some 'public 
undertakings', in particular as regards commercially unjustified costsl and any 
offsetting of them. The Commission must be able to distinguish between legitimate 
1 This expression denotes the costs resulting from burdens imposed by the State on certain under-
takings in order to secure its economic and social aims, and which have as their effect a diminution 
in the profits, or an increase in the losses which would result from purely commercial management 
of the undertaking. 
·COMP. Rep. EC·1976 
146 COMPETITION POLICY AND GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE 
offsetting of such costs and the granting by a Member State of competitive 
advantages which are incompatible with the common market. 
In the same way the Commission may, where necessary, address appropriate 
directives, decisions or recommendations to Member States, calling upon them 
to make 'public undertakings', by sector or separately, take the necessary measures 
as regards the award of contracts. 
276. There can be no doubt whatever that 'public undertakings' may be a par-
ticularly useful instrument for securing a country's economic or social policy 
objectives. 
If therefore the importance of the tasks which 'public undertakings' may be called 
upon to carry out should not be underestimated, it is nevertheless indispensable 
that the Member States should ensure that the behaviour of these undertakings is 
consistent with the Treaty. The free movement of goods and services and the 
unity of the common market would be endangered if the behaviour of certain 
categories of undertakings could evade the provisions of the Treaty. This applies 
both to provisions applicable to undertakings and to the rules imposing obligations 
on the Member States. 
The Commission is concerned to do two things: on the one hand, to ensure that 
'public undertakings' benefit from an enlarged market in the same way as private 
undertakings, by buying on the best terms, reducing the burden on the public 
finances and, where appropriate, also the cost of the services provided and on the 
other hand, to ensure that productive industries benefit fully from the common 
market and also consolidate their competitive position vis-a-vis non-member 
countries. 
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Introductory remarks 
277. As in previous years the Commission is here setting out recent. information 
on national and international mergers, share acquisitions and joint ventures (§ 1) 
and on the development of concentration in a variety of Community industries and 
countries (§ 2). . 
For the first time consideration is given on the basis of empirical research to the 
relation between size of firm and profitability (§ 3). 
Also for the first time, the Commission is publishing an initial batch of results 
from pilot research projects on the distribution of food products, in particulgr as 
. regards the level, formation and variation of prices for a number of ind'Jstrial 
food products (§ 4). 
By way of conclusion there is a summary of the results thus ,obtained fro'.n which 
a number of criteria for competition analysis can be deduced (§ 5). 
§ 1 - National and international mergers, share acquisitions 
and joint ventures in the Community in 1975 
Comparison between national and international operations 
278. The figures for the number and type of mergers and similar operations in the 
Community in 1974 are directly comparable with those for 1974 given in the Fifth 
Report (points 161 to 169),except as regards banks, insurance companies, holding 
companies and other services, figures for which were aggregated under 'services' 
in the Fifth Report. 
This more detailed breakdown of services has now become essential in view of the 
growing number of operations involving banks, insurance companies and holding 
companies. 
279. The figures below relate both to international and to purely domestic opera-
tions, though operations consisting of no more than the straightforward establish-
ment of a subsidiary are disregarded. In the absence of more detailed information, 
the figures concern solely the number of operations and not their economic signi-
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ficance. No direct relation can therefore be established between the frequency of 
operations and changes in the degree of con~entration.; 
Table 1 sets out the number of national and international mergers, acquisitions 
and joint"ventures in 1975 (compared with figures for '1974); there is a subsidiary 
breakdown by number of firms involved into bilateral ~ and multilateral operations. 
In the breakdown by type of operation the number of :firms involved is also given. 
When interpreting these figures the reader should remember that the same firm 
may have been involved in several operations in the s~me year. 
Table 1 expresses purely national operations as a percentage of the total number 
of operations for each of the two years. . 
280. Comparison of the 1975 and 1974 figures shoW:s that there was a sharp in-
crease (40%) in the number of takeovers and mergerS, and that the increase itseH 
was double the 20% increase in 1974 over 1973. The increase is higher still for 
share acquisitions (49%). Following the relative stability of 1974, when much the 
same number of such operations was recorded as in 1973, it can therefore be as-
sumed that in 1975 the share acquisition was th~ most favoured method of estab-
lishing links between companies. I 
The number of joint 'Ventures established has scarcely moved from the 500 mark, 
around which it has been hovering for several years ~ow. 
I 
As for the total number of operations, all categories combined, there has been an 
increa<;e of almost one-third (546). It will be seen that the number of firms in-
volved has increased (40%) far more than the number of operations (32%), which 
means that the average number of firms involved in leach operation is rising. 
281. As for the relative importance of the individu!ll types of operation, it will 
be seen that, continuing the past trend, acquisitions increased their share of the 
total from 59% in 1974 to 65% in 1975 and thus maintained their first-place 
ra"king, whereas the number of joint ventures fell to a little less than a quarter 
at the total (as against 32% in 1974). Takeovers ~nd mergers maintained their 
share of 10%. ! 
For joint ventures the number of operations has hot risen at all whereas the 
number of firms involved has risen by some 38%. In the other two categories of 
operation, the increase in the number of operation~ is slightly greater than the 
increase in the number of firms involved (takeovers and mergers: 40% and 35%; 
acquisitions: 48% and 44%). ; 
282. On the whole, there was a greater increase in, the number of national and 
international operations in 1975 than in 1974, suggesting greater dynamism in 
the economy. The breakdown by number of firms! involved reveals a truly re-
COMPo REP. EC 1976 
n 
~ 
;v 
,. 
m ;v 
m 
n 
~ 
TABLE 1 
National and international operations in the Community 
Breakdown of operations and firms involved by type of operation 
Takeovers and mergers 
Number of Number of 
operations firms involved 
1974 165 404 
1975 231 548 
----
---------
of which purely national operations (%): 
1974 
1975 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Sbare acquisitions 
Number of 
operations 
1018 
1500 
60 
75 
Number of 
firms 
involved 
2241 
3221 
58 
73 
Totals 
Joint ventures 
Number of Number of Number of Number of firms firms operations involved 
552 1615 
550 2201 
------
27 
52 
32 
53 
operations involved 
1735 4260 
2281 5970 
------
53 
69 
52 
68 
Breakdown of operations 
by number of IIrms 
involved 
Bilateral 
operations 
1367 
1872 
58 
74 
Multilateral 
operations 
368 
411 
36 
48 
i5 
I 
~ 
i 
-v. 
... 
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I 
I 
mark able expansion in bilateral operations (up by 37%), far greater than the 
expansion of multilateral operations (up by 12 %). This is even more significant 
as the percentages for bilateral operations were calculated on a much wider base 
(1 367 in 1974) than for multilateral operations (368). In absolute terms, the 
former h~lVe increased nearly twelve times faster than. the latter (50S against 43) 
and the ratio between the two types moved from 3.7 : 1 in 1974 to 4.6: 1 in 1975. 
i 
283. In the breakdown between national and international operations, special 
attention is drawn to the growing importance of purely domestic operations, con-
firming a trend which began to emerge in 1973. For the last three years the 
figures for national operations have moved from 40% to 60% and then to 
75%, and the figures for joint ventures have moved ftom 22% to 27% and then 
to 52%. For the first time there is a clear majority of national over international 
operations. : 
I 
Geographical breakdown of international operations 
284. As in 1974, a little more than half (54%) of all international operations in 
1975 concerned exclusively Community firms (Table 2). But a converse result 
was obtained as regards the number of firms involved; for the percentage of Com-
munity firms fell from nearly 83% in 1974 to roughly 75% in 1975. The sharpest 
variation concerns the number of non-Community firms involved in share acquisi-
tions, which rose from 9% in 1974 to 24% in 1975. • . 
285. In 1975 Belgium was the most popular terrain I for international operations 
(Table 3). It has overtaken Germany and France at the head of the table. These 
two countries have fallen to joint second position in the ranking, accounting each 
for one-fifth of all operations. The United Kingdom also falls by one place to 
fourth position, and other countries follow suit. It will be noted that the Benelux 
countries taken together are very close to the star placing occupied in 1973, their 
s~ ~e now being 37% (31 % in 1974 and 44% in 1?73). 
286. From information available on the nationality qffirms taking part in inter-
national operations in the Community, it is possible to determine the share of the 
total number of firms involved in 1974 and 1975 accounted for by non-member 
countries (Table 4). As in the past, American firms continued to head the list in 
1975, followed by Swiss firms. But the trend to a decline in the American share 
which began in 1973 has continued. For the first timb, firms in the 'others' group 
have overtaken American firms. The Swiss influence, on the other hand, is gaining, 
as is that for 'others' which have virtually trebled their share. In the ratio between 
the EEC and non-member countries, the former has declined and the latter have 
expanded in equal proportions. 
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TABLE 2 
Breakdown of international operations and of forms 
of operation in member and non-member countries 
(a) Number of operations 
Share acquisitions Joint ventures 
Year 
I I %EC %NMC %EC %NMC 
1974 57 43 52 48 
1975 ·52 48 55 45 
EC = Operations involving exclusively Community countries. . 
NMC = Operations also involving firms from non-member countries: 
(b) Number of firms involved 
Share acquisitions 
Year 
I %EC %NMC 
1974 91 9 
1975 76 24 
EC = Firms from Community countries. 
NMC = Firms from non-member countries. 
Joint ventures 
%EC I %NMC 
72 28 
77 23 
TABLE 3 
Total 
%EC I 
54 
54 
Total 
%EC I 
83 
75 
Geographical breakdown of International operations in the Community 
Year D 
1974 22 
1975 20 
Year I EC 
1974 79 
1975 77 
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F NL B L UK I IRL 
22 7 8 16 7 16 
20 4 7 21 9 15 
TABLE 4 
Share of Community and non-Commllliity firms involved 
in international operatio~s in the Community 
USA I Switzerland I Japan I Scandinavia 
10 I 4 1 3 
7 I 5 1 2 
1 
3 
()thers 
3 
8 
DK 
1 
1 
%NMC 
46 
46 
%NMC 
17 
25 
(%) 
Total 
100 
100 
(%) 
Total 
100 
100 
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Breakdown by industry of national and internation'al operations 
2fJ7. From 1974 to 1975 there were substantial changes in the industry break-
down (Table 5) of national and international operations in the EEe, particularly 
affecting metal-using industries (whose share of operations rose by one-third from 
21 % to 28%) and the food industry (which almost doubled its share). 
. I 
Increases in manufacturing industries were accompanied by falls in the tertiary 
sector, where there was a decline of almost a third (from 50% to 36%). In order 
to analyse variations within subsectors of the tertiary sector, the two most im-
portant types of financial service have been separated"':"'-banking and insurance on 
the one hand and holding companies on the other. The importance of the distinc-
tion is evident in that these twei subsectors alone are involved in nearly 40% of 
the operations involving the tertiary sector (13 % in rui aggregate 36%). 
Of these 40%, banks and insurance companies are involved in three-quarters 
(10% in an aggregate 13%). 
TABLE 5 
National and international operations in the Community, by industry 
I , 
Other ' Banks Metal-
manu-
and Holding 
Year using Energy Chemi- Textiles facturing Food ' Insur- Compa-indus· cals indus- industry IC~:!,";a- nics tries tries 
. Dies 
1974 21 3 9 4 9 4 - -
1975 28 2 9 4 14 7 ~ 10 3 
~ 
1 All services, including banks, insurance companies and holding companies. 
§ 2 - The development of concentration in selected industries 
and product markets 
General survey of research 
Other 
501 
23 
288. Research into the development of concentration' continued, and: 
(%) 
Total 
100 
100 
(i) new industries have been brought in (tyres, certain car accessories, beverages 
in general and brewing in particular, food distribution); 
(ti) certain earlier industry studies have been up~ated (paper industry and 
mechanical engineering in particular); , 
(iii) the possible relationship between the size of a firm and its profitability have 
been considered; 
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(iv) structural analyses have been supplemented by surveys and pilot studies on 
the prices of certain goods (notably manufactured food products). 
289. As regards the new orientation of these studies, which aim among other 
things to provide a more detailed analysis of the economic implications of con-
centration and the practical effects of competition, the reader is referred to the 
Commission's recent publication: 'Methodology of concentration analysis applied 
to the study of industries and markets', by Remo Linda (catalogue ref. 8756, 
September 1976). 
290. The broadening of research into concentration can be seen from Table 6, 
which gives a summary of the studies so far carried out under the Commission's 
research programme. Certain industries have been reported on twice, the first 
report covering the period from 1962 to 1970 (reference period for the first round 
of reports) and the second bringing the picture up to date for subsequent years. 
291. The new reports incorporated in Table 6 this year were prepared by the fol-
lowing research institutes and experts: 
Germany: IFO-Institut fUr Wirtschaftsforschung, Munich - Breiten-
acher, E. Greipl, D. Wilrl (food industry, brewing and food 
distribution). 
Kienbaum Unternehmensberatung, Gummersbach (paper 
manufacturing and processing, tyres, car accessories). 
France: lAM - J.L. Rastoin, G. Ghersi, M. Castagnos and M. AUaya 
- and INRA - D. Boulet and J.P. Laporte, Montpellier 
(beverages, brewing, food distribution). 
Italy: FIS-ATOR Consulenza Aziendale -A. Amaduzzi, R Cama-
gni and G. Martelli, Milan (tyres, car accessories). 
SORIS SpA Studi e ricerche di Economia e Marketing -
P. Balliano and R Lanzetti, Turin (paper industry, office 
machinery, hoisting and handling equipment, beverages, 
brewing, food distribution). 
Netherlands: Prof. H.W. de Jong, Stichting Nijenrode, Breukelen -
Maria Brouwer and W.J.C. de Brouwer, Amsterdam (paper 
processing, beverages, brewing). 
Belgium: Alex Jacquemin and A. de Ghellinck - CRIDE - Louvain 
(brewing). 
United Kingdom: Cranfield School of Management, Cranfield, Bedford -
F. Fishwick (tyres). 
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Hart and A.J. MacNeary (beverages, food distributivn). 
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! 
M.L.H. Consultants Ltd, London - J.E. Sussams and M.E. 
Evans (household electrical appliapces). 
Denmark: Institute for Future Studies, Copenhagen - T. Kristensen, 
Th. Herborg Nielsen and J. Vestergaard, Aarhus, and Niels 
Jorgensen, Odense (food industry, beverages, brewing, food 
distribution). . 
TABLE 6 
Studies used for analysis of concentration 
(situation at 31 December 1976) 
I 
Q>untry 
Industry 
I 
D I F I I I NL I B : 
TeHile industry 
Wool X X+ X 
! 
x+ 
Cotton X X+ X+ x+ 
Knitted and crocheted goods X X X x+ 
Paper industry and manufacture o/paper 
I products 
Manufacture of paper and cardboard x+ x+ x+ X 
Processing of paper and cardboard x+ X X x+ 
Chemical industry , 
Manufacture of pharmaceutical produc.ts X x+ x+ x+ x+ 
Manufacture 01 machinery other· than 
: electric machines 
Agricultural machinery and tractors X+ X X 
Office machioery x+ X x+ 
Textile machioery x+ X x+ 
Equipmeilt for civil engineering and 
machinery for the mechanical working 
! 
of building materials x+ X 
I I 
Hoisting and handling equipment x+ X x+ : 
Electrical engineering 
Electronic equipment audio equipment, 
radio ilnd television receivers x+ X x+ I X Household electrical appliances X+ X X+ X 
Manufacture 01 transport equipment 
Cycles, motorcycles and power-assisted 
x·+ 
, 
cycles x+' X .X ! 
Tyres for motor vehicles 0 0 , 
Certain car accessories (batteries, sparking 
I plugs) . 0 0 I I 
Food iniJustries 
(excluding beverages) ·x X X X X 
B~verages in general 0 0 0 0 I 
Brewing 0 0 0 0 0 
Distribution olloodproductsand beverage s 0 0 0 I 
1 In Germany the industry was divided into (i) cycles and (ii) motorcycles and mopeds. 
X = Given in. the Fifth Report on Competition Policy 
o = New studies ... 
+ = Updating of existing studies 
I UK I IRL I DK 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
0 X 
0 
X X 0 
0 
0 
0 0 
COMPo REP. EC 1976 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONCENTRATION 157 
Concentration in selected industries 
292. Tables 7 and 8 show the development of concentration in a number of in-
dustries, with comparisons to 1969170, 1972 and 1973/74. 
The degree of concentration is measured by the pair of indices used in the Fifth 
Report: 
. (i) concentration ratio (C4), expressing the share of the four largest firms in the 
aggregate sales of the industry; 
(ii) coefficient of disparity (4L); expressing the degree of unevenness of distribu-
tion of the aggregate share between these four firms. 
The coefficient of disparity is expressed as a percentage, like the concentration 
ratio, the maximum concentration ratio (100%) being at the same time the 
minimum coefficient of disparity. This minimum corresponds to the situation 
where the four leading firms are of exactly the same size. 
Hence the concentration ratio and coefficient of disparity will both be 100% in 
an industry where there are only four firms and each accounts for exactly the 
same share of total sales. Where, on the other hand, the size distribution of the 
four leading firms is sharply asymmetric, the coefficient of disparity will be closer 
to 400%, and the presumption of a partial and imperfect monopoly situation 
will become stronger as the coefficient reaches or exceeds 1 000%.1 
293. From the figures in Tables 7 and 8 it can be deduced that: 
(i) concentration is fairly stable; 
(ii) the degree of concentration in a given industry varies considerably from one 
country to another. 
It should be borne in mind that: 
(i) concentration in certain industries or countries frequently does not increase 
simply because it is already at a very high level; 
(ii) the degree of industry concentration is below the degree of concentration 
on individual product markets, which are generally oligopolistic and fre-
quently almost monopolistic; 
(iii) of the industries studied, the industry in which concentration has increased 
most sharply in recent years is food distribution, followed by household elec-
trical appliances. 
The high degree· of concentration in food distribution together with the tendency 
for even greater. concentration may well pose very serious problems for competi-
tion policy, as will be seen at § 4. 
1 See Methodology, op cit, and particularly Chapter VII. 
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TABLE 7 
Development of concentradon in various Community industries and countries 
Concentration ratio (C~ and coefficient of disparity (4L) 
1969/70 1972 1973/74 
Industry Country 
I I I C. 4L C. 4L C. 4L 
Wool F 21 282 29 308 - 342 
B 34 173 36 195 30 127 
UK 41 193 43 210 42 222 
Cotton F 28 197 25 192 - 194 
I 14 144 21 117 22 107 
B 29 546 20 495 18 431 
UK 55 171 57 256 56 235 
Paper and cardboard manufacture D 40 216 40 278 40 294 
F 32 130 32 105 29 116 
I 27 184 28 164 21 180 
UK 50 200 49 200 
Paper and cardboard processing D 24 274 I 24 289 24 298 
F 8 185 9 160 10 126 
NL 29 114 29 172 39 276 
Pharmaceutical products F 13 152 ! 13 138 20 147 
I 32 160 31 ISS 
NL 72 152 69 154 80 169 
B 43 272 44 243 42 200 
UK 61 358 61 354 
DK 66 140 65 198 66 221 
I 
Agricultural machinery and D 31 134 37 103 
tractors UK 81 554 19 450 
, 
Office machinery D 35 195 i 64 138 I 97 824 97 900 97 196 
UK 74 216 
: 
17 382 
Textile machinery D 26 182 i 2S 142 
F 23 190 . 23 131 
I 18 115 I 20 116 22 120 
UK\ 72 145 . 14 353 
, 
Equipment for civil engineering 
and machinery for the mechanical 
working of building materials D 22 200 ' 26 219 
UK 52 210 ! 54 230 
Hoisting and handling equipment D 25 244 25 261 
I 33 166 ! 31 194 34 287 
UK 42 184 37 200 
I 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
1969/70 1972 1973/74 
Industry Country 
I I I C. 4L C. 4L C. 4L 
Electronic and audio equipment, D 59 140 54 130 I 51 134 
radio and television receivers F 66 132 68 236 -
-
I 31 183 43 191 45 178 
DK 84 567 76 550 75 403 
Household electrical appliances D 65 256 75 270 73 260 
I 51 182 61 222 62 268 
UK 36 337 50 333 52 357 
DK 94 562 93 315 94 400 
Manufacture of: 
cycles D 62 148 59 150 55 195 
motorcycles and 
power-assisted cycles D 98 169 98 154 98 153 
cycles, motorcycles and 
power-assisted cycles together I 64 592 68 536 
Tyres for motor vehicles D 71 266 71 208 72 239 
F 87 87 84 
I 92 417 93 387 94 448 
UK 89 643 92 666 92 670 
Food industries D 5 128 7 187 8 167 
F 8 116 7 130 
I 10 128 10 115 
NL 14 245 19 296 
B 21 248 22 229 
UK 41 252 39 247 
IRL 24 140 19 159 21 166 
DK 51 140 50 187 49 158 
Beverages D 7 9 264 9 168 
F 41 108 47 184 45 210 
I 16 138 19 132 17 124 
UK 52 148 62 124 64 142 
NL 60 433 60 410 
Brewing D 9 192 14 264 13 209 
F 56 201 69 481 69 481 
I 58 272 - - 66 219 
NL 91 682 92 640 92 596 
B 50 369 50 368 50 374 
DK 95 > 1000 95 1000 95 ~ 1000 
Food and beverage distribution D 27 177 26 195 28 183 
F 31 123 35 132 37 158 
UK 40 200 48 210 60 294 
DK 69 680 70 598 71 714 
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1973/74 
Ranking I C. 
1 98 
2 97 
3 95 
4 94 
S 94 
6 92 
7 92 
8 84 
9 80 
10 75 
11 .73 
12 72 
13 71 
14 69 
IS 66 
16 66 
17 64 
18 62 
19 60 
20 60 
21 56 
22 5S 
23 S2 
24 52 
25 51 
26 49 
27 45 
28 45 
29 42 
30 42 
31 40 
32 40 
33 39 
34 37 
35 34 
36 30 
37 29 
38 28 
39 27 
40 24 
41 22 
42 22 
43 21 
44 20 
45 18 
46 17 
47 13 
48 10 
49 9 
50 8 
TABLE 8 
Level·of concentration in various Community indus~es and countries 
(Ranking and. concentration ratio (4» 
I 1972 
Industry and country I 
1969 
Ranking I C. Ranking I 
I 
Motorcycles D 1 98 1 
Office machinery I 2 97 2 
Brewing DK 3 95 3 
Tyres I 4 93 5 
Household electrical appliances DK 5 93 4 
Tyres UK 6 92 7 
Brewing NL 7 92 6 
Tyres F 8 87 8 
Pharmaceutical products NL 13 69 10 
Electronic and audio equipment, radio 
11 TV receivers DK <) 76 9 
Household electrical appliances D 10 75 14 
Tyre. D 11 71 11 
Food and beverage distribution DK 12 70 12 
Brewing F 14 69 20 
Brewing I 18 60 (E) 19 
Pharmaceutical products DK 16 66 13 
Beverages UK 22 52 16 
Household electrical appliances I 17 61 l2 
Beverages NL 19 59 17 
Food and beverages distribution UK 26 48 28 
Cotton UK 20 57 21 
Cycles D IS 69 IS 
Household electrical appliances UK 23 SO 30 
Brewing B 24 50 24 
Electronic and audio equipment, radio I 
11 TV receivers D 21 55 18 
Food manufacturing DK 2S SO 23 
Electronic and audio equipment, radio 
11 TV receivers . . I 29 43 34 
Beverages F 27 47 26 
Pharmaceutical products B 28 44 25 
Wool UK 30 43 27 
Electronic and audio equipment, radio I 
11 TV receivers 'uK 36 30 40 
Paper industry D 31 40 29 
Paper and board piocessing NL 37 29 36 
Food and beverage distribution F 33 35 35 
Hoisting and handling equipment I 35 31 32 
Wool B 3.2 36 31 
Manufacture of pulp, paper and 
paperboard . F 34 32 33 
Food and heverage distribution D 39 26 39 
Paper industry I 38 28 38 
Paper and board processing D 40 24 41 
Textile machinery and accessories I 42 20 43 
Cotton I 41 21 44 
Food indUstries lRL 44 19 42 
Pharmaceutical products F 47 12 45 
Cotton B 43 20 37 
Beverages I 45 19 47 
Brewing D 46 13 (E) 46 
Paper and cardboard processing F 48 9 48 
·Beverages D 49 9 (E) 49 
Food industries D 50 7 (E) 50 
C. 
98 
97 
95 
92 
94 
89 
91 
87 
72 
84 
65 
71 
69 
56 
58 
66 
62 
51 
60 
40 
5S 
63 
36 
SO 
59 
51 
31 
41 
43 
41 
24 (E) 
40 
29 
31 
33 
34 
32 
27 
27 
24 
18 
14 
24 
13 
29 
10 
13 (E) 
8 
7 (E) 
5 
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Concentration on product markets 
294. A detailed series giving concentration ratios and coefficients of disparity for 
some 300 product markets in different Community countries was published in 
Appendix 1 to the Commission's Methodolgy, already referred to. This report 
will simply give a few figures for the most recent situation which can be studied 
(1972/74) in a few important industrial branches in various Member States. 
Table 9 gives the -simple arithmetic mean both of the concentration ratios (C4) 
for 221 product markets and of the coefficients of disparity (4L) for 198 of those 
markets (it was not possible to ascertain the value of the 4L index for the other 
23 markets). 
The Table considers only the following major product markets: 
textiles; 
paper; 
pharmaceuticals; 
mechanical engineering (manufacture of machinery other than electrical machi-
nery); 
electrical engineering; 
food industries excluding most beverages (beer, alcoholic beverages, spa and 
mineral waters, and the like). 
295. It must be emphasized that: 
-(i) markets were selected and industries were sub-classified in response to prac-
tical constraints relating to the collection, analysis and harmonization of 
figures for the 221 cases; 
(li) consequently, the individual markets taken within a given industry (e.g. 
textiles or food industries) are neither identical nor strictly comparable 
between all Community countries; 
(iii) it is accordingly impossible to conclude that a specific industry is more or 
less concentrated in one country than in another. 
Even so, Table 9 nevertheless constitutes a useful first stage of research to 
measure the structure of the various markets in a given industry, for the average 
concentration of the industry (calculated from the average of the degrees of 
concentration for each market) can then be subjected to consistent historical 
scrutiny; the resulting figures can be used for various types of comparative study, 
notably in industry-to-industry and country-to-country terms. 
Although Table 9 is really no more than a starting point, its figures eloquently 
illustrate . the degree of oligopolization or even of virtual monopolization which 
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can be ascertained on a large number of markets i in the various Community 
countries. 
One point which merits particular attention is that the very industry where the 
analysis was made in greatest detail in most of the Member States-the food 
industry excluding beverages-the average levels of concentration on product 
markets are the highest (with figures ranging from 54% in Germany to 94% 
TABLE 9 
i 
Average concentration of the sample of markets for various Industries 
1972-1974 ' 
-
Average concentration on markets Number of markets selected 
Industry Country 
I I C.% 4L% , C. 4L 
I 
Textiles F 88 425 15 4 
I 37 248 ' 3 3 
---
Paper I 79 452 5 5 
NL 73 213 ! 6 6 
UK 75 315 7 , 7 
-
Pharmaceuticals F 64 364 I 10 9 
NL 63 368 11 11 
UK 80 353 ' 30 30 
DK 84 349 7 7 
Mechanical D 44 180 : 6 4 
engineering I 76 394, 11 3 
UK 73 211 - 5 5 
Electrical D 59 190 6 6 
engineering I 77 359 ' 6 6 
DK 80 346; 7 7 
UK 72 256' 8 8 
Food industries D 54 269 14 13 
F 85 579' 28 28 
I 62 287, 12 12 
UK 94 435 13 13 
DK 77 355: 11 11 
AVerage concen- D 52 213 26 23 
tration for the F 79 456; 53 41 
sample of markets I 66 348 37 29 
and aggregates NL 70 290' 17 17 
UK 79 314 63 63 
DK 80 350 25 25 
Commumty aggregate 71 328 221 198 
I 
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in the United Kingdom), particularly in comparison with concentration indices 
calculated on the industry as a whole (Table 7 gives relatively low C4 ratios for 
1972, ranging from 7 % in Germany to 50% in Denmark). 
296. Finally, it can be concluded from the sample survey of industries and 
markets that Germany is broadly speaking the Community country with the 
lowest level of industrial concentration. 
§ 3 - The relation between size of firm and performance 
The measure of effiCiency 
297. Any economic study of concentration and its effects entails measurement 
of corporate efficiency, and in particular analysis of the relation between size 
and profitability. The Commission has consequently adopted an econometric 
method enabling corporate performance to be measured by expressing the relation 
between performance in terms of official results and the actual volume of sales 
and own capitai.1 
In this report, this method for measuring comparative corporate performance is 
applied to all industrial activities taken at Community level. We have considered 
. the financial variables for firms domiciled in anyone of the nine Member States 
and appearing in the 1975 list of the 500 largest European industrial firms 
published by the magazine Vision.2 
298. The four performance ratios used are the following: 
l r 
net profit (04) 
of a given firm expressed a percentage. = as 
. sales (01) 
2r net profit (04) of a given firm expressed a percentage. = -- as 
own capital (07) 
cash flow (05) 
3r = of a given firm expressed as a percentage. 
sales (01) 
cash flow (05) 
4r = of a given firm expressed as a percentage. 
own capital (07) 
By adding each firm's ranking on each of these four performance ratios, we 
obtain the profitability score for each firm expressing its degree of profitability 
compared with the oilier sample firms. 
1 A detailed analysis of the method is given in the Methodology, op cit, Chapter V, points 32 to 39. 
2 Vision, 52 rue Taitbout, F-75009, Paris. 
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The measure of efficiency applied to a horlzof?tal 
cross-section of firms (all industries) 
299. The sample drawn from the Vision classification includes only firms that 
are domiciled in one of the nine Member States and whose four variables (sales 
(01), net profit (04), cash flow (05) and own capit~ (07» are all known. 
Only 292 of the 500 firms were therefore selected for the sample, and of these 
292: 
119.5 are British (UK) I giving 40.92 % 
60 are French (F) giving 20.55% 
57 are German (D) giving 19.52% 
23 are Dutch (NL) giving 7.88% 
13 are Belgian (B) I giving 4.45% 
12.5 are Italian (I) giving 4.28% 
6 are Danish (DK) giving 2.06% 
1 is Irish (JRL) giving 0.34% 
2921 100.00% 
! 
300. Table 10 gives the most important figures for the fifty most profitable 
industrial firms in the Community, ranked in decreasing order of profitability 
according to the ranking held by each firm in terms of profitability score. 
Breakdown by nationality 
, 
301. The fifty most profitable firms are broken down by nationality as follows: 
I 
25.5 are British (UK) giving, 51 % + 10.082 
10 are French (F) giving' 20% 0.55 
7 are German (D) giving: 14% 5.52 
3 are Belgian (B) giving: 6% + 1.55 
2.5 are Dutch (NL) giving 5% 2.88 
1 is Italian (I) giving i 2 % - 22.28 
1 is Irish (IRL) giving, 2% + 1.66 
o are Danish (OK) giving, 0% - 2.06 
501 
- I 
1 Firms having dual nationality, such as Royal Dutch/Shell, are recorded as two halves opposite 
the relevant 'countries. ' 
II The figures in this column expressed the difference between the percentages and the percentage 
shares of each nationality in the sample of 292 firms. I 
I 
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Comparison between the two series of percentages (share of each nationality in 
the sample of 292 firms and then in the sample of the 50 most profitable firms) 
confirms that British firms are not only in the lead as regards straight technical 
and financial concentration but are also among the most profitable. 
This is further borne out by the fact that of the ten most profitable Community 
firms six are British. It is necessary to point out however, that 12 subsidiaries 
of American companies (USA) are included among the 50 most profitable Euro-
pean industrial firms, that is 5 in the United Kingdom, 3 in Germany, 3 in France 
and 1 in Italy. 
Breakdown by Industry 
302. The most profitable industries seem to be electrical engineering and elec-
tronics, which provide eleven of the top fifty, including the first, second and fifth. 
There follow the oil, fuel and gas industries, which provide six of the to~ fifty, 
including Royal Dutch/Shell, Mobil Oil and Petrofina. From this it can be 
deduced that the oil crisis has had no apparent serious effect on the profitability 
and development of the great multinational oil companies. 
Finally, highly profitable firms are also to be found in the following industries: 
Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and chemicals: 
7 firms (Beecham, Glaxo, Kodak-Pathe, ICI, L'Oreal, Smith & Nephew and 
Wellcome). 
Building materials: 
3 firms (Redland, BPB Industries and Consolidated Gold Fields). 
Food and beverages: 
3 firms, (Heinz, Douwe Egberts and Pernod/Ricard). 
Paper, stationery and publishing: 
4 firms (BPB Industries, Smith & Nephew, BerteIsmann and Bunze Pulp & Paper). 
The energy industry, which is represented by five firms, may be singled out for 
special attention. With the exception of the Irish Electricity Supply Board, which 
ranks third and also has public works and electrical and electronic engineering 
interests, these firms, in business solely in electricity generation, would seem to 
owe their profitability entirely to their monopoly status. 
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Rank Score in score 
1 22 
---
2 29 
---
3 57 
-------
4 79 
---
5 85 
------
6 108 
----
7 128 
-'--
7 128 
------
9 147 
---
9 147 
- - ---
11 154 
----
12 160 
---
13 164 
-.--
13 164 
---
15 169 
---
TABLE 10 
The 50 most profitable industrial firms in the &ropean Community - 1975 
The values are expressed in thousands of dollars 
04 04 os os 
Ratio-- Ratio-- Ratio-- Ratil'-- 01 Sales 04 Net profit 
01 07 01 07 
Rank 1 Rate Rank 1 Rate Rank I Rate Rank il Rate Rank I Value Rank \ Value 
3 6 S 
I 
8 S5 9 
9.04 27.73 28.12 ! 86.29 1926640 174090 
I 7 7 14 69 11 
12.61 27.35 28.03 i 60.79 1241600 156 570 
5 12 16 24 261 79 
8.19 22.22 18.07 ; 49.04 292460· 23940 
4 1 44 30 : 80 19 
8.84 36.81 11.26 46.88 I 146 500 101380 
11 56 3 15 i 128 36 
6.60 13.SS 28.76 59.05 6805S0 44910 
19 21 28 40, 213 8S 
5.74 18.00 13.66 42.87 374590 21490 
23 IS 44 46 ' 196 82 
5.65 20.44 11.26 ! 40.73 406 720 22980 
14 14 40 60 134 39 
, 
6.40 20.48 11.48 , 36.75 643080 41140 
---------
24 4 98 21 290 123 
5.60 33.05 8.85 : 52.18 239900 13440 
33 2 99 13 226 107 
4.87 35.75 8.69 I 63.82 341300 16620 
54 84 6 10 104 56 
3.88 10.91 28.11 79.00 801300 31090 
39 32 42 47 : IS 5 
4.48 15.88 11.42 40.50 4993730 223630 
44 26 55 39' , 250 127 
4.27 17.10 10.78 43.13 307140 13120 
, 
2i 99 54 9 114 93 
2.59 13.60 27.41 144.02 
• 
749740 19410 
38 19 63 49· 137 61 
4.61 18.22 10.10 39.92 621480 28 640 
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(Number of firms In the sample: 292) 
05 Cash flow 07 Own capital Rank 
Name of firm Vision Main activities Country Notes 
Rank I Rank I 
1975 
Value Value 
."._. 
16 45 Electrical machinery. 
IBM-Deutschland 82 domestic appliances, D 
541690 627740 electronics (9) 
26 51 Electrical machinery, 
Rank Xerox 115 domestic appliances, UK 
347980 572 390 electronics (5)(11) 
--
110 194 Energy, public works, 
Electricity Supply 432 electrical machinery, IRL 
52850 107760 Board electronics (7) 
54 98 Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, 
Beecham 129 alcoholic and non-alcoholic UK 
129100 275390 beverages (7) 
--
-_._--
42 83 Electrical machinery, 
IBM-Italia 214 domestic appliances, I 
195720 331420 electronics (9) 
----
116 180 
Redland 352 Building materials UK 
51170 119360 (7) 
--
125 185 Building materials, paper, 
BPB Industries 327 packaging UK 
45800 112450 (7) 
----
87 125 
Glaxo Holdings 221 Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics UK 
73820 200 890 (2) 
209 278 Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, 
Smith & Nephew 495 textiles, paper, packaging UK 
21220 40670 
--
167 271 International 
Harvester 378 Mechanical engineering D 
29670 46490 (5) (14) 
----
36 95 Electrical machinery. 
IBM-UK 176 domestic appliances. UK 
225210 285090 electronics (9) 
----
14 26 Various activities, 
Mannesman 26 mechanical engineering, D 
570220 1407950 iron and steel 
----
158 234 Motor vehicles. motorcycles, 
BTR 416 accessories, rubber and lyres. UK 
33100 76740 plastics 
41 158 
Mobil-Oil France 189 Oil industry F 
205480 142670 (10) 
95 145 
British Aircraft 225 Aircraft industry UK 
62760 157220 
COMPo REP. EC 1976 
168 THE DEVEWPMENT OF CONCENTRATION 
TABLE 10 (continued) 
04 04 05 05 
Ratio-- Ratio-- Ratio -- Ratio-- 01 Sales 04 Net profit 
Rank Score 01 01 01 : 01 in score 
Rank I Rate Rank I Rate Rank I Rate Ran~ I Rate Rank I Value Rank I Value 
68 49 32 
I 
221 58 25 
16 111 
3.58 13.85 13.15 50.92 1110210 61190 
---- ------
31 115 11 43 165 141 
11 172 
2.29 22.14 11.28 1 112.12 495 100 11330 
----
61 11 18 26, 116 63 
18 182 i 
3.15 18.90 9.56 1 48.21 139830 21720 
----
10 31 31 106 222 16 
19 184 , 
6.84 14.66 13.36 I 28.64 354660 24250 
---
48 30 59 48 30 13 
20 185 
4.01 16.04 10.21 40.41 3110610 151010 1 
---
42 22 72 51 45 11 
21 181 
4.45 17.90 9.74 39.19 2427920 108.010 
------
19 76 26 19 266 160 
22 200 
3.13 11.57 14.44 53.30 286220 8970 
---
12 20 60 108 81 23 
22 200 I 6.59 18.08 10.23 28.05 1144400 75430 
---
15 64 25 96 14 2 
22 200 
6.16 12.17 14.46 ! 29.95 6270740 386480 
----
69 99 15 20 142 86 
25 203 
3.5S 10.11 18.40 52.41 60S 070 21470 
------
13 29 53 117 1 1 
26 212 
6.58 16.46 10.81 27.06 29244090 1922810 
- - ---------
57 b9 38 53 167 98 
27 211 
3.83 12.08 12.22 38.57 485170 18560. 
---
75 59 51 38 103 64 
28 223 
3.36 13.42 10.89 ~ 43.47 810990 27270 
---
101 9 105 11 159 125 
29 226 
2.54 23.66 8.38 i 78.06 521620 13240 
----
110 3 111 4 132 112 
30 228 
2.40 33.55 7.84 109.77 6538S0 15660 
---
8 81 17 125 122 32 
31 231 
7.62 11.01 17.83 25.78 699 790 53320 
---
I 
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05 Cash flow 01 Own capital 
Rank 
Name of firm Vision Main activities Country Notes 
Rank I I 
1915 
Value Rank Value 
31 65 Thorn Electrical Electrical machinery, 
Industries 89 domestic appliances, UK 
224950 441800 electronics (1) 
----
105 265 Chan tiers de Shipbuilding, mechaoical 
L'AtIantique 211 engineering F 
55860 49870 
92 153 Publishing and printing, 
Bertelsmann 193 various activities D 
10100 146640 (2) 
-- ----
122 140 
Kodak-PatM 368 Chemicals F 
47370 165400 (5) (13) 
-- ----
21 33 
Petrofina 44 Oil industry B 
381210 941900 
-- ----
34 47 Motor vehicles. motorcycles. 
Ford-Werke 66 accessories D 
236460 603360 (8) 
----
134 232 
Forges de C1abecq 443 Iron and steel B 
41330 77 S40 (2) 
63 69 Consolidated Gold Building materials, mining, 
Fields 130 raw materials UK 
117020 417120 (2) 
----
3 6 Chemicals, plastics. 
ICI 22 textiles UK 
906 S20 3027110 
64 121 Electrical machinery,. 
Honeywell Bull 231 domestic appliances, F 
111330 212440 electronics (12) 
----
I I Oil industry, chemicals, 
Royal Dutch/Shell 1 mining. raw materials NL/UK 
3161410 11683330 
100 146 ICL, International Electrical machinery, 
Computers 275 domestic appliances, UK 
S9270 1S36S0 electronics (4) 
----
76 124 
L'Or6a1 173 Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics F 
88300 203130 
----
127 260 Civil engineering, 
Routiere Colas 2S9 public works F 
43690 55970 
_. 
----
liS 210 
Mobil Oil 219 Oil industry UK 
51240 46680 (10) 
----
58 62 
INTERCOM 204 Energy, power utilities B 
124800 484180 
----
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04 04 
Ratio- Ratio-
Rank Score 01 07 in score 
Rank I. Rate Rank 1 Rate 
2 113 I 
32 232 
9.27 9.38 
-------------
93 103 
32 232 
2.79 9.93 
------------
63 46 
34 234 
3.71 14.04 
---
45 23 
34 234 
4.26 17.86 
------
lOS 45 
34 234 
2.45 14.05 
-------
21 50 
37 235 
5.68 13.71 
------------
63 13 
38 236 
3.71 22.05 
-------------
81 93 
39 237 
3.09 10.36 
------
60 16 
40 239 
3.78 19.53 
-------
47 38 
41 254 
4.17 14.55 
------
198 25 
41 254 
0.93 17.70 
------------
43 57 
43 255 
4.42 13.54 
----
6 33 
44 260 
7.87 15.40 
---
25 36 
45 264 
5.48 14.95 
------
30 27 
46 267 
5.06 16.95 
----
9 28 
47 273 
6.87 16.63 
---- I 
TABLE 10 (continued). 
! 
05 I 05 
Ratio-- Ratio--
01 07 
Rank 1 Rate Rank, I Rate 
8 109 
27.49 27.81 
20 161 
16.38 58.33 
69 56 
9.90 I 37.40 
102 64 
: 
8.43 35.39 
67 17 
: 
9.95 57.08 
48 116' 
11.21 27.09 
123 37' 
7.33 , 43.56 
29 34 
13.62 i 45.71 
113 50· 
7.72 i 39.83 
87 82, 
I 
9.28 32.38 
30 I: 
13.44 254.86 
64 91 
10.06 , 30.79 
50 171. 
I 
10.99 2UI 
80 123, 
9.49 25.92 
103 1071 
8.41 ! 28.15 
.---
81 ISS' 
9.46 I 22.91 
01 Sales 04 Net profit 
Rank I Value Rank I Value 
212 49 
375270 34780 
12 7 
6840620 190820 
228 132 
340270 12640 
249 124 
311800 13270 
93 81 
949180 .23240 
234 95 
329560 18710 
109 60 
774400 28730 
268 166 
281740 8700 
89 45 
989810 37450 
182 100 
433990 18090 
145 186 
589490 5500 
270 134 
277970 12300 
184 50 
430770 33890 
201 84 
403190 22080 
151 62 
557150 28210 
208 72 
382140 26250 
I 
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OS Cash flow 07 Own capital I Rank 
Name of firm Vision Main activities Country Notes 
Rank I Rank I 
1975 
Value Value 
69 81 I BEWAG 351 Energy, power utilities 0 103 160 370980 (2) 
----
2 16 Oil industry, chemicals, 
Elf Aquitaine 19 mining, raw materials F 
1120370 1920870 
-----
156 216 
H.I. Heinz 381 Food products UK 
33670 90030 (1)(15) 
181 241 Paper, packaging, plastics, 
Bunzl Pulp & Paper 414 various activities UK 
26290 74290 
----
72 139 
Dassault-Breguet 153 Aircraft industry F 
94420 165410 
-- ----
147 163 Electrical machinery, 
; Hoover 387 domestic appliances, UK 
36950 136420 electronics (16) 
101 169 Construction, various 
Trafalgar House 183 activities UK 
56760 130290 (4) 
143 224 Electrical machinery, 
Moulinex 449 domestic appliances, F 
38370 83940 electronics 
----
83 127 Shipbuilding, various 
Thyssen-Bornemisza 148 activities NL 
76380 191780 
136 173 Electrical machinery, 
Bridon 300 domestic appliances, UK 
40270 124360 electronics 
----
79 282 South of Scotland Energy and power 
Electricity Board 236 utilities UK 
79210 31080 
-. 
-----
176 212 Glass, pottery, china. 
Hepworth Ceramic 452 plastics UK 
27970 90830 
----
123 119 Wellcome 
Foundation 307 Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics UK 
47350 220100 (3) 
--- --
144 151 Food products, tobacco, 
Douwe Egberts 334 alcoholic and non-alcoholic NL 
38280 147710 beverages 
-- ----
124 138 
Ultramar Group 247 Oil industry UK 
46860 166 470 
.---
149 144 
Gestetner Holdings 346 Various activities UK 
36160 157860 (5) 
--
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TABLE 10 (contin'ued) 
04 04 
Ratio-- Ratio--
Rank Score 01 in score 
Rank r Rate Rank 
---
28 
48 276 
5.18 
-.--
7 
48 276 
7.83 
-.--
37 
48 276 
4.66 
(1) = Year ended April 1975. 
(2) = Year ended June 1975. 
(3) = Year ended August 1975. 
(4) = Year ended September 1975. 
(5) = Year ended October 1975. 
(6) = Year ended February 1976. 
(7) = Year ended March 1976. 
(8) = Controlled by Ford (USA). 
(9) = Controlled by IBM (USA). 
67 
79 
159 
(10) = Controlled by Mobil Oil (USA). 
(11) = Controlled by Xerox (USA). 
07 
I Rate 
12.34 
11.13 
5.95 
os 
Ratio--
01 
I Rank I Rate 
S4 
10.80 
21 
15.25 
10 
27.13 
(12) = Controlled by Honeywell Information Systems (USA). 
(13) Controlled by Eastman Kodak (USA). 
(14) Controlled by International Harvester (USA). 
(1 S) Controlled by Heinz (USA). . 
(J 6) Controlled by Hoover (USA). 
, 
os 
R~tio--
07 
R~I Rate 
127 
, 25.70 
169 
21.68 
7p 
34.69 
01 Sales 04 Net profit 
Rank 
I 
Value Rank I Value 
278 121 
262520 13610 
225 67 
341.590 26750 
95 37 
924870 43060 
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OS Cash flow 07 Own capital Rank 
Name of firm Vision Main activities Country Notes 
I I 
1915 
I Rank Value Rank Value 
174 191 I Electrical machinery, 
Ever Ready 475 electronics, mechanical UK 
28350 110310 engineering (6) 
113 113 Alcoholic and non-alcoholic 
Pemod Ricard 376 beverages F 
52100 240290 
-- ----
29 42 Vereinigte Elektrizi-
titswerke Westfalen 157 Energy, power utilities D 
250950 723320 (yEW) 
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Profitability in relation to sales 
303. Of the fifty most profitable firms only six a1s6 appear in the top fifty firms 
ranked by sales. Furthermore, eight of these fifty most profitable firms are to be 
. I 
found among the bottom fifty ranked by sales. I 
The measure of efficiency applied to the worldwide food Industry 
I 
304. Our method is also, as we have seen, applied in the Commission's individual 
research projects on concentration and competiti0Ilj. The food industry is one of 
those which has been subjected to the most exte~ive scrutiny. 
I 
The hundred largest food groups in Western countries ranked by 1974 sales 
were analysed in the same way as the 'Vision' list. The sample was reduced 
from 100 to 64 firms by elimination of those for which one or more of the four 
variables (sales (01), net profit (04), cash flow (0!5) and own capital (07)) were 
unavailable. 
Table 11 gives the most important figures for the W most profitable food groups 
in the world, ranked in decreasing order of profitability according to the ranking 
held by each firm in terms of profitability score. : 
Of the 10 most profitable groups, only two appear among the top ten firms 
ranked by sales. Conversely, these ten groups include the firm which ranks lowest 
in terms of absolute sales among the 64 firms constituting the sample. 
Examination of the profitability score ranking of the ten largest firms ranked by 
sales in relation to the whole sample is also significant: 
Firm 
Unilever 
Nestle Alimentana 
Swift (Esmark) 
Kraftco 
Beatrice Foods 
Ralston Purina 
General Foods 
CPC International 
Associated British Foods 
Coca-Cola 
Sales ranking 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
i 
Profitability score ranking 
36 
31 
46 
49 
23 
26 
23 
9 
28 
1 
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J: 
:v 
~ 
m 
n 
~ 
Ranking 
in 
seo", 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Score 
23 
26 
28 
44 
47 
51 
61 
64 
76 
77 
R· 04 
aM Of 
Ranking I Rare 
5 
7.77 
8 
7.13 
6 
7.52 
3 
8.24 
15 
5.59 
11 
6.01 
14 
5.66 
23 
4.20 
25 
3.86 
1 
14.82 
TABLE 11 
The ten most profitable food firms in the Western nations - 1974 
(Value: in thousands of dollars) 
R· 04 
atlo i57 R· 05 a£lo Oi R· 05 ano 07 01 . Sales 
Ranking 1 Rate Ranking 1 Rate Ranking. 1 Rate Ranking 1 Value 
4 7 7 10 
19.18 10.10 24.94 2522 150 
3 9 6 34 
20.40 8.85 25.31 1 009 818 
6 8 8 33 
18.70 9.99 24.86 1035053 
9 4 28 29 
15.88 10.71 20.64 1088557 
5 17· 10 36 
18.80 7.22 24.31 967700 
13 10 17 46 
15.54 8.68 22.42 814524 
12 14 21 48 
15.57 7.88 21.66 753 131 
11 21 9 12 
15.70 6.51 24.32 2080759 
8 31 12 8 
16.65 5.46 23.55 2570273 
27 1 48 64 
12.69 17.88 15.32 455269 
-- ---
-------
(Number of fi,ms in sample: 64) 
Firm Country 
Coca-Cola USA 
Kellogg USA 
Beecham UK 
National USA Distillers 
Heublein USA 
ios, ~chlitz 
rewmg USA 
Castle & USA Cook 
Pepsico USA 
CPC- USA International 
Hiram Walker- CAN Gooderham 
~ 
I 
g 
8 
I 
-~ v. 
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Remarks on the profitability of large firms 
305. One conclusion seems evident: the largest firms are hardly ever the most 
profitable (and are unlikely to be the most efficient). There consequently seems 
to be little point in systematically promoting the fprmation of giant firms or in 
encouraging an uncontrolled process of merger and concentration, for it is by no 
means certain that this would actually help to make Community industry more 
profitable or more competitive. 
§ 4 - Surveys of retail food prices and trading !'!lark-ups 
The research programme 
306. The survey of food prices in several Member States is part of the Commis-
sion's research programme into the evolution of concentration and the workings 
of competition in the distribution of food product~.l 
At the practical level, the following problems of qefinition arise: 
(i) what samples of products and sales points should be taken into consideration; 
(ii) what data should be recorded; 
(iii) how frequently should the enquiries be carried out? 
Sample of products 
307. The sample of products was relatively small; all of the products were 
articles manufactured by the food industry, in fairly common use in the Member 
States; the type of article, the quantity and the presentation (packaging and trade-
mark) could therefore be defined rigorously, and homogeneity was ensured so 
that comparisons of different prices for each articl~, in each country and at each 
selling point, were significant. 
Because of differing situations and facilities in the: different countries, 51 articles 
were studied in Germany, 35 in France, 44 in Itaiy, 57 in Denmark and 154 in 
the United Kingdom. I 
All of the articles studied belong to one of the :seventeen groups of industrial 
food products shown in Table 12. 
1 See Methodology op cit, Chapter VII, points 60 to 71. 
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It was also possible-especially in the United Kingdom-to consider a fairly 
large number of different trademarks and packs (weights or measures) for the 
same product; this explains the large number of observations in the United King-
dom. 
TABLE 12 
Groups of food products covered by the price surveys 
I Tinned fish, meat, vegetables and fruit (Con.) 
II Baby foods (Enf.) 
III Soups (Sou.) 
IV Vegetables in packets (Leg.) 
V Meat extracts and aromatic sauces (Epi.) 
VI Oils and fats, margarine (Ora.) 
VII Sweet biscuits, cakes, sweets, chocolates (Bis.) 
VIII Rusks, powdered desserts, flour, salt, sugar and jellies (Far.) 
IX Cereals (Cer.) 
X Jams and marmalades (Mar.) 
Xl Drinks, coffee, tea, soft drinks, mineral waters (Boi.) 
XII Dairy products, cheeses, butter, etc. (Lai.) 
XIII Frozen products (including ice-cream) (Fro.) . 
XIV Pasta (spaghetti, macaroni, etc.) prepared dishes (pizza, ravioli, etc.) (Spa.) 
XV Beers (Bie.) 
XVI Alcoholic drinks (whisky, brandy, martini, wine) (A1c.) 
XVII Hams. salted and smoked meats (Cha.) 
Sample of sales points 
308. The following basic criteria governed the choice of sales points: 
(a) geographical concentration: The number of sales points is small; only one 
area or city was chosen (Munich for Germany, Montpellier for France, 
Greater London for the United Kingdom, Turin for Italy and the Arhus/ 
Odense area for Denmark); 
(b) the sample had to be representative of the types and structures of business, 
distributed according to the form of trade and the size and location of the 
sales points (for example, suburban hypermarkets, small cooperative self-
service stores out of town, small independent stores in the town centre, and 
so on). 
We can therefore bring out differences in the levels and variations of prices 
resulting from the size and the location of each sales point in the sample. 
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Data to be considered 
; 
309. The surveys were not limited to recording the price of each product at each 
sales point in the small samples considered. Many! other data were collected and 
elaborated: I 
(i) the make of· the product, and the distinction :between manufacturer's make, 
trademark and distributor's own label; 
I (ii) the origin of the product, and the distinction between home-produced articles, 
imported articles, partly home-produced articles and articles of undetermined 
origin. 
The systematic series of information collected at Community level and classified 
according to the categories of sales points makes it possible to carry out a signifi-
cant economic analysis of the workings of compe~tion in a field which is vital to 
the study of inflation. 
Timing of the enquiries 
310. Surveys could not be carried out more frequently than every six months; 
the first was in January 1976, the second in July' 1976 and the third in January 
1977. 
I 
Initial results of surveys of prices and mark-up,s 
311. It is still too early to assess the outstanding features of the evolution of 
prices, since the surveys only began in 1976, and since the samples of products 
and of sales points were too limited for any generill conclusions to be drawn. 
However, the results are striking enough to justify one or two remarks. . 
Firstly, the methodology drawn up by Commission departments for this research 
has proved to be applicable and productive. 
Secondly, a general operating principle seems to have been proved: since an 
outstanding feature common to all the regions studied in the various Member 
Stat~s is that relevant price differences exist for: the same product between dif-
ferent sales points: 
(a) it would not be feasible to impose single uniform prices on all sales points 
for the same product or the same make; 
(b) a claim that the phenomenon of inflation w¥ being quantified and analysed 
on a scientific basis would be unfounded if! there had been no prior study 
of the most important structures and levels Of prices at a given moment. 
I 
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These two points are paramount for competition policy. We must now look more 
closely at why and how the initial results of these surveys on prices and mark-ups 
justify our conclusions. 
The hypothesis of divergence 
312. Our statement that considerable price differences exist between the different 
sales points was based on a simplifying working hypothesis involving the cal-
culation of the relative percentage deviation between the maximum price recorded 
for any given product at one sales point and the minimum price recorded for the 
same product at another sales point.1 
Table 13, which classifies samples into six classes, in descending order, shows 
that price differences may be considerable in the local samples analysed in the 
various Community countries, for the articles considered in each country. In 
Germany, for example, out of 51 articles observed, there are five in class 1 of 
differences or relative deviations; this means that there were five articles whose 
price at some sales points was more than twice the minimum price recorded for 
that product. 
In the United Kingdom, the situation is quite different. There are no articles whose 
price varies in the ratio of 1 to 2 (class 1: eRp > 100%) from the sales point 
offering the minimum price to another sales point; one article was, however, 
offered at 80% higher than the minimum price recorded. 
313. The following remarks are based on a second simplifying hypothesis. 
It may be supposed, on the basis of certain provisional results of the surveys in 
progress, that the size and location of the sales points are factors determining the 
cost of distribution and the profitability of each sales point. The following sim-
plifying hypothesis may be considered justifiable: a small supermarket or an 
independent town-centre shop may have a cost structure that leaves it no choice 
but to offer prices up to 40% higher than those offered by an enormous hyper-
market on the edge of the town, where land is cheap, near the point where 
several motorways converge, and where supply and storage costs are therefore 
low. 
On the basis of this simplifying hypothesis, one may postulate a relative deviation 
as a percentage of the minimum price of some 10% to 40% as being the normal 
case, since this order. of deviation could be due quite simply to the different cost 
structures characterizing each sales point. 
1 The formula is: ERp = maximum price - minimum price x 100 
minimum price. 
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TABLE 13 
Survey of prices based on a small sample of food products and sales points - January 1976 
Price differences between sales points 
Germany Denmark France Italy 
Number of cases Number of cases N umbe r of cases Number of cases 
Per class I Cumulative Per class I Cumulative Per class I Cumulative Per class I Cumulative 
5 5 I I I I 1 1 
- 4-- --
-9 - -- 9- -- 10- - --
---0 --- ___ L_ 2 3 
-
17 26 18 28 14 -- --15 16 19 
24 50 27 55- 19 34 24 43 
0 50 2 57 1 35 0 43 
1 51 I 0 57 0 35 1 44 
-----
United Kingdom 
Number of case. 
Per class I Cumulative 
0 0 
1 1 
--- 19- - -- 20 --
101 121 
23 144 
10 154 
-~ 
~ 
1:1 
~ 
S 
~ 
?j 
~ 
~ 
I 
3 
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Thus, on the basis of Table 13, three kinds of price difference may be distin-
guished: 
(i) The 'normal case', with a difference between the maximum and minimum 
prices expressed as a percentage of the minimum price of 10% or more, but 
less than 40%; 
(ii) The 'divergent case', with a difference of 40% or more; 
(iii) The 'uniform case', with a difference of less than 10%. 
314. Table 14 shows that the 'uniform case' is, in fact, the most rare (about 10% 
of cases), which shows how dangerous it would be from the point of view of the 
inflationary process, to adopt a policy of authoritarian price fixing. 
Such a policy of fixing uniform prices would have to align prices either on the low 
prices of the most efficient sales points, or on the highest prices, offered by the 
most expensive sales points; the first solution would eliminate the marginal sales 
points, whose distribution and buying costs are higher; the second would mean, 
firstly, that consumers would be at a serious economic disadvantage, and, secondly, 
that the most efficient and least costly sales points would enjoy an additional profit 
which could hardly be an obstacle to inflationist tendencies. 
TABLE 14 
The three degrees of price difference: normal case, divergent case and uniform case 
Normal ease .Rp Divergent ease .Rp > Uniform case .Rp < 
between 10% and 40% 40% 10% 
Country Total cases 
I % of total I % of total I %oftotal Number Number Number of eases of eases of eases 
Germany 51 24 47.1 26 51.0 I 2.0 
Denmark 57 27 47.4 28 49.1 2 3.5 
France 35 19 54.3 15 42.9 I 2.9 
Italy 44 24 54.6 19 43.2 I 2.3 
United Kingdom 154 101 65.6 20 13.0 33 21.4 
Community 341 195 57.2 108 31.7 38 11.1 
315. The 'divergent case' (almost 30% of cases) seems very widespread, after the 
'normal case' (nearly 60% of cases). The fact that there are great differences in 
price for the same product is not necessarily a negative indicator of the workings 
of competition. This statement calls for one or two explanatory remarks: 
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The 'normal case' (maximum prices from 10 to 40% above minimum prices) may 
well be due, as noted above, to different cost structures from one sales point to 
another. 
The 'divergent case' (price difference of 40% or more) may be explained in two 
I 
w~: I 
(a) the sales points offering minimum prices are usually either exposed to much 
more intense competition than the others, or actively engaged in an aggressive 
competition strategy; ! 
(b) these sales points belong to groups or retailers'organizations whose power 
of negotiation with manufacturers and producers is very great; this enables 
them to obtain exceptionally favourable conditions and cost prices ('power 
of demand'). 
These two explanatory remarks show, firstly, that there is an active and intense 
mechanism of competition, but, secondly, that t~e final consequences of over-
intense competition may not be desirable. Such consequences might be: 
(i) the excessive concentration of distribution, through the massive elimination 
of too many marginal or costly sales points; 
(ii) 
, 
a serious disadvantage to the industries supplying the large groups or retailers' 
chains, in so far as the retailers might abuse ,their power of negotiation, and 
succeed in obtaining the various industrial food products at the manufacturing 
cost, without any guarantee that, in the long term, the sale price to consumers 
would reflect the reduction in the retailers' pu,chasing price. 
The tendency to a parallel increase in concentration between retailers, which, as 
remarked in paragraph 2, is marked enough to be worrying, might lead the large 
retailers to reduce considerably the present level ,of intensity of competition. 
The phenomena and tendencies involved are obviously particularly complex-the 
situation is different from one member country to another; the Commission intends 
to study them in depth over the next few years. 
Divergent evolution of prices 
316. Any conclusions drawn from the evolution qf prices from the surveys would 
be premature; the surveys only began in Januaryi 1976. However, the results ob-
tained up to now bring out divergent evolution of, prices between: 
products; I 
countries; 
sales points. 
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Bearing in mind the reservations made earlier in connection with the limited nature 
of the samples of products and sales points, which precludes generalized and 
definitive conclusions, we may infer from Table 15 that in 1976 the evolution of 
prices confirmed the divergent case. The table reveals not only divergent evolution 
between the two countries considered (Germany and the United Kingdom), but 
also the divergent price tendencies from one group of products to another, with 
different tendencies in different countries. 
These tables show that the analysis of prices and other factors in the inflation 
process cannot depend on generalizations based on price averages-which do not 
reflect reality-and that fuller synchronic analyses should be developed. 
317. One or two factors that have already emerged are significant for considering 
the divergent evolution of prices from one sales point to another; they relate to 
the period January-April 1976 in Germany and France. 
TABLE 15 
Variations in average price of articles 
considered in the limited sample of food products by product groups 
Percentage price variation between 
January 1976 
Product group and June/July 1976 and January 1977 
Germany 
I 
United United 
Kingdom Kin&dom 
I 
I Tinned fish, meat, vegetables and 
fruit (Con.) + 4.03 + 0.50 + 8.60 
II Baby foods (Enf.) + 0.14 + 17.88 + 19.24 
III Soups (Sou.) + 9.72 + 20.51 
IV Vegetables in packets (Leg.) + 0.15 + 0.44 . + 19.61 
V Meat extracts and aromatic sauces (Epi.) - 3.01 + 20.17 + 20.49 
VI Oils and fats, margarine (Gra.) +0.06 + 18.08 + 29.46 
VII Sweet biscuits, cakes, sweets, 
chocolates (Bis.) - 1.83 + 0.57 + 9.94 
VIII Rusks, powdered desserts, flour, salt, 
sugar and jellies (Far.) - 1.63 + 8.22 + 16.69 
IX Cereals (Cer.) 0 + 6.57 +20.84 
X Jams and marmalades (Mar.) - 0.11 + 2.94 + 15.15 
XI Drinks, coffee, tea, soft drinks, 
mineral waters (Boi.) + 5.05 + 30.23 + 65.38 
XII Dairy products (cheeses, butter, etc.) (Lai.) + 0.02 + 12.51 + 15.26 
XIII Frozen products 
(including ice cream) (Fro.) - 0.17 - 8.54 + 24.76 
XIV Pasta (spaghetti, macaroni, etc.) 
prepared dishes (pizza, ravioli, etc.) (Spa.) + 0.04 
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Table 16 shows how great was the divergence (in percentage) for the same products 
between different sales points during this period.1 
The deviation is greater than 20% for 17 articles out of 51 in Germany (33% 
of the articles considered), and for 23 articles out of 35 (66% of the articles 
considered) in France. 
The wide variability of prices-against the background of a divergent evolution 
according to the sales point-is an unequivocal indication of vigorous competitive 
mechanisms. It should be borne in mind, however, that the brevity of the period 
considered (three months) may also justify another hypothesis: the prices might 
not be so much evolving in different directions as adjusting and aligning them-
selves; this process would not be simultaneous at the different sales points, but 
rather spread over a whole quarter. 
But if this is indeed the case, it could be argued that the absence of simultaneity 
or synchronization of the price policy of the retailers in the sample is another 
manifestation of the competitive mechanism. 
Research in progress will supply more details on the outstanding features and the 
causes of these phenomena. 
318. The study of prices and of price formation must be accompanied by the 
analysis of the recorded gross profit margins (mark-ups) of the retailers considered 
in the samples. This analysis is a crucial aspect of the highly complex study of 
the formation of the galaxy of consumer prices for various products. 
The analysis of the evolution of these profit margins should also be related to two 
factors that play an important role in the formation of final prices: 
(i) the concentration of distribution, not only at national level, but also, and 
especially. at regional level, which may lead to local trade oligopolies, or 
even structures of domination, that are incompatible with an efficient and 
lasting competitive mechanism; 
(ii) the balance of power between manufacturers and" retailers, and in particular, 
the general buying and selling strategies, of the large retailers. 
The manifold effects of these factors tend to be felt not only on final prices, and 
thus on consumers-in a very different way depending on the structure of retail 
trade in the town or region considered-but also on the long-term evolution of 
the structures of the manufacturing industries of the member countries; these 
1 The deviation eAs is calculated as the difference between the maximum price increase and the 
minimum increase (or maximum reduction) for the same article. Thus. if the most inflationary firm 
has increased its price by 500/0 and the least inflationary by 20%. eAs will equal 300/0. If. on the 
other hand. the latter firm has reduced its price by 20%. eAs will equal 70%. 
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industries, if they are to survive and develop, must be able to count on their most 
important customers-the big retailers-for a reasonably long period. 
The Commission hopes that information on the level and evolution of gross profit 
margins will be available in forthcoming reports on competition policy. 
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TABLE 16A 
Maximum and minimum price variations between sales points (eAs) 
(January 1976 and April 1976 surveys) 
France 
y= Variations (in %) 
number of Ranking Article Group 
articles 
I studied Max. Min. 
30 I Crackers Ritz Far. + 12.2 - 83.9 
II Dessert 
Mont Blanc Lai. + 51.4 - 23.7 
III Molitarde Amora Epi. + 23.5 - 35.8 
IV Potage Kubor Sou. + 26.6 - 30.1 
V Margarine Astra Gra. + 34.1 - 17.1 
VI Eau min~ra1e 
Evian Boi. + 31.8 - 11.3 
VII Purre Mousseline Leg. + 38.2 - 3.2 
VIII Macedoine 
Cassegrain Con. + 24.1 - 15.5 
IX PetIts pois 
Cassegrain Con. + 17.2 - 22.0 
X A¢ritif Martini Ale. + 14.5 - 24.2 
XI Biere Kronenbourg Bie. + 23.6 - 10.1 
XII Fromage Boursin Lai. + 17.7 - 15.5 
xm Huile Fruidor Gra. + 25.4 - 4.3 
XIV Beurre bas 
degamme Gra. + 14.1 -14.2 
XV Fromage Supreme Lai. + 19.3 - 5.9 
XVI Caf~ soluble 
Nescaf~ Boi. + 14.4 - 10.1 
XVII Lait en poudre 
Regilait Lai. + 11.6 - 12.2 
XVIII Eaumin~ale 
Contrex Boi. + 7.7 - 15.2 
XIX Soda Schweppes Boi. + 13.0 - 9.0 
XX Lait concentr~ 
Gloria Lai. + 18.2 - 3.8 
XXI Sucre Saint Louis Far. + 17.5 - 3.6 
XXII Pates Panzani Spa. + 7.5 - 13.2 
xxm Boisson fruitoo 
Oasis Boi. + 14.3 - 6.0 
COMPo REP. EC 1976 
eA. absolute 
deviation 
in ~~ 
J6.1 
75.1 
59.3 
56.7 
51.2 
43.1 
41.4 
39.6 
39.2 
38.7 
33.7 
33.2 
29.7 
28.3 
25.2 
24.5 
23.8 
22.9 
22.0 
22.0 
21.1 
20.7 
20.3 
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TABLE 16B 
Maximum and minimum price variations between sales points (eAs) 
January 1976 and Apri11976 sun'eys 
Germany 
I Variations (in %> y= 
number of Ranking Article I Group 
articles 
I I studied Max. Min. 
51 I Ketchup von 
Kraft Epi. + 50.8 - 61.0 
11 Erdbeer-
Marmelade 
Bassermann Gold Mar. + 34.5 - 64.6 
III Kirsch-
Marmelade 
Schwartau Mar. + 38.5 - 28.2 
IV BUcklingsfilet 
von Norda Con. + 57.1 - 6.4 
V Klare Fleischsuppe I 
von Maggi Epi. + 27.0 - 28.8 
VI Bad Reichenhaller 
Salz Far. + 32.7 -18.2 
VII Schweinefleisch-
konserve Sibiu Con. + 35.4 - 13.2 
VIII Rohe Klosse 
von Pfanni I Leg. +22.2 ~ 25.1 
IX Salat-Mayonnaise 
I von Kraft Epi. + 20.2 - 26.3 X Toast Scheibletten 
Kraft Lai. + 6.9 - 37.6 
I XI Butterkeks von Bahlsen Far. + 19.6 - 18.7 
XII Karotten und 
Aprikosen 
von Gerber Enf. + 33.0 - 1.0 
XIII Bauernbrod 
von Wasa Far. + 12.5 - 19.0 
XIV Bauernknacke 
I 
von Batscheider Far. + 10.1 - 17.3 
XV Flocken Puree 
von Maggi Leg. + 25.0 - 0.6 
XVI Nescafe Gold BoL + 15.4 - 9.8 
XVII Edelweiss 
I Camembert LaL + 7.8 - 16.S I 
eA. absolute 
deviation 
in % 
111.8 
99.1 
66.7 
63.5 
55.8 
50.9 
48.6 
47.2 
46.5 
44.5 
38.3 
34.0 
31.5 
27.4 
25.6 
2S.2 
24.3 
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§ 5 - Summary and conclusions 
319. To sum up, the following conclusions can be drawn from the results so far 
obtained: 
The total number of national and international mergers, share acquisitions and 
joint ventures increased by more than 30% between 1974 and 1975. Purely 
national operations seem to be increasing at the expense of intern~tional oper-
ations. 
In 1975, the greatest number of national and international operations was recorded 
in Belgium, where the increase on 1974 was pronounced; the metallurgy industry 
was the most affected. 
The evolution of concentration in the various industries is generally characterized 
by a trend towards stability. This remark is particularly true of the industries 
where concentration is already high. However, distribution of food products and 
drinks (especially in the United Kingdom and France), and to a slightly lesser 
degree the electrical home-appliances industry, show a marked tendency te-wards 
an increasing degree of concentration. 
The analysis of concentration in a number of product markets reveals that on 
the supply side, the degree of oligopoly power, or even domination, is higher than 
over the industry as a whole. This is particularly true of the food industry. 
The Commission's first study on the relation between the size of a firm and its 
yield shows that the biggest firms are not necessarily the most profitable. Theoret-
ically, therefore, very large units are not necessary to increase economic efficiency. 
The first surveys of retail food prices and mark-ups show that identical products 
are sold at considerably different prices within the Member States. For about 
a third of the food products considered, the differences were greater than 40%. 
The surveys also show considerable divergence in the evolution of prices over a 
short period. Frequently, in the same town or region, the price of an article may 
increase considerably (e.g. by 50%) at one sales point, while it may be con-
siderably,reduced elsewhere (e.g. by 60%). 
The summary analysis of the initial result confirms the need to continue the 
systematic and permanent study of the formation of consumer prices, so as to 
acquire fuller knowledge of the workings of competition at the level of distribution, 
assessing in particular the effects of increased power of demand; it is also 
important to make the European consumer more aware of the price differences 
existing within the Community. 
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List of individual Decisions of the Commission and rulings of the Court of Justice made in 1976 
concerning the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty and of Articles 65 and 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty 
Final Decisions given by the Commission under the procedures of Article 93(2) of the EEC Treaty 
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DECISIONS ON INDIVIDUAL CASES 
1. Concerning Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty 
Decision of 9.6.1976 on a proceeding under Article 86 of 
the EEC Treaty 
'Vitamins' 
Decision of 25.6.1976 on a proceeding under Article 85 of 
the EEC Treaty 
'CSV' 
Decision of 26.7.1976 on a proceeding under Article 85 of 
the EEC Treaty 
'Pabst & Richarz (BNIA)' 
Decision of 26.7.1976 on a proceeding under Article 85 
of the EEC Treaty 
'Reuter/BASF' 
Decision of 1.12.1976 on a proceeding under Article 85 of 
the EEC Treaty 
'Miller International' 
Decision of 22.12.1976 on a proceeding under Article 8S 
of the EEC Treaty 
'Gerofabriek' 
Decision of 2.12.1976 on a proceeding under Article 85 
of the EEC Treaty 
'Junghans' 
Decision of 21.12.1976 on a proceeding under Article 85 
of the EEC Treaty 
'Theal/Watts' 
Decision of 20.1.1977 on a proceeding under Article 85 
of the EEC Treaty 
'Vacuum Interrupters' 
2. Concerning Articles 65 and 66 of tile ECSC Treaty 
OJ L 223 of 16.8.1976, p. 27 
IP (76) 127 of 10.6.1976 
Bull. EC 6-1970, point 2124 
OJ L 192 of 16.7.1976, p. 27 
IP (76) 141 of 2.7.1976 
Bull. EC 7/8-1976, point 2123 
OJ L 231 of 21.8.1976, p. 24 
IP (76) 165 of 28.7.1976 
Bull. EC 7/8-1976, point 2124 
OJ L 254 of 17.9.1976, p. 40 
IP (76) 162 of 28.7.1976 
Bull. EC 7/8-1976, point 2125 
OJ L 357 of 29.12.1976, p. 1 
.IP (76) 262 of 14.12.1976 
Bull. EC 12-1976, point 2124 
OJ L 16 of 19.1.1977, p. 8 
IP (76) 275 of 22.12.1976 
Bull. EC 12-1976, point 2126 
OJ L 30 of 2.2.1977, p. 10 
IP (76) 270 of 22.12.1976 
Bull. EC 12-1976, point 2123 
OJ L 39 of 10.2.1977, p. 19 
IP (76) 283 of 22.12.1976 
Bull. 12-1976, point 2125 
OJ L 48 of 19.2.1977, p. 2 
IP (77) 19 of 1.2.1977 
Bull. EC 1-1977, point 2.1.18 
Decision of28 January 1976 on a proceeding under Article Bull. EC 2-1976, point 2113 
66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the acquisition by 
Sicaworms SA of a majority shareholding in Deblaye SA 
and Soyez & Fils SA. 
Decision No 76/354jECSC of 13 February 1976 on a OJ L 95 of 9.4.1976, p. 21 
proceeding under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty extend- Bull. EC 2-1976, point 2112 
ing for six months Decision 71/314/ECSC of 27 July 1971 
authorizing specialization agreements covering the manu-
facture of rolled steel products and agreements for the 
setting up of an agency to allOcate orders for merchant 
steel bars and wire rod between Eisenwerk-Gesellschaft 
Maximilianshiitte mbH, KlOckner-Werke AG and Stahl-
werke Peine-Salzgitter AG . 
. COMP. REP. EC 1976 
                                                                191
192 ANNEX 
Decision No 76/355jECSC of 13 February 1976 on a 
proceeding under Article -65 of the ECSC Treaty extend-
ing for six months Decision 71/315jECSC of 27 July 1971 
authoriiing specialization agreements covering the manu-
facture of rolled steel products and the joint buying of 
iron ore between steel undertakings in south-western 
Germany 
Decision No 76/356jECSC of 18 February 1976 on a 
proceeding under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty extend-
ing the authorization of joint fuel sales for the Belgian 
mining companies associated within ,the Comptoir beIge 
des charbons, societe Cooperative (Cobechar). 
Decision of 23 February 1976 on a proceeding under 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing an exception 
from Article 2(1) of the Decision of31 Jilly 1969 authoriz-
ing the acquisition of shares in SA Metallurgique d'EspC-
rance-Longdoz by SA Cockerill-Ougree-Providence and 
in Societe de participations industrielles de Winterslag by 
Societe General de Belgique, Societe de Bruxelles pour la 
Finance et l'Industrie and Compagnie financiere et indus-
trielle. 
Decision of 27 February 1976 on a proceeding under 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the acquisition 
of a majority shareholding in Ets Albert Fonlupt Sari by 
Cie Francaise des Ferrailles SA. 
Decision of 1 March 1976 on a proceeding under Article 
66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the acquisition by 
Sicaworms SA of a majority shareholding in Etablisse-
ments Michon Freres. 
Decision No 76/325/ECSC of 12 March 1976 on a pro-
ceeding under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty extending 
the authorization of the joint selling of fuels from 
Houilleres du bassin de Lorraine and Saarbergwerke AG 
by SaarIor. 
Decision of 25 March 1976 on a proceeding under Article 
66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the acquisition by 
DEUMU GmbH of 50% of the capital of Schrott-Weiss 
GmbH & Co. KG and of Karl Weiss GmbH 
Decision No 76/368/ECSC of 30 March 1976 on a pro-
ceeding under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing 
the acquisition by the British Steel Corporation of 75% 
of the capital of Walter Blume GmbH. 
Decision of 14 April 1976 on a proceeding under Article 
66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing an exception in favour 
of Mr G. Rambaud from Article 2(1) of the Commission 
Decision of .25 July 1973 authorizing· SA Usinor to 
acquire 50% of the shares in SA Solmer, and approving 
a draft contract between Sollac, Usinor and Solmer. 
Decision No 76/602/ECSC of 20 May 1976 on a pro-
ceeding under Article 6S of the ECSC Treaty authorizing 
a j oint buying agreement in respect of finished rolled steel 
products between the steel distribution undertakings 
C. Walker & Sons Ltd, J. Champion SA and NV A. 
Lommaert. 
OJ L 95 of 9.4.1976, p. 23 
Bull. EC 2-1976, point 2112 
OJ L 95 of 9.4.1976, p. 25 
Bull. EC 2-1976, point 2114 
OJ L 78 of 25.3.1976, p. 18 
Bull. EC 3-1976"point 2112 
Bull. EC 3-1976, point 2110 
OJ L 94 of 9.4.1976, p. 44 
Bull. EC 3-1976, point 2111 
OJ L 198 of 23.7.1976, p. 6 
Bull. Ee 5-1976, point 2113 
COMP.,REP. ECI976 
ANNEX 193 
Decision of 20 July 1976 on a proceeding under Article 66 Bull. EC 7/8-1976, point 2127 
of the ECSC Treaty authorizing British Steel Corporation 
to acquire a 33.3% shareholding in Six Hundred Metal 
Holdings Ltd. 
Decision of 22 July 1976 on a proceeding under Article 66 
of the ECSC Treaty authorizing two eAceptions from 
Article 2(1) of the Commission's Decision No 75/298/ 
ECSC of 2 April 1975 authorizing Fried. Krupp Hutten-
werke AG to acquire the majority of the share capital in 
Stahlwerke Sudwestfalen AG. 
Decision of 26 July 1976 on a proceeding under Article 66 
of the ECSC Treaty on the acquisition of the assets and 
goodwill of Countrywide Fuels Ltd., wholesale coal trader 
of Manchester, by National Fuel DistributorS Ltd and 
British Fuel Company, London. 
Decision of 26 July 1976 on a proceeding under Article 66 
of the ECSC Treaty on the acquisition of Coal Concentra-
tion Depot, wholesale coal trader of Fratton, Portsmouth, 
by Southern Depot Co. Ltd, London. 
Decision No 76/775/ECSC of 28 July 1976 on a proceed- OJ L 270 of 2.10.1976, p. 31 
ing under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty, extending for six 
months Decision 71/314/ECSC of 27 July 1971, authoriz-
ing specialization agreements covering the manufacture 
of rolled steel products and agreements for the setting up 
of an agency to allocate orders for merchant steel bars and 
wire rod between Eisenwerk-Gesellschaft Maximilians-
hutte mbH, KlOckner-Werke AG and Stahlwerke Peine-
Salzgitter AG. 
Decision No 76/776/ECSC of 28 July 1976 on a proceed- OJ L 270 of 2.10.1976, p. 33 
ing under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty extending for six 
months Decision 71j315/ECSC of 27 July 1971 authoriz-
ing specialization agreements covering the manufacture 
of rolled steel products and the joint buying of iron ore 
between steel undertakings in south-western Germany 
Decision of 29 July 1976 on a proceeding under Article 66 Bull. EC 7/8-1976, point 2126 
of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the acquisition by Guest, 
Keen & Nettlefolds Ltd of a majority shareholding in 
SachsAG. 
Decision of 29 July 1976 on a proceeding under Article 66 
of the ECSC Treaty on the formation by coal distributors 
of IKO-Kohlenaufbereitung GmbH & Co. KG. 
Decision of 20 October 1976 on a proceeding under Bull. EC 10-1976, point 2113 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing the acquisition 
of 66.5% of the capital of Ressorts du Nord by Marine-
Wendel. 
Decision of 26 October 1976 on a proceeding under Bull. EC 10-1976, point 2114 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing Denain Nord-
Est Longwy'SA to acquire 85.1% shareholding in Ferem-
balSA. 
Decision of 12 November 1976 on a proceeding under Bull. EC 11-1976, point 2121 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty approving the joint con-
struction and operation of an iron ore direct reduction 
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plant ('North Sea Iron Company Ltd') by Sheerness Steel 
Company Ltd, Consolidated Gold Fields Ltd, Tube 
Investments Ltd and Manchester Steel Ltd. 
Decision of 7 December 1976 on a proceeding under 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing Sicaworms SA 
to acquire as a going concern the scrap preparation and 
dealing business of Sometam. 
Decision of 7 December 1976 on a proceeding under 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authorizing Sicaworms SA 
to acquire a majority shareholding in a scrap dealing 
undertaking to be formed jointly with Rolanfer SA. 
Decision No 77/153/ECSC of 20 December 1976 on a 
proceeding under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty authoriz-
ing the specialization and cooperation agreements 
between the following steel-producing undertakings: 
Eisen- und Stahlwalzwerke Rotzel GmbH, Eisenwerk-
Gesellschaft Maximilianshiitte mbH, Fried. Krupp 
Hiittenwerke AG, Klockner-Werke AG, Stahlwerke 
Peine-Salzgitter AG, Stahlwerke Siidwestfalen AG and 
Theodor Wuppermann GmbH. 
Decision No 77/154/ECSC of 20 December 1976 on a 
proceeding under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty relating 
to specialization agreements concerning the production 
of finished and final rolled products and to the joint buying 
of iron ore, involving steel-producing undertakings in 
south-west Germany and the Grand Duchy of Luxem-
bourg. 
IQo, 
Decision No 77/135/ECSC of 22 December 1976 on a 
proceeding under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty authoriz-
ing the acquisition by Klockner-Werke AG of a majority 
holding in Eisenwerk-Gesellschaft Maximilianshiitte 
mbH. 
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FINAL DECISIONS GIVEN BY THE COMMISSION 
UNDER THE PROCEDURES OF ARTICLE 93(2) OF THE EEC TREATY 
Italy 
Decision of 8 March 1961 on a modification of the system OJ 25 of 8.4.1961, p. 582 
of aid applied in Italy in respect of shipbuilding 
Belgium 
Decision 64/651/EEC of 28 October 1964 on the abolition OJ 195 of 28.11.1964, p. 3257 
by Belgium of the aid granted to Ford Tractor (Belgium) 
Ltd, Antwerp 
France 
Decision 66/556/EEC of 23 September 1966 on the aid OJ 182 of 12.10.1966, p. 3141 
instituted by France for the purchase of aircraft 
France 
Decision 69/266/EEC of 18 July 1969 on the French 
system of aid for the textile industry 
Italy 
Decision 70/304/EEC of 27 May 1970 on the Italian draft 
law providing for the restructuring, reorganization and 
conversion of the textile industry 
Germany 
Decision 71j121jEEC of 11 February 1971 concerning the 
law relating to adjustment and reorganization in the 
German colliery and mining areas 
Germany 
Decision 71j295/EEC of 23 July 1971 on tax exemptions 
under the German Law of 28 December 1970, relating to 
the imposition of a tax on the carriage of goods by road 
Belgium 
Decision 72/34/EEC of 15 December 1971 on the abolition 
of Belgian aid to undertakings in difficulty . 
Belgium 
Decision 72/173/EEC of 26 April 1972 concerning aid 
granted pursuant to the Belgian Law of 30 December 
1970 on economic expansion 
Italy 
Decision 72/261/EEC of 28 June 1972 concerning aids 
granted by Italy under Law No 471 of 14 July 1969 for 
imports of scientific instruments and advanced tecanolog-
ical equipment 
France 
Decision 72/436/EEC of 6 December 1972 on the French 
system of aid for the production of paper pulp, for paper 
making and forestry research, and for afforestation 
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